Hacker groups linked to Russian intelligence services are constantly improving methods of penetrating the information systems of institutions, defense enterprises, and international organizations of NATO and EU countries, including those involved in supporting Ukraine. Their operations include multi-stage intrusion, searching for vulnerabilities in protection systems, intercepting email correspondence, maintaining long-term access to compromised networks, and concealing traces of their presence. New methods of such attacks are described in a study by the cybersecurity company ESET dated November 10, 2026; additional details are provided in materials from Symantec and Microsoft Threat Intelligence dated October 20 and September 29, respectively.
According to ESET, the Turla (Snake) group, linked to Russia’s FSB, used a previously unknown set of espionage tools called Cereal for the covert collection of email correspondence from government institutions. ESET researchers chose the name because of its similarity to the data serialization technology used by the toolkit’s components. The first traces of its use were discovered on the mail server of one of Kazakhstan’s government organizations on November 28, 2025, and on December 23 the compromise of the mail server of an unnamed Romanian state institution was established. In the latter case, the malware was configured to select messages exchanged by the Romanian institution with NATO and EU structures.
The main feature of Cereal is its ability to intercept correspondence as it passes through Microsoft Exchange Server. The CerealBox component embeds itself into the standard EdgeTransport.exe mail processing process, covertly checking the sender, recipient, message subject, and the presence of Word and PDF documents. Selected emails are copied, encrypted, and stored for later transmission to the attackers, while the originals are delivered to the recipients.
Another feature of the attacks was the use of the infected system as a command-and-control center for the malware instead of traditional external infrastructure. The CerealNeuron component receives encrypted commands via web requests disguised as ordinary Exchange traffic; other modules allow exploration of the internal network, obtaining credentials, and executing commands directly from RAM, which complicates detection of the intrusion and enables long-term control of the compromised system.
A Microsoft Threat Intelligence study dated September 29 describes a change in the tactics of the Star Blizzard group, which the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) links to Center 18 of Russia’s FSB. Since January 2026, Microsoft has recorded at least 13 large-scale phishing campaigns against Ukrainian institutions, Western think tanks, government structures, and non-governmental organizations. In total, more than 100 organizations became targets of the attacks, mainly in the United States and the United Kingdom, including structures that provide Ukraine with political or financial support.
A characteristic feature of Star Blizzard is the thorough study of potential victims through whom access to organizations’ information systems or confidential information can be obtained. Hackers study their social media profiles, publications, and professional contacts, then establish contact while posing as politicians, diplomats, or experts. Gradually gaining trust during correspondence, the attackers encourage the recipient to open an infected document or follow a malicious link. In 2026, this tactic was supplemented by large-scale phishing mailings, including fake invitations to expert discussions supposedly from the British organizations International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Chatham House, and the American Atlantic Council. To make the emails look credible, they also used mailboxes on compromised sites and imitated corporate correspondence.
A notable phishing campaign, uncovered on June 23, 2026, by Ukraine’s Laboratory of Digital Security, targeted civil society organizations, journalists, economists, and officials involved in Euro-Atlantic integration, confiscation of Russian assets, accountability for Russian war crimes, and Ukraine’s reconstruction. The attackers posed as Polish politician Paweł Kowal, sending fake invitations in his name to a conference on Ukraine’s reconstruction in Gdańsk. Importantly, the first email contained no attachments; only after the recipient replied did the attackers send a password-protected archive with a malicious file disguised as a PDF document, designed to obtain covert remote access to the computer.
One of Star Blizzard’s innovations was the RedFlick technique — a method developed by the hackers for the covert installation of the CosmicPulse spyware, which provides remote access to the infected computer and the execution of attackers’ commands. Unlike previous methods, RedFlick requires only one user action instead of several. In particular, in July 2026, the hackers sent password-protected archives with a Windows shortcut disguised as a PDF document; after opening it, the computer automatically downloaded a real PDF with hidden commands for installing the malware. In other campaigns, the attackers created automatic Windows tasks, disguising them as internet connection checks, network settings, or computer monitoring. One of them transmitted the username and device data to the hackers; others ensured the installation of CosmicPulse, disguising its loader as a system component of the Windows Control Panel. Thus, opening a document that looked ordinary launched a multi-stage infection without further user involvement.
On October 20, Symantec published the results of an investigation into the activities of the Swallowtail group (APT28, Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard), which U.S. authorities link to Russian military intelligence. Its targets included a military shipbuilding enterprise, a manufacturer of engines for combat aircraft, and a law enforcement agency in two unnamed European NATO countries. Researchers documented in the greatest detail the attack on a military shipbuilding company, whose employee opened an infected Word document received by email, allowing the hackers to install the Hookedge spyware and gain covert access to the computer. To mask the intrusion, the attackers used the ordinary Microsoft Edge browser and a legitimate internet service through which they covertly transmitted commands and received information from the infected system. Over the following week, the hackers repeatedly connected to the infected computer, stole user credentials, and created a hidden access channel to the enterprise’s internal network; traces of their activity were still recorded on September 24 — two months after the initial infection.
The activities of hacker groups linked to Russian intelligence services are part of the Russian Federation’s hybrid war against the West, aimed at weakening NATO’s defense potential, compromising Alliance member states, and undermining their unity. Viewing the Alliance as a strategic adversary, the Kremlin uses cyber espionage to obtain classified information about military developments, defense cooperation, and support for Ukraine, while also testing the level of protection of critically important information systems. The documented attacks show that Russian hackers are constantly improving methods of intrusion, searching for new vulnerabilities and ways of covertly gaining access to state and military secrets. Therefore, countering such threats requires NATO countries not only to strengthen technical protection but also to improve means of detecting cyber threats, share intelligence data, and coordinate the work of national cybersecurity services.




