Greenland, which until recently was perceived as a remote Arctic territory with limited influence on world politics, has now become one of the key hubs of global geopolitical tension. The United States’ heightened interest in the island has revealed not only the struggle for resources and security in the Arctic, but also deep divisions within the transatlantic alliance, calling into question the stability of relations between the US and Europe.
It is worth noting that Washington’s interest in Greenland has a long history. As early as the 19th century, after the purchase of Alaska, American political circles discussed the idea of expanding US influence in the North Atlantic. In 1946, President Harry Truman officially offered Denmark $100 million for Greenland. Copenhagen’s refusal was unequivocal, but the very fact of the offer confirmed the strategic perception of the island as an element of North American defence. During the Cold War, the US established a military presence in Greenland, creating a base in Thule (now Pitutik), which became an important element of the early warning and missile defence system. Formally, Denmark’s sovereignty was not questioned, but in fact, the island was already considered by Washington to be a critically important military base.
The situation changed significantly in the 21st century, when the Arctic ceased to be a ‘frozen periphery.’ Climate change accelerated the melting of ice, opening up prospects for new sea routes and access to natural resources, and Greenland found itself at the centre of these processes. According to geologists’ estimates, the island and the adjacent shelf contain significant reserves of oil, gas and rare earth elements, which are vital for high-tech and defence industries. At the same time, rivalry between the great powers in the Arctic has intensified. Russia is actively building up its military infrastructure in the North, while China has declared itself a ‘near-Arctic state’ and is investing in Arctic projects. In this context, Greenland has become not just an allied territory for the United States, but a potential weak link in its security system.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has sharply brought these processes to the fore. In 2025-2026, statements about the need to ‘acquire’ Greenland were once again heard from Washington. The official argument was based on security. Trump, his aides, and some members of Congress repeatedly stated that the US needed to control Greenland to ensure security from ‘Russian and Chinese expansion.’ They argue that Europe is ‘weaker’ and therefore Washington must take the initiative to protect the Arctic. There have also been more candid statements about US strategic interests in containing Russia and China.
Along with this, economic incentives were also discussed. Information appeared in the American media about possible payments to Greenland residents (from $10,000 to $100,000 per person) if they agreed to change the status of the island. Such ideas looked like an attempt to circumvent not only international law, but also the political will of Denmark itself.
Copenhagen’s response was harsh and unequivocal. The Danish authorities reiterated that Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark and cannot be bought or sold. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called the very idea absurd and dangerous. Denmark also mobilised its own forces and sent in the military to strengthen control over the island, partly signalling its readiness to defend the territory. For Copenhagen, it was not only a matter of territory, but also of principle, since yielding to pressure from an ally would undermine the entire system of international relations.
The position of the Greenlanders themselves proved to be no less revealing. Despite their economic dependence on Danish subsidies and growing discussions about independence, the majority of the island’s population is opposed to joining the United States. Local politicians emphasise that Greenland’s future should be decided exclusively by its inhabitants, not by external powers. For many Greenlanders, the American statements served as a reminder of the colonial logic of the past, where the interests of the local population took a back seat to the strategic calculations of large states.
The European reaction turned the situation around Greenland into a full-blown transatlantic crisis. The EU countries, as well as the UK and Norway, came out in support of Denmark, emphasising the inviolability of borders and the inadmissibility of pressure on allies. The support was not only political but also practical. In late 2025 and early 2026, Denmark not only strengthened its military presence on the island, but also requested coordination with its European partners. Within the framework of bilateral and NATO mechanisms, limited contingents and military specialists from the United Kingdom and Norway were sent to Greenland to participate in exercises, reconnaissance and logistical support, as well as to demonstrate collective support for Denmark’s sovereignty. France and Germany, without deploying permanent forces, sent military observers and increased their participation in Arctic manoeuvres, emphasising Europe’s readiness for joint defence in the region.
Brussels was particularly sensitive to US threats to impose trade tariffs on European countries that supported Copenhagen. In response, the European Commission began working on a package of countermeasures, including mirror tariffs on American goods, restrictions on public procurement, and possible measures against specific sectors of the US economy. Discussions of these steps were accompanied by statements that the EU cannot allow trade to be used as a tool for political pressure within the allied bloc. Washington’s actions were seen as blackmail and a direct blow to the foundations of the alliance. For the first time in a long time, there was serious talk in Europe that US policy could pose a threat not only to the West’s external enemies, but also to the very architecture of the transatlantic world, based on trust, mutual commitments and respect for sovereignty. The European Commissioner for Defence also warned that the military seizure of an ally’s territory would lead to the collapse of NATO, stressing the critical importance of preserving the alliance and collective security.
The crisis did not go unnoticed at the global level either. China called on the United States to comply with international law and not destabilise the Arctic, seeing the events as confirmation of American policy of coercive pressure. Russia, although it avoided making any sharp official statements, gained an additional argument in favour of its thesis about the hypocrisy of the West and its double standards. Thus, the conflict over Greenland has become a factor influencing the global balance of power.
The possible scenarios for further developments remain uncertain. The most constructive path would be a diplomatic settlement, whereby the US would maintain its military presence and influence in the Arctic without attempting to change sovereignty, and Europe would strengthen its own role in ensuring regional security. This option would avoid the destruction of NATO and preserve the strategic partnership. However, there is also a risk of escalation through continued economic pressure and harsh rhetoric, which could lead to a prolonged crisis of confidence between the US and the EU, weakening the West as a whole. Finally, we cannot rule out a scenario of ‘soft control,’ in which Washington would expand its influence in Greenland through investment, infrastructure projects, and political pressure, without resorting to formal annexation.
The events unfolding around Greenland are yet another symptom of processes that point to a rethinking of the rules of the global political game, the struggle for resources and security, and a crisis of trust between allies. The outcome of the ‘Greenland issue’ will largely determine whether the transatlantic alliance will remain a unified political space or enter an era of internal rivalry, the consequences of which will be felt throughout the world.