The Republic of Serbia has held the status of an EU candidate country since 2012 and has been in membership negotiations since 2014, but the process remains far from completion. Meanwhile, authoritarian powers such as China and Russia are by no means “sitting idly by.” Both autocracies, each in their own way, are seeking to strengthen their influence in the Western Balkans and particularly in Serbia.
Beijing has successfully drawn Belgrade into active cooperation under its global Belt and Road Initiative. For China, Serbian territory is a crucial gateway to ensure reliable access for Chinese goods to European markets. Over the past 15 years, China has financed projects in Serbia worth more than $10 billion. The influx of Chinese capital and the participation of Chinese engineering and construction firms in building local infrastructure have created a reality in which economic growth has gone hand in hand with the strengthening of authoritarian practices by the ruling elite.
From highways and bridges to power plants and railways, Beijing-funded projects have reshaped Serbia’s physical landscape. For many Serbs, this visible development has fostered a positive view of China, which is perceived as a partner ready to support Serbia’s economic progress without demanding much in return.
At the same time, while Chinese investments have fueled growth, they have also entrenched a system with little transparency or accountability. The Serbian public has virtually no knowledge of the undisclosed conditions in Belgrade’s deals with Beijing. Most agreements are hidden in annexes to international treaties, making them nearly impossible to scrutinize by independent politicians and activists.
Since the Serbian parliament functions more as a rubber stamp for government-drafted legislation than as a check on executive power, Belgrade’s contracts with China are typically ratified without public debate or oversight. This lack of transparency, combined with “material incentives” offered to Serbian politicians by Beijing, has enabled the ruling Serbian Progressive Party to consolidate its grip on power.
A striking example is the notorious reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station, also funded by China. On November 1, 2024, the newly renovated station’s canopy collapsed, killing 16 people. Investigations revealed that the collapsed structure had not been included in the capital repairs, even though the station itself had been refurbished. Charges were filed against 13 individuals, including a former transport minister. These events triggered mass protests across the country, with demonstrators linking Serbia’s poor governance to widespread corruption, media censorship, and the gradual erosion of democratic standards.
Against this backdrop, Serbian protesters were dismayed by the muted response from Brussels and Washington, which refrained from strongly condemning Belgrade for the harsh and violent police crackdown on demonstrators. Needless to say, neither Beijing nor Moscow had any intention of criticizing Serbia’s leadership for its attempts to suppress the mass protests, which continue to this day.
It is telling that police violence and arrests are no longer the only tools at the government’s disposal. A leak of classified documents showed that the Serbian government has been secretly deploying advanced Chinese surveillance systems from Huawei across the country. These systems are being used to suppress dissent, obstruct the work of activists, and undermine the resilience of the pro-European youth movement.
Serbian youth continue to hope that despite the influx of Chinese investment and Belgrade’s close ties with Moscow (ranging from energy to culture and the Church), Serbia’s path toward the European Union will ultimately bring real change within the country, since it requires compliance with concrete rules, standards, and regulations.
Some Serbian analysts argue that the country may never join the EU, having fallen into a debt trap with China. Others counter that Belgrade’s debt to Beijing is not catastrophic, and note that Serbia also owes money to several Western states and international financial institutions, primarily the IMF. In their view, the bigger obstacles to EU membership are the lack of transparency in governance and the government’s increasing embrace of authoritarian practices.
In this context, it is important to note that the EU does possess leverage over Serbia. The EU accounts for 60% of Serbia’s foreign trade, and in 2023, half of all foreign direct investment came from EU member states. Moreover, as a candidate country, Serbia receives both loans and non-repayable grants from the EU worth tens of billions of euros.
As for Russia, it wields significant influence over Serbia’s energy sector. Gazprom supplies around two-thirds of the natural gas consumed in Serbia (roughly 2 billion cubic meters annually). Serbia is also negotiating with Russia on building new underground gas storage facilities in cooperation with Gazprom and Srbijagas. At the same time, Belgrade is seeking to reduce Russia’s stake in its national energy company, NIS.
A recent and somewhat unexpected move came from Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who announced a supposed strategic turn toward Europe, particularly through a lithium extraction project (a critical resource for electric vehicle batteries). Belgrade rejected cooperation with China and Russia on this project, choosing instead to partner with the EU and Germany. Still, Serbia continues to balance between China, Russia, the EU, and the US, making it unclear whether Belgrade has truly committed to a decisive geopolitical shift toward EU membership.
For now, Serbian youth remain distrustful of Vučić’s gestures and continue their protests against the ruling authorities. At the same time, local analysts warn that if young people also become disillusioned with the EU, it will be all too easy for Russia and China to cement their foothold in Serbia and further expand their influence across the Western Balkans.