Russia and China are demonstrating intensified cooperation in the Arctic, particularly in the security sphere. Moscow anticipates that global warming will melt Arctic ice, opening new opportunities for use of the Northern Sea Route (along Russia’s northern borders). Beijing likewise expects that climate change will make the Arctic more accessible, automatically leading to increased human presence in the region.
The cooperation began in April 2023, when Russia’s Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and China’s Coast Guard signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation between the two countries’ maritime law enforcement agencies. The document focused on combating illegal migration, smuggling, illicit fishing, maritime terrorism, and—crucially—joint Arctic operations. In September 2024, Russia and China organized their first joint patrol and coast guard exercises in the Russian Arctic. On this basis, plans are expected for future military cooperation between Russia’s Pacific Fleet and China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy.
Russia and China have also conducted joint naval exercises, such as “Joint Sea” in the northern East China Sea and “Northern Interaction” in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. Forecasts suggest that in the near future, they will hold joint drills in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. Such maneuvers would signal to world powers that China can rapidly deploy and sustain its naval forces in the Arctic if needed.
Western experts acknowledge that Russia outpaces the United States and its NATO allies in icebreaking capabilities. For decades—since Soviet times—Moscow has sought to develop a commercial shipping route along its Arctic coast. Until recently, Russia was thought to possess 46 icebreakers, including 18 polar-class vessels and two nuclear-powered ones, unique in the world. However, after sweeping sanctions were imposed on Russia in 2022 in response to its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow lost access to crucial Western technologies. It can no longer cooperate with Scandinavian countries or Canada in building new icebreakers, or even in servicing and modernizing existing ones. Neither China, nor India, nor the Gulf petro-monarchies can fill this gap. At most, they can procure counterfeit parts on the global market and resell them to Russia at inflated prices. Consequently, the actual number of Russia’s operational icebreakers remains unknown.
The Northern Sea Route holds particular interest for China as the shortest shipping path to Europe. With this in mind, Beijing has in recent years launched an ambitious program to build its own icebreaker fleet. Today, China pursues two main strategies in the Arctic: substantial investment in critical and other infrastructure, and scientific research, including geological surveys, seabed mapping, and intelligence gathering.
In November 2024, the United States, Canada, and Finland responded to Russia and China’s growing Arctic presence by signing the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact). The three nations agreed to share research, expertise, and capabilities in icebreaker construction. Commenting on the pact, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Linda Fagan noted that while no Chinese research vessels had previously operated in the Arctic, by 2022 one appeared, in 2023 there were five, and in 2024 Russian and Chinese surface groups began operating together just 60 miles off Alaska’s coast. As she stressed, if such maneuvers had taken place near the U.S. East or West Coast, Washington would have reacted strongly. Fagan concluded that the U.S., Canada, and Finland must ensure year-round Arctic presence to safeguard sovereignty—requiring heavy icebreakers now and even more in the foreseeable future.
Another key fact: Russia operates 17 deepwater ports along the Arctic Ocean coast, while Canada—with a comparably long northern coastline—has none. Moreover, under Putin’s rule, Russia not only restored all Soviet-era Arctic military bases, many of them abandoned, but also began building entirely new ones.
Against this backdrop, Western analysts predict that Russia and China may soon sign an agreement on joint missile defense in the Sea of Okhotsk and Japan’s Northern Territories (the Russian-held Kuril Islands) as part of a shared ballistic missile early warning system.
Since 2019, joint air patrols and flights by Russian and Chinese strategic bombers have been recorded over the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, near Japan and South Korea’s air defense identification zones. These patrols have regularly violated Japanese and South Korean airspace. In 2024, joint patrols also began near Alaska, close to the U.S. air defense identification zone, though without breaching U.S. airspace.
Russia and China also share an interest in disrupting critical undersea infrastructure belonging to Western states—particularly data and energy cables in northern waters, often in the Baltic Sea. In December 2024, the Russian oil tanker Eagle S was accused of damaging several marine facilities, including the Estlink 2 power line between Finland and Estonia. The following month, a Chinese tanker was accused of sabotaging submarine data cables in the Baltic.
Overall, most Russian and Chinese civilian vessels—fishing trawlers, supply ships, container carriers, and research platforms—sailing through Baltic and Arctic waters should be considered capable of dual-use operations: on the surface, underwater, and on the seabed.