The idea of forming a new geopolitical format, tentatively called Core 5, at first glance appears to be a pragmatic response by the US to the changing world order. This bloc is expected to consist of five key powers: the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan. However, upon closer examination, this approach carries systemic risks for Europe and could become a turning point in the weakening of the transatlantic architecture that has been in place since World War II. The discussion was prompted by the new US National Security Strategy (NSS), as well as leaks and comments by American politicians and analysts published in leading Western media outlets. These increasingly emphasize the need for “flexible diplomacy among major powers” and reduced dependence on traditional multilateral institutions such as the G7 or even NATO. A number of publications in Politico and the Financial Times emphasize that, according to this logic, Europe is seen more as a regional partner than as an equal strategic center.
The main threat to Europe lies not in the very existence of dialogue between major powers, but in the fact that the Core 5 format institutionally excludes the European Union from the circle of key decision-making. The EU is not represented either directly or through a single state comparable in weight to the bloc’s participants. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom find themselves outside the “circle,” despite their economic and political significance. Analysts from the European Parliamentary Service point out that the US transition to the Core 5 format means the de facto devaluation of European influence in matters of global security, sanctions policy, arms control, and technological standards. Thus, Europe risks finding itself in the position of being the subject of agreements rather than their co-author.
The possible inclusion of Russia in the Core 5 on equal terms is particularly dangerous for the EU. A number of American experts quoted by Reuters and the Atlantic Council openly admit the possibility of a “grand bargain” with Moscow in exchange for stabilizing global security or containing China. In this case, the issue of Ukraine could be resolved through a compromise between the US and Russia without the full participation of European states, which bear the brunt of the war’s consequences: economic, migratory, and military.
For Eastern and Central European countries, such a scenario does not mean abstract geopolitical shifts, but a direct increase in existential threats. The weakening or gradual erosion of anti-Russian sanctions would undermine one of the few instruments of deterrence against Moscow, while reducing military support for Kyiv would send a dangerous signal that forceful border revisions are acceptable. The erosion of the principle of indivisible security, a key foundation of the post-war European architecture, effectively returns the region to the logic of the 19th and 20th centuries, where the security of some states could be ensured at the expense of others. Experts emphasize that this approach sets a dangerous precedent for recognizing spheres of influence in Europe, whereby the fate of states in the “border zone” is once again determined by agreements between great powers rather than by international law and collective obligations.
At the same time, the formation of Core 5 is exacerbating the crisis of confidence within NATO. Even without the US formally leaving the alliance, the shift in strategic focus is undermining the reliability of American guarantees. European capitals are already responding with increased military spending, but as noted by the British analytical center on defense issues (RUSI), rapid compensation for the American military presence in Europe is practically impossible in the medium term. This creates asymmetry, as Europe is being asked to take on greater responsibility, but at the same time is being deprived of any real influence on strategic decisions.
Another dimension of the threat is economics. Closed-door talks between the US and China, India, and Japan could lead to the agreement of trade rules, supply chains, and technological standards without taking EU interests into account. The US is already actively using tariffs and subsidies as a means of exerting pressure. With the Core 5 in full swing, Europe risks having to accept someone else’s rules of the game in order to maintain access to markets and technologies.
Finally, the strategic shift by the US may exacerbate internal divisions in Europe and trigger political fragmentation within the EU. Supporting bilateral relations with individual EU countries, bypassing Brussels, undermines the unity of the Union. Political analysts note that such tactics strengthen the positions of Eurosceptic and populist forces, reducing the EU’s ability to develop a common foreign and defense policy.
The formation of the Core 5 bloc and the shift in the US strategic vector from Europe to direct deals with China, Russia, India, and Japan pose a structural risk to the EU. This involves a gradual loss of political weight, a weakening of European security, and the transformation of Europe from a global political player into an arena for compromise between other players. The key challenge for European leaders is not only to increase autonomy, but also to prevent a scenario in which the future of the continent is decided without its participation.