The UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) conducted a large-scale operation called “Destabilisation”, which exposed money laundering schemes and transnational infrastructures linking street crime in the UK to global cryptocurrency networks working for Russian interests. How can organized crime become a link between sanctioned Russian elites and British street crime?
At the center of the scheme are two companies, Smart and TGR. They operate globally, acting as “financial hubs” for Russian clients, criminal groups, and espionage organizations. Smart is headed by Ekaterina Zhdanova, a Russian woman with extensive international connections, including among cybercriminals. TGR is run by George Rossi, whom authorities link to Altair Holding SA, a company that controls Keremet Bank in Kyrgyzstan. According to the NCA, these groups have linked cash from “street” earnings obtained from drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and illegal migration to cryptocurrency by organizing “cash to crypto” conversions through couriers.
The model exposed by the NCA is a complex chain. Street criminals (drug dealers, arms dealers) accumulate large amounts of cash. Couriers associated with TGR and Smart then collect this money in dozens of cities across the UK. The NCA’s investigation found that at least 28 cities in Britain were involved in the scheme. The collected cash is exchanged for cryptocurrency (e.g., stablecoins), which the criminals transfer via crypto addresses linked to TGR and Smart. Some of the crypto assets were returned or transferred to new transactions, which were then used for transfers, in particular to support sanctioned clients from Russia.
This scheme proved to be beneficial for all parties. For street criminals, it became a good channel for legalizing money; for cybercriminals, the opacity of cryptocurrency transactions made it possible to transfer huge amounts of money; and for the Russian elite, it was an effective way to circumvent sanctions.
One of the most sensational parts of the scheme was the acquisition of Keremet Bank in Kyrgyzstan. According to the NCA investigation, Altair Holding SA, a company linked to Russia and TGR, bought 75% of the bank’s shares. According to investigators, this controlling stake was used to organize cross-border payments, including transfers linked to Russian government agencies. Keremet Bank served Promsvyazbank (PSB), a state institution linked to the Russian military-industrial complex. Thus, Keremet Bank became an important component of the “sanctions evasion” scheme, allowing funds to be transferred to companies linked to the Russian defense, aerospace, and technology sectors.
The political and criminal nature of the exposed scheme goes far beyond ordinary economic crime. It demonstrates a dangerous intertwining of organized crime and state policy, in which criminal mechanisms become instruments of geopolitical influence. The key element here is the hybrid threat. Money “laundered” through criminal chains is used not only for the personal enrichment of those involved, but also to support Russia in circumventing sanctions and in the interests of its military operations. Thus, criminal networks involved in the formation of financial flows are becoming another element of Russia’s hybrid warfare and part of the international confrontation.
Equally significant is the fact that this scheme reveals serious flaws in international regulatory architecture. The fact that Altair Holding SA acquired a controlling stake in a major bank in the Kyrgyz Republic in December 2024 demonstrates the vulnerability of the global financial system, as state financial institutions can be drawn into servicing transactions aimed at circumventing sanctions and supporting a state under international pressure. This points to the need to review the mechanisms for controlling cross-border transactions and corporate structures in the financial sector.
The consequences are also evident in the area of security. Through cryptocurrency exchange mechanisms and transnational financial networks, proceedings from criminal activities can directly contribute to the financing of the defense sector, high-tech industries, and other state interests. Here, the criminal economy becomes a factor that can shift the balance of power, turning the problem into a matter of international security and sovereignty.
The involvement of organized crime adds to the severity of the situation. Money obtained from drug trafficking, arms dealing, and illegal activities is integrated into a global scheme that serves the interests of political elites and, ultimately, Russia. This interconnection shows how crime can become part of a larger geopolitical game, influencing international conflicts and the redistribution of power in the modern world.
As a result of the operation, the NCA arrested 128 people and seized more than £25 million in cash and cryptocurrency in the UK. Earlier, in December 2024, 84 people were arrested and more than £20 million in cash and cryptocurrency was reportedly seized. The US, through OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control), imposed sanctions on key figures in the Smart and TGR networks, including Zhdanova and Rossi. Sanctions were also imposed in the UK, including on Altair Holding SA, the company that bought a controlling stake in Keremet Bank. The cross-border transfer system through Keremet Bank has also had diplomatic consequences. Media reports say that Kyrgyzstan has come under pressure following US sanctions related to the bank’s role in “circumventing sanctions” imposed by Russia. According to some media reports, the president of Kyrgyzstan called the sanctions interference in the country’s internal affairs. This increases the risk for Kyrgyzstan, a country whose banking system is now at the epicenter of a global geopolitical conflict.
One of the most significant conclusions drawn from Operation Destabilization was that the boundaries between international financial crimes are blurred, and that corruption, organized crime, and state interests can merge into a dangerous mixture, which Russia has ingeniously exploited in its efforts to counteract the sanctions regime.