Two key initiatives support this claim: the groundbreaking agreement between France and the United Kingdom to coordinate nuclear deterrence, and the establishment of a multinational operations headquarters for a 32-country coalition in support of Ukraine. These steps mark a fundamental shift toward strategic autonomy for Europe, as the continent increasingly stops relying on American leadership and begins to create its own defense and security mechanisms.
A number of significant events have recently taken place in Europe. Two of them clearly indicate that Europe is moving forward and beginning to build alternative security structures independent of the U.S.
First, France and the United Kingdom have agreed to begin coordinating their responses to nuclear threats. This is a tectonic shift in France’s nuclear policy, which has traditionally been strictly sovereign and national to the extent that France has previously refused to participate in any multilateral nuclear deterrence coordination mechanisms. France, for example, does not participate in NATO’s nuclear-sharing agreements and is the only NATO member that has declined membership in the Nuclear Planning Group.
Now, France has agreed to create a nuclear oversight group co-chaired by the Élysée Palace and the British government, tasked with “coordinating growing cooperation in policy, capabilities, and operations.” This is a revolutionary development—so much so that, as some quipped, “hell might just freeze over.”
The planned coordination is based on the assessment that “there is no conceivable emergency threat to Europe that would not trigger a response from both countries… Any adversary threatening the vital interests of the UK or France can thus be deterred by the combined force of both nations’ nuclear capabilities,” according to the UK government. The agreement implies that, for the first time, the two countries’ deterrent forces, though independent, may now be coordinated. The nuclear oversight group is not expected to remain a mere discussion forum: potential cooperation includes retrofitting nuclear submarines to ensure that the maximum number of nuclear platforms are at sea at any given time.
According to British sources, France and the UK are also working together on several projects: next-generation long-range missiles and air-to-air missiles, high-tech microwave weapons, jammers for drones and missile defense, and the use of artificial intelligence to improve coordinated strike capabilities.
France and the UK each possess only about 300 nuclear warheads, which limits their ability to replace the American extended deterrence that has existed in Europe under nuclear-sharing arrangements. Therefore, the goal is not to replicate U.S. power but to maximize what Europe already has and raise the threshold for potential adversaries (like Russia) who might consider reckless moves. In that sense, Europe is in a stronger position than U.S. allies in Asia, whom Washington has so far dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons. But this may soon change, as South Korea and Japan are now potential nuclear-armed states—and former President Trump may have given them a push in that direction.
Second, a “coalition of the willing,” led by the UK and France and consisting of 32 countries committed to supporting Ukraine, will soon be served by a new three-star multinational operations headquarters in Paris. In true European fashion, the headquarters will rotate to London after 12 months. This new permanent HQ is a step toward institutionalizing the coalition and will enable flexible military contributions from partner countries.
The coalition already has operational plans for potential peacekeeping forces following a ceasefire, although political conditions for such a deployment have not yet materialized. If—or “when,” according to the UK government—these reassurance forces are deployed, a coordination group will be established in Kyiv, led by a British two-star officer. Encouragingly, these forces are, in principle, ready for deployment if needed.
The UK government outlines three core missions for these forces:
- Rebuilding Ukraine’s ground forces: Supplying logistics, weapons, and training experts to help restore and restructure Ukraine’s land forces.
- Protecting Ukrainian airspace: Coalition aircraft will patrol Ukrainian skies alongside the Ukrainian Air Force to reassure the population and create conditions for restoring normal international air traffic.
- Securing maritime access: The existing Black Sea Task Force (comprising Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria) will be strengthened with additional specialized personnel to speed up demining efforts and ensure safe and reliable access for all ships entering or leaving Ukrainian ports.
However, even more significant than the reassurance forces is the institutionalization of the coalition itself. Created outside NATO—and now operating in the vacuum left by a retreating U.S.—it has become a platform for Europeans to coordinate among themselves and with Indo-Pacific partners without U.S. involvement. It already has a system in place for regular meetings of top political and military leaders, including heads of state and defense ministers.
One of the coalition’s strategic advantages is that Ukraine is already a member, while Hungary is not. The U.S. had initially pulled back from the group but appears to be reconsidering its stance. U.S. representatives—including presidential envoy General Keith Kellogg and Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal—joined the coalition meeting for the first time, perhaps realizing that the U.S. risks losing relevance while Europe moves forward and effectively carries out the very responsibilities the U.S. once demanded of them. All this is happening while the Trump administration shows reluctance to deliver new aid to Ukraine.
Together, these two developments—Franco-British nuclear coordination and the institutionalization of the coalition of the willing—may serve as elegant workarounds to existing institutions that have proved dysfunctional or insufficient for the task of supporting Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s autonomous defense capabilities. Depending on how U.S. policy evolves, NATO might lose its central role as Europe’s primary defense structure—and alternative frameworks like these could become essential.
Both initiatives may serve as foundational elements of a new European security architecture—this time built without the United States. Whether the Trump administration recognizes its own best interests and resumes constructive engagement with Europe remains to be seen. But Europe, clearly, is moving forward—either way.