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European vessels after sale became the core of Russia’s shadow fleet

Russia’s oil exports continue to rely on a fleet of tankers whose owners, operators, and insurers are often hidden behind chains of foreign companies. A significant portion of these vessels previously belonged to European shipowners, and after being sold, some of them entered the system of Russian oil transportation, allowing Moscow to maintain export revenues under Western sanctions. At the same time, the financial and insurance links of the shadow fleet with the European market remain the subject of investigations and political debates in the European Union.

In 2023, one illustrative case involved the Greek tanker Aris, which transmitted its last automatic identification system signal in the area of the Singapore Strait but reappeared on shipping routes two weeks later under the new name Canis Power and the flag of the Cook Islands. The vessel was acquired by a company registered in the Marshall Islands that paid €21 million for it; its previous owner was the Greek company Tsakos Energy Navigation. In June 2024, a British sanctions notice recorded that this tanker was carrying Russian oil. This episode became one example of how old European vessels, after several corporate restructurings, end up in Russian oil logistics.

The story of the Aris received wide publicity after investigations by the international journalistic organizations Follow the Money and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), published on 4 February 2025. Journalists established that after the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Western shipowners sold at least 230 tankers that subsequently became part of the Russian shadow fleet, with the total value of the deals exceeding $6.3 billion. According to the investigators’ estimates, these vessels accounted for about 40% of the fleet they examined, which numbered approximately 600 tankers.

Greek shipowners were the most active. According to the investigation, 54 companies managed from Greece sold more than half of the identified vessels, receiving at least $3.7 billion for them. Among the participants mentioned were Tsakos Energy Navigation, Marla Tankers, Toro Corp, Prime Marine, and Thenamaris. For example, Marla Tankers sold two tankers roughly 15 years old for $84 million. European sellers also included the German company Chemikalien Seetransporte and the Belgian company Euronav. The latter received about $135 million from the sale of five vessels in 2022–2023 that later ended up in the group examined by the investigators.

The involvement of British business in building the infrastructure of the Russian shadow fleet deserves separate attention. British companies sold 22 tankers that were subsequently used to transport Russian oil. A specific case involves the British financier John Ormerod, who, according to materials from the Financial Times, participated in 2022–2023 in the acquisition of at least 25 tankers with a total value of more than $700 million. The deals were financed through Eiger Shipping DMCC, linked to the Russian company Lukoil. After acquisition, these vessels transported more than 120 million barrels of Russian oil. In May 2025, London imposed sanctions on Ormerod, but in March 2026 removed him from the relevant list.

The scale of the problem is also confirmed by research from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE Institute). According to an analysis published on 8 June 2026, in April 137 tankers carried Russian crude oil, 75% of which belonged to the shadow fleet. Another 213 vessels were used to transport oil products, with the share of “shadow” ships at 41%. The age factor is of particular concern, since 92% of the “shadow” tankers carrying crude oil were older than 15 years.

The main routes ran through the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic Sea. The Pacific direction accounted for 45% of Russian crude oil shipments, and the Baltic for 35%. The main buyers remained China and India, which accounted for 35% and 32% respectively of the supplies carried by “shadow” tankers. At the same time, for 23% of the volume the destination remained unknown, which complicates the identification of the final recipients of the oil and the verification of compliance with restrictions.

The registration structure of the fleet is also changing. While in May 2025 Russian vessels accounted for about 3% of the shadow fleet’s transportation volume, in the first quarter of 2026 this figure reached 19.5%, and in April — 23%. KSE analysts link this dynamic to increased pressure on foreign ship registries and checks of tankers using false flags, meaning Russia is gradually transferring part of the vessels under its own registration, reducing dependence on certain foreign jurisdictions.

A serious issue is related to insurance. After the start of the war, many Western insurance companies ceased servicing Russian oil exports, but the tankers continued to operate thanks to Russian insurers and alternative financial mechanisms. The question of possible involvement of European financial infrastructure in insuring such shipments was raised by a POLITICO investigation published on 3 June 2026, according to which certain insurance schemes of the Russian shadow fleet may rely on European and Western financial markets through intermediary structures. Ville Niinistö, chair of the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with Russia, stated that payments pass through chains of intermediaries and may ultimately reach European and Western banking organizations.

European states are gradually expanding the practice of controlling such vessels. In December 2024, participants in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), including the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Poland, and Estonia, agreed to coordinate checks of insurance documents of tankers passing through the English Channel, the Danish straits, and the Gulf of Finland. Germany and Sweden also began paying increased attention to confirming insurance for liability in case of possible marine pollution.

In 2026, the inspections were accompanied by several notable incidents. On 20 March, French naval forces boarded the tanker Deyna in the Mediterranean Sea. The vessel was sailing under the flag of Mozambique and was suspected of using false registration. French authorities checked the documents and initiated the relevant procedures. On 3 April, the Swedish Coast Guard inspected the tanker Flora 1, which was on the EU sanctions list. The vessel was suspected of involvement in oil pollution of the Baltic Sea, and questions also arose regarding its flag registration. However, the investigation did not allow proof of an environmental crime, and Cameroon confirmed the vessel’s presence in its registry. Another case occurred on 3 May, when Swedish law enforcement boarded the tanker Jin Hui south of Trelleborg. The inspection was related to suspicion of using a false flag and violating seaworthiness requirements. The captain was detained on suspicion of using a forged document under aggravating circumstances, but was later released. The vessel itself remained banned from operation.

An important direction of European policy remains the expansion of sanctions lists. The European Union consistently introduces restrictions on certain tankers entering ports and receiving maritime services. However, the effectiveness of these measures depends on the willingness of member states to control their own companies, insurance intermediaries, ship brokers, and operators. Additional difficulties are created by the international nature of shipping, since a tanker can be sold in one country, registered in another, insured in a third, and managed by a company from a fourth jurisdiction.

Greece, Cyprus, and Malta occupy a special position. Since their economies are closely linked to maritime transport, ship management, and related services, tightening control affects significant commercial interests, and during discussions of sanctions policy representatives of these states drew attention to the need to take into account the consequences of restrictions for the European shipping industry. At the same time, international investigations show that companies operating in the European maritime jurisdiction received significant revenues from the sale of tankers that were later used to transport Russian oil.

The environmental problem also persists. Old tankers with opaque ownership structures and questionable insurance coverage pass through the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, as well as other busy international routes. In the event of an accident, the costs of oil spill response and damage compensation may fall on coastal states. According to estimates by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), in April 2026 Russian crude worth about €209 million passed through ship-to-ship oil transfer operations in EU waters, with the bulk of such operations conducted in the waters of Cyprus and Lithuania. This is another example of how closely Russian oil logistics comes into contact with European maritime space.

The current situation raises the question for the European Union of the practical effectiveness of sanctions policy. European companies received billions of dollars from the sale of tankers, some of which subsequently began carrying Russian oil; Russian insurers provide coverage for a significant number of vessels, but investigations point to the persistence of links between certain insurance operations and Western financial markets.

Russia’s shadow fleet continues to ensure a significant part of seaborne oil exports, and its activities rely on the international system of vessel sales, registration, management, insurance, and financial settlements. Europe remains one of the important centers of the global maritime industry and at the same time a participant in sanctions policy against Moscow, and therefore the question of the responsibility of European intermediaries for the further fate of the sold tankers and the possible involvement of financial structures in servicing Russian shipments remains open. The answer depends on the transparency of commercial operations, control, and the willingness of European countries to scrutinize their own economic ties.