The results of recent elections in European countries showed significant electoral fluctuations. In Europe today, there is a systemic shift that changes the rules of the political game.
The wave of votes for nationalist, populist, and openly radical parties has strengthened these parties’ positions in national and European parliaments, giving liberal elites and institutions a difficult choice: to marginalize or integrate new forces into decision-making processes.
These changes already have real implications for the EU agenda, national politics, and European society as a whole.
The reasons for the right’s success are mixed, but collectively they give a steady trend. First, economic uncertainty and rising cost of living have made voters more sensitive to the protection of «local interests» and critics of migration policy.
Second, the security agenda and skepticism about «green» reforms have given the right space to argue that they are the ones who propose pragmatic solutions to social challenges. Finally, digital media capabilities whose algorithms and targeted campaigns help to quickly radicalize and mobilize the audience.
Analysts warned about such a combination of factors as early as 2024, but now their forecasts are confirmed by the election results in Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. It is worth mentioning also the failed attempt to take power of the «right» in Romania.
An illustrative illustration is Austria, where in September 2024 the Freedom Party (FPÖ) won first place in parliamentary elections and was at the center of government-forming negotiations. It is not just a party victory, it is a signal that radical rhetoric can be legitimised by voters and then introduced into state practice through coalition agreements, staff appointments, and influence on the country’s EU representation.
For its neighbours and for Brussels, this means rethinking diplomatic calculations and anticipating how the country’s voice will change on issues important to the EU, from migration to assistance to Ukraine.
Special drama unfolds in Germany. The largest opposition party AfD in 2025 was officially recognized as an extremist organization by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), which opened the way to legal restrictions on its activities.
This is an example of how democracy tries to protect itself, but at the same time faces a dilemma: what measures are permissible in the rule of law and whether they will strengthen the party’s own victim status in the eyes of the electorate.
The AfD decisions show that the influence of the extreme right is measured not only by seats in parliament, but also by the reaction of institutions, up to the use of punitive mechanisms. In October 2025, the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic showed a clear example of the success of the right-wing populist project.
The leading ANO party, led by former Prime Minister Andrei Babiš, won around 34-35% of the vote and 80 out of 200 seats in the lower house. His opponents from the ruling coalition, the SPOLU bloc, were limited to about 23% of the vote. The ANO party intends to form a government with the support of two more radical right-wing forces: Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the Motorists for Themselves (AUTO).
This means a potential shift by the Czech Republic towards a more skeptical attitude toward the EU, declining support for Ukraine, and increasing influence of Eurosceptics inside Brussels.
Even when the right does not get absolute power, their «working» topics (migration, «security», EU criticism and «environmental» politics) are dripping into the rhetoric of mainstream parties, leading to the policies of «rightwing» moderate blocs in hopes of returning voters.
The results of the last elections showed that old taboos (not to cooperate with radicals) become a subject for negotiation and compromise. This complicates the predictability of EU countries’ foreign policies and calls into question the ability of a unified front on key issues.
The coming to power of right-wing forces is also associated with the normalization of radical formulations in the public field. This leads to the dehumanization of groups (migrants, religious minorities), which increases the risk of local acts of violence and leads to an increase in the demand of society for «harsh» measures.
This provokes the response of state legal structures. States are forced to use law and intelligence, judicial mechanisms, and financial constraints to contain extremism. But these tools are ambiguous, because excessive use can undermine democratic legitimacy and feed stories of «repression» that strengthen support for the right. Scientists and lawyers warn of the need to respect the fine line between protecting democracy and replacing it.
Speaking of geopolitical consequences, the shift to the right in a number of capitals weakens European coordination on foreign policy issues.
Agreed aid packages, a unified sanctions position, a crisis management strategy – all of this could be opposed. Some right-wing forces openly question European integration or propose a reorientation towards pragmatic bilateral relations, including with Moscow or Beijing.
This does not mean an immediate overhaul of all foreign policies, but it creates a framework for manoeuvre and pressure within the EU. Faced with the challenge of strengthening right-wing and radical movements, European democracies need to act comprehensively and consistently.
Above all, it is necessary to protect state institutions, but not to turn political struggle into a criminalization of dissidence. Oversight and investigative mechanisms should be strictly within the law and subject to public and legal scrutiny, otherwise the risk of undermining the credibility of democratic procedures themselves will only increase.
It is equally important to put the economic and social agenda, issues that directly concern voters, back at the political center.
Populists often win because they offer simple and emotional answers to complex problems. To regain citizens’ trust, progressive forces must speak to society in the language of concrete solutions: jobs, affordable housing, energy efficiency, and fair tax policies. Media space also plays a significant role. Fighting radicalization requires systemic work – from regulating digital platforms to media education programs, developing critical thinking and resistance to manipulation. This should be a long-term strategy, without which any administrative countermeasures would be temporary.
Finally, the most important direction is the foreign policy itself. The European Union and national governments need to come up with a coherent but flexible strategy that will minimize external attempts to use Europe’s internal contradictions.
Only a combination of institutional resilience, social responsibility and strategic unity can strengthen democracy in the new political cycle.
The rise of the right and extreme right in Europe has ceased to be an episode, and has visible symptoms of deep transformations: economic, information and cultural.
The consequences range from changing parliamentary balances to institutional responses and reallocation of foreign policy priorities.
The challenge for democratic societies is not only to resist radicalism, but also to restore lost trust and sense of connection with citizens in order to return to political normality without restrictions on freedom of speech and right to political participation. In this struggle, it is not only the laws but also everyday political practices that will determine whether Europe becomes more closed or more mature and sustainable in its democratic institutions.