In early January 2026, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán made one of the harshest and most candid pre-election statements of his entire time in power. Addressing Hungarian voters via social media and controlled media outlets with a call to support his Fidesz party in the elections, Orbán stated that the alternative was war. The “either me or war” thesis essentially became his ultimatum. According to Orbán, if the opposition comes to power, it will say ‘yes’ to war, funding Ukraine, an influx of migrants, and “gender propaganda.” Only he, in his words, can preserve peace, stability, and security in the country.
Viktor Orbán has ruled Hungary since 2010, winning four parliamentary elections, and this rhetoric is nothing new for him. Over the past fifteen years, he has consistently built his political strategy on exploiting the fears of society. At various times, migrants, “liberal Brussels,” and billionaire George Soros have played the role of the threat. In 2022, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, Orbán positioned himself as the “candidate of peace,” accusing the opposition of wanting to drag Hungary into the war. However, in 2026, this tactic took on particular significance, and not by chance. For the first time since 2010, Orbán’s power was truly under threat.
According to data from Hungarian and international sociological services, by the end of 2025 – early 2026, the new opposition force TISZA, led by Péter Magyar, will demonstrate a clear advantage over Fidesz. This has dealt a serious blow to Orbán’s political monopoly, which has won elections by a comfortable margin for many years. The reasons for this shift are not ideological, but socio-economic in nature. Hungarian society is increasingly feeling the effects of high inflation, declining real incomes, the deterioration of the healthcare and education systems, as well as fatigue from constant corruption scandals and the concentration of power in the hands of a single political group.
Under these circumstances, the old mobilization themes have ceased to work. Anti-immigrant rhetoric has lost its relevance, and the image of the “external liberal enemy” is no longer capable of distracting attention from internal problems. That is why Orbán is banking on a universal and deep-seated fear—the fear of war. The historical memory of Hungarians, who have lived through two world wars, Soviet occupation, and the suppression of the 1956 uprising, makes this topic particularly sensitive. Orbán skillfully uses fear as a mobilizing factor for his electoral base—conservative, rural voters and the elderly. In Hungary, a country historically traumatized by wars, the theme of “peace versus war” resonates. Orbán presents himself as the sole guarantor of stability: cheap Russian gas, neutrality in “foreign wars,” and protection from “liberal threats” (migrants, LGBT, EU), thereby presenting the election as an existential choice—either him or catastrophe.
It is important to emphasize that Orbán’s rhetoric of “peace” does not mean pacifism in the classical sense. It is a political construct in which any alternative course is automatically declared military and destructive. The opposition, even though it has not declared Hungary’s military participation, is portrayed as a puppet of Brussels and NATO. This approach allows Orbán to avoid discussing economic failures, social inequality, and systemic corruption, replacing substantive political debate with emotional intimidation.
This strategy is reinforced by the “reforms” that have been implemented. During Orbán’s years in power, Hungary’s electoral system has been repeatedly changed in ways that strengthen the ruling party’s position. Opponents, including Magyar and opposition figure Katalin Cséh, call this “psychological pressure” and “propaganda.” They note that Orbán spends billions on his campaign, using state media (which controls up to 80% of the market) to broadcast a single narrative in which Orbán is the guarantor of peace and the opposition is a source of chaos.
OSCE observers have previously criticized the Hungarian elections for “xenophobic rhetoric” and “blurring the line between party and state,” as well as for the use of administrative resources for political purposes.
Orbán intimidates voters not out of whim, but out of necessity. His power is under threat for the first time in many years. Thus, intimidation becomes not just a rhetorical device, but part of a systematic policy of retaining power. The weaker the real arguments, the stronger the pressure on voters’ emotions. Orbán needs not so much to expand his support as to consolidate his electorate and demoralize those who are undecided, instilling in them the idea that any change is dangerous.
Orbán’s possible victory in the April 2026 elections will have consequences far beyond Hungary. It will cement the model of “pseudo-liberal democracy” in the European Union, in which formal elections are combined with the undermining of the independence of state institutions, the media, and the judicial system. Hungary already regularly blocks pan-European decisions on support for Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and issues of the rule of law. Orbán’s new mandate will reinforce this line, making the EU less capable of pursuing a unified foreign policy and more vulnerable to internal divisions.
Furthermore, Orbán’s continued hold on power will reinforce the “perception” of authoritarian practices within Europe. His success will serve as an argument for other populist leaders, demonstrating that fear, misinformation, and confrontation with the EU can be an effective electoral strategy. In the long term, this could weaken not only European solidarity, but also the very idea of democratic governance.
Ultimately, the 2026 elections in Hungary are not just another vote, but a test of which will prove stronger: society’s fatigue with the concentration of power and manipulation, or fear of an artificially constructed image of war and chaos. Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric clearly shows that this is not about peace as a value, but about power as an end in itself. And it is up to Hungarian voters to decide whether they are willing to pay for the promised “peace” at the cost of further erosion of democracy. And not only in their own country, but in Europe as a whole.