Since the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions in 2022, the countries of Central Asia (CA) and the CIS have become a center of “gray” imports to Russia and the main channel for circumventing sanctions. Parallel imports through Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Georgia have shown impressive growth rates over the past few years. This was made possible thanks to a network of intermediary firms that purchase Western electronics, spare parts for aircraft, cars and other technological equipment under the guise of domestic market needs.
According to the UK Department of Business and Trade (DBT), for the period 2024–2025, trade statistics with the CIS countries showed anomalous growth that cannot be explained by the domestic needs of these markets.
Kyrgyzstan is rightly considered one of the largest “gray” logistics and financial hubs of Russia in Central Asia. The country’s role has evolved from simple resale of goods to the creation of complex crypto-financial systems.
Total exports of goods from the UK alone to Kyrgyzstan in 2024 grew by 214.7% to $132 million. According to Bloomberg, exports of specialized equipment and electronics in 2025 grew by 1,200%. About 90% of these goods are microcircuits, drones, machine tools and car parts. At the beginning of 2026, exports to Kyrgyzstan continued to grow from Estonia – by 10,000%, from Finland – by 3,100%, from Poland and Greece – by 2,200%.
Significant growth was also observed in the category of “equipment and vehicles”. Data from British customs (HMRC) showed that these goods are not delayed in the country of arrival. Thanks to simplified customs procedures within the Eurasian Economic Union, cargo arriving from Heathrow or Dover, for example, crosses the Russian border within 48 hours. Even exports of services to the region have increased by 56%, indicating the deployment of an entire infrastructure – legal and logistical support for shadow flows.
Kazakhstan plays an equally important transit role in this scheme. The Russian military-industrial complex is critically dependent on Western microelectronics, and Astana is the main channel for its receipt. Statistics on the export of microcircuits from Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation showed an impressive growth of more than 70 times (from $245,000 to over $18 million) during the first year of the Russian-Ukrainian war. An investigation conducted in 2023 by journalists from iStories, OCCRP, and the German magazine Der Spiegel exposed the involvement of the Kazakh company Aspan Arba in the import of drones and spare parts from Europe to the Russian Federation. In Kazakhstan alone, researchers identified more than three dozen such companies, and as soon as one of them was added to the sanctions list, a new one appeared in its place within a week with the same management but under a different name.
Georgia occupies a special and rather specific place in the system of sanctions evasion. On the official plane, Tbilisi claims to comply with sanctions restrictions, but in reality the situation is the opposite. Geographical proximity, the absence of a visa regime for Russians and the pro-Russian policy of the ruling Georgian Dream party have de facto turned this country into one of the key logistics hubs for the supply of sanctioned goods to the Russian Federation. According to the National Statistics Service of Georgia (Geostat), in 2024-2025, car exports increased by 600-800%. Since direct re-export to the Russian Federation of cars with an engine capacity of more than 1.9 liters and electric cars is prohibited, they are documented as exports to Armenia, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. Most of these cars never reach these countries, but instead quickly appear in Russian car showrooms and on roads.
Despite assurances from Georgian customs about strict control, investigations (in particular by the journalistic group iFact) have repeatedly recorded trucks with sanctioned goods crossing the Georgian-Russian border without hindrance. According to the Georgian Statistics Service and a report by the Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), over 37,000 new companies were registered in Georgia by Russian citizens in 2024–2025. Many of them exist only on paper and most are almost certainly involved in entrepreneurial activities and the purchase of sanctioned goods, and the resumption of regular air traffic between the Russian Federation and Georgia in 2019 has significantly simplified the “shuttle” business.
Participants in the sanctions evasion scheme try to hide the origin of funds and the ultimate beneficiaries. After most Russian banks were disconnected from SWIFT, Central Asian financial institutions became “laundries” for sanctioned transactions. In 2025, the UK was forced to impose sanctions on Capital Bank of Central Asia (OJSC “Capital Bank”) and its top management for systematically falsifying end-user documents. Platforms such as Grinex and Meer, which were recently blocked by the British regulator OFSI, passed through them about $9.3 billion in 2025 alone. These funds were used to purchase CNC machines and electronic components in Europe and Asia.
The European Union countries are currently trying to eliminate or narrow the loopholes through which Russia obtains dual-use technologies and finances the war. Despite the efforts of London and Brussels to strengthen the sanctions regime by creating new control bodies such as OTSI, criminalizing circumvention of restrictions, and introducing strict clauses in export contracts, Russia continues to find new channels for the supply of goods and equipment it needs.
In other words, the Kremlin is using the former Soviet republics to purchase sanctioned goods and electronics in such quantities that it simply cannot go unnoticed. The usual expansion of the lists of prohibited goods and products will no longer have the necessary effect. Political pressure is needed on the governments of Astana, Bishkek and Tashkent, as well as the digitalization of customs control in the territory of the former Soviet republics, which will allow detecting violations of the sanctions regime. Given that these countries do not show willingness to limit parallel imports to Russia, secondary sanctions are clearly indispensable here.