Despite expanding sanctions, European industrial and navigation technologies continue to reach Russia and Belarus through intermediaries, concealed end users, and re-exports from third countries. Investigations and law-enforcement statements released in August–September 2026 showed that the weak point of the sanctions regime remains control over goods after they have formally left the EU.
On 10 August 2026, Austria’s Interior Ministry announced the dismantling of an international network that supplied sanctioned machine tools and metalworking equipment to Russia. At the center of the investigation was a Vienna-based company whose name was not disclosed. According to Austrian authorities, the equipment was purchased for enterprises linked to Russia’s Rostec and could later have been used to manufacture components for cruise missiles, combat aircraft, and other military hardware.
To conceal the route, companies in Turkey, the UAE, Hong Kong, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Poland, and Lithuania were used, and European manufacturers were given forged end-user certificates. Since 2022, the investigation has confirmed deliveries to Russian defense enterprises worth more than €3.3 million. On 13 May 2026, Austrian officers arrested a 28-year-old Belarusian citizen, the director and co-owner of the Vienna company, and seized sanctioned equipment worth about €140,000. The Austrian case confirmed a long-known sanctions gap: goods can legally leave the EU for a buyer in a third country and then, through a chain of resales and fictitious paperwork, reach Russia.
On 31 August 2026, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) announced convictions of two Belarusian citizens and a Lithuanian company they controlled, whose name was not disclosed. The company had received EU funding to develop high-precision GNSS receivers for Galileo’s High Accuracy Service (HAS). The project budget exceeded €1.064 million, of which the EU was to provide €745,500; €447,300 was actually paid. EPPO established that after a formal change of ownership in April 2022, the Belarusian beneficiaries continued to control the company while also holding executive posts in a Russian entity that developed and tested military-purpose satellite navigation chips and was under EU sanctions. One of those involved also held stakes in other structures linked to Russian and Belarusian military programs. The description in EU sanctions documents matches the Russian company LLC Navitron (NTLAB-SK), though EPPO did not confirm that name directly.
Commenting on the 31 August verdict, European Chief Prosecutor Laura Kövesi called for stronger due diligence and other preventive mechanisms in the EU. The case showed that the problem is not only re-export as such, but also that a formal change of owners can hide actual control by people tied to Russia’s defense industry.
On 1 September 2026, Lithuanian broadcaster LRT, citing the Belarusian Investigative Center, reported new evidence in the case of GPS trackers made by Teltonika being supplied to Russia. Researchers found that part of the Lithuanian manufacturer’s output was bought by the Russian company Laboratoriya Interneta Veshchey through Hong Kong-based Sinalex and then passed to Belarusian BelTransSputnik. BelTransSputnik in turn resold the GPS trackers to Russia’s Evrosvyaz. According to the investigators, BelTransSputnik sold 345 Teltonika GPS controllers and vehicle trackers in 2024–2025 in circumvention of sanctions, for more than $100,000.
Earlier, on 22 January 2025, LRT had already reported numerous cases of Teltonika products being shipped to Russia in 2023–2024. Intermediaries included the Turkish firms Aavat Endustriyel Sistemleri and Olimpik Gama Logistics, as well as Hong Kong’s Sinalex Limited, which in September 2023 sent GPS equipment and other goods worth more than $70,000 to Russia, with the Aurora Evernet group as the Russian-side recipient. Teltonika said in response that it had ended commercial ties with Russia and Belarus, tightened control over resale chains, and did not allow grey exports. LRT noted, however, that a system of enhanced export controls on high-priority goods to third countries had still not begun operating as of September 2026.
All three cases pointed to the same long-known vulnerability in sanctions enforcement: the difficulty of tracking sanctioned goods once they move through third countries. Detection is further complicated by forged end-user certificates, multi-tier intermediary networks, and formal changes of company ownership. Enforcement remains largely a competence of EU member states, so the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the quality of national controls and on information-sharing among regulators and security services.
European sanctions have made Russia’s direct access to critical technologies and dual-use goods harder. Russian procurement networks have adapted by using intermediaries in third countries and multi-layer re-export. Current European regulatory oversight still cannot fully trace goods to the real end recipient. As long as sanctioned products can be re-exported through third countries, Russia will retain alternative channels for some of the critical technologies and dual-use goods its military-industrial complex needs.
