France entered 2026 in the midst of a political crisis that, just a few years ago, would have seemed unimaginable for one of Europe’s leading democracies. Cabinet reshuffles have become routine, parliament has nearly lost its ability to form a stable majority, budget disputes have escalated into social conflict, and public trust in government institutions has fallen to near-historic lows. Against this backdrop, the far-right “National Rally” (Rassemblement National, RN) and its leader Jordan Bardella are enjoying high approval ratings and are viewed by many analysts as among the top favorites in the 2027 presidential race.
However, there is a pattern in French history: the political chaos that is currently driving voters toward the far right may simultaneously become the main obstacle to their rise to power, and the deeper France sinks into a governance crisis, the stronger the public demand grows—not for protest, but for stability.
The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to the 2024 snap parliamentary elections. At that time, President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly following his political camp’s defeat in the European Parliament elections backfired, and instead of restoring governability, France ended up with a fragmented parliament in which no single political force was able to form a stable majority. As a result, French politics entered a period of constant compromises, temporary alliances, and threats of government crises.
Cabinet reshuffles became the new norm, and the political system of the Fifth Republic, long considered a model of presidential stability, began to show signs of “fatigue.”
By early 2026, France was effectively in a state of chronic political uncertainty, and in the public consciousness, the crisis was no longer perceived as a temporary phenomenon but began to be viewed as the country’s permanent condition.
This was most evident in fiscal policy. The French government found itself faced with the need to simultaneously reduce the budget deficit and preserve the country’s social model, a task that proved virtually impossible. In 2024, France’s budget deficit stood at approximately 5.8% of GDP. In response, Prime Minister François Bayrou presented a program of strict fiscal consolidation totaling nearly €44 billion. The plan called for cuts in government spending and additional tax revenues with the aim of reducing the deficit to 4.6% of GDP by the end of 2026 and to 3% by 2029.
However, any attempts to cut spending faced resistance from both left-wing parties and labor unions. In May 2026, the International Monetary Fund warned that France was facing growing fiscal risks. According to IMF estimates, the deficit in 2025 fell only to 5.1% of GDP, and economic growth in 2026 could be as low as 0.7%.
The Fund’s experts separately pointed to the threat of market pressure in the absence of a convincing financial stabilization program. Thus, France entered the presidential campaign facing the most severe budget crisis in decades.
Financial problems quickly turned into social unrest, and one of the most telling episodes was the large-scale strike by healthcare workers that began on January 5, 2026. Family medicine clinics closed, scheduled surgeries were postponed, and patients faced canceled appointments and diagnostic procedures.
Protesters opposed the social insurance budget parameters and new restrictions in the healthcare system. The protest lasted ten days and affected a significant portion of the French healthcare system. For many French people, this conflict became a symbol of the state’s crisis, for if even the healthcare system—one of the key elements of the French social model—was under threat, then the problems were not temporary but systemic in nature.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the main political beneficiary of these events was Marine Le Pen’s “National Rally,” which for many years has built its strategy on criticizing the political establishment, and every new government crisis only confirms its central thesis that traditional parties are no longer capable of effectively governing the country. An additional factor has been the party’s “normalization” process.
While Marine Le Pen was long perceived by parts of French society as too radical a politician, her successor, Jordan Bardella, has managed to cultivate the image of a young and more moderate leader.
By the end of 2025, a poll by Odoxa, an independent French marketing and sociological research institute, indicated a scenario in which Bardella would win the presidential election regardless of who faced him in the second round.
According to the study, he could count on 35–36% of the vote in the first round, and in the second round, he was ahead of all his main rivals. For the party, this marked a crucial psychological milestone, as for the first time in French society, the far right began to be perceived not as the “eternal” opposition, but as a real contender for power. A common assumption is that the deepening of the crisis automatically guarantees a victory for the RN. However, political practice shows the opposite.
At the same time, the history of French elections shows that protest voting has its limits, and when the crisis becomes too deep, a significant portion of society begins to seek not radical change, but guarantees of order and governability. Today, the National Rally remains a party with no experience in governing the state at the national level. It is precisely this circumstance that could become the main argument of Bardella’s opponents in 2027. Amid a debt crisis, slow economic growth, and rising defense spending, many voters are beginning to ask not who is better at criticizing the system, but who is capable of preventing the country from financial destabilization.
Bardella’s party faces a paradoxical situation: the higher its chances of winning, the greater the public demand for predictability and professional governance—areas where it has virtually nothing to offer voters.
As a result, France today finds itself caught between two extremes: on the one hand, the continuation of political paralysis and endless government crises; on the other, a sharp shift toward a political force that has never governed the country. It is precisely this contradiction that will define the 2027 presidential campaign.
To win, the far right will have to prove to the French people its ability to ensure stability and development at a time when the political system itself is undergoing one of its most severe crises since the founding of the Fifth Republic—and this is precisely where the RN faces serious difficulties.