Promoting its interests has always been one of the Kremlin’s foreign policy priorities. One way of achieving this goal has been to win over former European politicians and influential experts. As a rule, they act as a link and a form of “soft power” that helps promote Moscow’s interests in the business, media, and political spheres. Several public cases, such as those of Gerhard Schröder, Matthias Warnig, Esko Aho, François Fillon, Karin Kneissl, and Alexander Rahr, illustrate how this model works and what risks it poses to European democracies.
The first and most notable example is former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. After leaving office, he took up senior positions in projects and companies closely linked to the Russian energy sector, including structures associated with Nord Stream and the board of directors of Rosneft. These appointments gave him not only income and status, but also direct access to decision-making in the energy sector, which, according to critics, increased Europe’s dependence on Russian energy resources and served the interests of the Kremlin. But after Russia’s war in Ukraine began in 2022, or rather, after a series of scandals in Germany, he resigned from his positions.
Another example is Matthias Warnig, a man close to the Russian authorities and head of the Nord Stream project. For many years, Warnig held senior management positions in several large Russian companies, including the state-owned oil giants Transneft and Rosneft, where he had been a member of the board of directors since 2011. In 2022, the US imposed sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 project and against Warnig personally, directly linking his activities to Moscow’s geopolitical goals.
The Kremlin deliberately invites former politicians from other countries to take up prominent positions, which brings political dividends in the form of access to Western political elites, opportunities to lobby for their interests, and the “legitimization” of Russian companies and initiatives in the West. For example, in 2021, former Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl was appointed to the board of directors of the state-owned oil company Rosneft; this move raised doubts in the EU and the media as to whether the reputation of European politicians was being used to “justify” Russian interests. In this context, it is worth noting that in 2023, Ms. Kneissl moved to Russia, where she became the head of the G.O.R.K.I. analytical center at St. Petersburg University.
The mechanics of how an “agent of influence” operates in the European context usually involve several components. First, there are economic incentives, such as high salaries, consulting contracts, and seats on the boards of directors of large state-owned companies. Second, there are symbolic and communicative benefits. For example, the appearance of a recognizable European name in the leadership gives Russian projects status and additional arguments in discussions with Western representatives. And third, access to closed channels, where personal meetings and negotiations are used to promote decisions favorable to Moscow or to weaken resistance (for example, to sanctions or energy restrictions).
This scenario is also played out by expert figures whose analytical activities are disguised as “neutral expertise.” Alexander Rahr, an analyst who has specialized in Russia for many years, has been repeatedly criticized for being overly “pragmatic” and for his assessments too often coinciding with Russian narratives. The role of such “experts” is not only to explain, but also to shape the context in which European politicians’ decisions are perceived differently.
The systemic effect is obvious and consists in the fact that when recognizable European figures appear in important economic sectors (energy, finance, industry), this reinforces the effect of influence, which makes it easier for Moscow to achieve its foreign policy goals. In practice, this was also reflected in the decisions of politicians.
However, the reaction of European institutions is also important. After the war in Ukraine began in 2022, several former European leaders and politicians announced their resignation from the boards of Russian companies. This was the case, for example, with former Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho (Sberbank) and former French Prime Minister François Fillon, who had previously held positions in Russian companies, including petrochemical groups. These resignations showed that public and institutional pressure can partially offset the practice of employing foreign elites in Russian structures, but only when the risks become obvious and politically costly.
For Europe, the presence of such influential Kremlin agents poses significant risks. First, there is a conflict of interest: when a person who has held high public office receives financial benefits and influence through companies owned by foreign governments, this undermines trust in the relevant state institutions of the country he represented. Second, it distorts public discourse through “expert” voices dependent on Russian connections, which can legitimize pro-Kremlin narratives and slow down the consolidation of political decisions. Finally, economic vulnerability, as long-term energy and financial ties leave leverage in the hands of a state with which Europe may have a conflictual relationship.
Transparency and rules are important in combating such challenges. Laws on mandatory disclosure of interests, restrictions on holding positions in foreign state-owned entities for a certain period after leaving politics, and increased oversight and investigations by independent institutions are all designed to reduce the appeal and effectiveness of the “agents of influence” scheme. Parliamentary checks and international sanctions mechanisms will also make the cost of “cooperating” with the regime unacceptable for public figures.
The examples of Schröder, Warnig, Kneissl, Aho, Fillon, and Rara demonstrate that the Kremlin knows how to use not only military and political tools, but also personal and institutional instruments of influence. This refers to the systematic practice of integrating the European elite into an economic and communication network that is useful for Russia’s foreign policy goals. Countering this strategy requires a combination of transparent rules, institutional control, and an active civil society and journalistic environment capable of identifying and exposing such connections in a timely manner.