Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many observers expected European companies, especially those with strong reputations, to immediately cease all cooperation with the aggressor. However, as it turns out, a significant number of European companies, including some with global reputations, have continued their business ties with Russia. Among these companies is the Austrian company Swarovski, whose division (Swarovski Optik), which specializes in the development and manufacture of high-precision, long-range premium optical instruments, has continued to supply optical sights to Russian security forces.
Journalists from iStories, together with analysts from the Conflict Intelligence Team, conducted an investigation based on open Russian customs data. It revealed that since February 2022, after the war began, at least 90 Swarovski Optik rifle scopes have been imported into Russia, with a total value estimated at approximately 21 million rubles. Moreover, most of these imports (57 units) occurred in 2023, after the imposition of major Western sanctions.
High-quality optics, priced between $3,000 and $5,000, were supplied to Russia. These scopes are popular among hunters but installing them on combat weapons is not difficult. Analysts suggest that such scopes are primarily supplied to elite Russian units of the FSB and GRU.
The supply chain is traditional—via third-party intermediaries. According to the investigation, Swarovski Optik supplies to Russia are currently not made directly from Austria, but through companies in the United Arab Emirates. In 2024, the intermediary was BMH Equipment LLC, and in 2023, Bynuna Military & Hunting Equipment Trading LLC. Both companies are registered in Abu Dhabi. The final importer is listed as the Russian company Electronic Commerce Center, which manufactures thermal and optical equipment and sells imported products (including under its own brands, Fortuna and Arkon). Import documentation often describes the scopes as “intended for hunting, tourism, and sport shooting”, which formally allows them to declare that they are not military goods.
On paper, these are products for amateur shooting, but in reality, these tools are ideal for sniping in combat situations. This is due to their technical characteristics and the real demand for such products.
Analysts emphasize that Swarovski Optik riflescopes are of an exceptional high quality. According to experts at the Robert Lansing Institute, these scopes offer high magnification, outstanding image clarity, and high reliability, making them fully compatible with professional combat rifles. These parameters meet the highest standards typically required by elite military units.
There’s also an economic argument. The cost of such scopes can reach several thousand dollars, and ordinary hunters in Russia aren’t willing to pay such prices for their hobby. The high price point effectively excludes mass civilian users and makes these products more popular with state-funded special forces.
Video evidence also supports the investigation’s findings. Videos have repeatedly appeared online, including on YouTube, showing Russian military personnel demonstrating weapons equipped with premium Western optics, particularly Swarovski sights. Journalists recorded such cases while analyzing available footage from the combat zone.
Although these products are marketed as “for sport and hunting” when imported, in practice, most are used for military purposes. Their technical level, price, and documented use indicate that they are not hunting accessories, but fully-fledged elements of sniper equipment.
It’s worth noting that the Swarovski case is far from unique. Despite sanctions, optics from Western countries continue to enter Russia through parallel import schemes and backdoor routes.
According to media reports, between 2022 and 2023, Russia imported optical sights worth approximately 16 billion rubles (~$174 million) from Western manufacturers (not only Swarovski, but also Nachtforce, Leupold, Holosun, and others). Importers such as Russian online stores Pointer (St. Petersburg) and Navigator (Moscow) use intermediaries in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and China. These companies purchase supposedly “civilian” sights from Western brands, import them officially, and then some of them end up in the hands of the army or security forces.
According to the Robert Lansing Institute, this is a classic export control evasion scheme. Dual-use optics are being registered as civilian goods to circumvent restrictions that should govern the export of “military” equipment.
This example clearly illustrates a systemic problem, namely that sanctions cease to be an effective tool if their mechanism does not cover the entire path of goods from the manufacturer to the end user. Even companies that have publicly announced their withdrawal from the Russian market, such as Swarovski, may in fact leave loopholes. Having formally ceased direct deliveries, they still allow products to enter Russia through parallel channels – distributors and intermediaries in third countries where export controls are much weaker.
The issue of the need for a serious review of export rules, categories, and end-use verification procedures remains problematic. The system that allows high-tech equipment to leave the European Union under the guise of “civilian products” needs to be updated and tightened.
Intermediary countries also play a decisive role in circumventing sanctions. The UAE, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and a number of other states have become major transit hubs through which products that are restricted or prohibited from direct delivery continue to flow into Russia. Their companies are a key link in the re-export of high-tech optics and other dual-use goods, turning them into instruments of war despite international sanctions.
Finally, brands such as Swarovski risk being associated not only with premium products, but also with indirect involvement in military conflict. Even with an official position of neutrality, market mechanisms and insufficiently strict controls mean that their goods end up on the front lines. The longer this gap between declared policy and reality persists, the more acute the question of corporate responsibility and the role of business in global conflict becomes.