Russia has long positioned itself as a leader in nuclear technology and energy. It must be recognized that the competition in this field is not so great, and the strategic potential of nuclear energy is huge. Realizing this, Russia has constructed a model in which the construction of nuclear power plants is transformed not into a one-off export of equipment, but into a long-term mechanism of political and economic influence. These are not just commercial contracts – they are «packages» of financing, training, fuel and service support designed for the entire life cycle of the reactor. Together, these elements create the institutional and financial linkage of partner countries to the Russian supplier.
The key to understanding influence is the transaction model. The example of «Akkuyu» nuclear power plant in Turkey and «El-Dabaa» in Egypt shows that the Rosatom corporation not only supplies reactors, but also finances projects, takes over operation or provides loans on preferential terms. «Accu» is built according to the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) scheme, where the Russian side obtains the right of ownership and exploitation. In «El-Daaba», the Russian loan covers an overwhelming portion of the cost of the project (about 85% according to official reports), leaving Egypt with a long debt load and dependence on the Russian service. Such financial and technical packages make a «quick rebalancing» of the foreign policy line for partner countries extremely expensive and risky. This dependence has several dimensions and consequences. The first is fuel-service binding. Contractual obligations to supply, service and dispose of spent fuel mean that even in case of mutual political cooling, countries must maintain economic links with the supplier in order to maintain security and continuity of energy supply. The second position is debt and financial dependence. The essence of it is that long-term public debt creates a powerful economic lever, and failure to cooperate has significant financial and legal consequences. Last but not least, there is the institutional and personnel linkage. Regulation, procedures, staff training and technology-specific infrastructure increase transaction costs of turnover and make alternatives costly and time-consuming. The political effects of such ties are often less apparent than outright intervention. Economic commitments and the need for guaranteed energy supply reduce political maneuvering, because governments are more difficult to criticize a partner by giving up important contracts, especially when the project provides much of the basic generation or promises an inflow of investment. The example of Hungary and the Paks II project vividly illustrates this dilemma. The multibillion-dollar loan and direct transfer of the contract to the Russian side caused political controversy within the EU, but at the same time reinforced Budapest’s dependence on Moscow, which was reflected in diplomatic relations and economic ties. The decisions of the European courts and institutions only partially change the picture – legal disputes drag on, while objects and obligations remain.
The social and sovereign costs to the countries concerned are often underestimated. Obviously, large projects absorb significant public resources and attract external borrowing, which increases fiscal vulnerability and limits investment maneuvers in other areas (health, education). Nuclear power plants are also a source of social tension, as issues of safety, reprocessing and storage of spent fuel often cause fears and protests in local communities. At the same time, responsibility and control over critical infrastructure is increasingly in the hands of a foreign operator or entity integrated with another country’s state apparatus. Finally, debt burdens and long service contracts increase corruption risks. Opaque negotiations, closed financial agreements and lack of competition in the tenders create space for shadow schemes and vulnerabilities of democratic institutions.
However, the external risk for Russia itself and its corporation is no less real. Investments in ten-year projects and a centralized role in the global chain of nuclear infrastructure make «Rosat» vulnerable to sanctions, blockages of financial channels and international legal restrictions. After 2022, some European projects were actually frozen or reconsidered. In the Czech Republic and Finland (project Hanhikivi-1) contracts with Russian participation were terminated. Helsinki in 2022 officially revoked the building license due to «national security risks and delays». In Bulgaria and Slovakia, scenarios of diversification of nuclear fuel supply and the gradual abandonment of dependence on Russian fuel for ERW reactors are being discussed, which weakens Russia’s market position in the EU. Even the Paks II project in Hungary, which formally retains Russian participation, has been under constant pressure from Brussels, and its implementation is being delayed by bank restrictions and European Commission audits. Against this background, Moscow is increasing activity in countries less sensitive to sanctions and political restrictions. On the African route «Rosatom» has signed memoranda of cooperation with Nigeria, Zambia and Ethiopia, and also promotes the construction of research reactors in Sudan and Rwanda, positioning them as part of «peaceful atom for development». In Egypt, the large-scale project «El-Dabaa», Russia’s largest infrastructure contract on the continent, financed by state credit, continues despite foreign policy risks. In the Middle East, in addition to the Turkish «Akkuyu», negotiations are underway with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Algeria on possible forms of participation in future nuclear programs. Central Asia becomes another vector of expansion. In Uzbekistan, the first national nuclear power plant project under Russian technology VVER-1200 has been agreed, and Kazakhstan is consulting with several suppliers, including Russia, on the construction of a reactor in the Almaty region.
Thus, after losing part of the European contracts «Rosatom» strategically reorients to the Global South, regions where the economic attractiveness of Russian loans and the willingness of the corporation to take over the full cycle of construction and services remain strong arguments. This compensates for short-term losses, but reinforces Russia’s overall foreign policy dependence on nuclear projects and makes the enterprise itself an even more politicized tool of influence in unstable and vulnerable regions. Finally, it is important to understand the temporal nature of influence: nuclear projects do not «close down» after a couple of years. Construction, commissioning, maintenance, possible refurbishment and waste disposal are all processes that have lasted 40-80 years or more. This time distance turns the atomic energy into a mechanism not only of current, but also of intergenerational influence. Contractual obligations and debts remain with subsequent governments, limiting the freedom of choice of future generations.
What should partner countries and the international community do? Above all, demand transparency of contracts, competitive procedures and public risk assessments. Then diversify sources of finance and technology, develop regional and multilateral mechanisms for storage and treatment of spent fuel. Finally, to strengthen institutional resilience so that critical infrastructure decisions are made on the basis of strategic independence. Without these measures, nuclear projects run the risk of transforming themselves from instruments of modernization into long-term «anchors» of external influence, causing lasting damage to the social and political sovereignty of host countries. Nuclear power plants can be a source of economic modernization and stable energy. But in the current practice of export nuclear projects, where finance, fuel and services are concentrated in one external player, they also become a tool for long-term geopolitical impact with consequences that are destructive to autonomy and social cohesion, Not immediately, but as projects move into operation and maintenance. It is this «long-term dependence» that is the main political lesson of cooperation with major exporters of nuclear technologies in the 21st century.
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