Hungary continues to receive Russian crude oil through the southern branch of the Druzhba (“Friendship”) pipeline – an exemption allowed by the EU due to the particular dependence of Budapest and Bratislava on supplies of Russian “black gold.” The Druzhba pipeline runs from Russia through Belarus and Ukraine, delivering oil to Hungary and Slovakia.
In September 2024, the Hungarian international integrated oil and gas company MOL Group concluded an agreement with Moscow under which it assumed ownership of Russian crude from the Belarus–Ukraine border to the Hungary–Ukraine border. In practice, this arrangement “rebranded” Russian oil as Hungarian, with the Ukrainian pipeline operator receiving transit fees from the Hungarian side, while Russia continued to collect all export revenues.
Given Hungary’s political alignment with Russia and MOL Group’s control over Slovakia’s refineries, the Kremlin has strategically chosen Hungary as a testing ground for maintaining and potentially expanding Russian oil pipeline exports into the EU. According to expert estimates, in 2024 Russia earned at least $6.6 billion from oil exports transiting Ukraine to Hungary and Slovakia.
Hungary and Slovakia have refused to use the Adriatic pipeline through Croatia as an alternative supply route, citing high tariffs and allegedly insufficient capacity. Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó argued that Croatia is simply not a reliable transit country, as it raised transit fees fivefold compared to the market average after Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine began – making it impossible for MOL to secure long-term transport capacity. As of September 2025, Hungary remains one of the EU’s most dependent member states on Russian crude, with Urals still accounting for more than 50% of its imports.
The Hungarian government continues to insist in Brussels that cutting off Urals supplies would be an “atomic bomb” for the country’s economy, since shifting to alternative grades would require major upgrades to refineries and related infrastructure. The fact is that MOL’s two key refineries – in Százhalombatta (Hungary) and Bratislava (Slovakia) – were designed for Russian crude back in the Soviet era. Transitioning to lighter grades would require deep modernization of hydrocracking units, blending and storage systems, as well as portfolio-wide technological upgrades. Yet, time is passing and neither Budapest nor Bratislava is in any rush to diversify energy supplies for their own needs.
Moreover, Hungary is actively helping Russia to export oil to the EU. A little-known oil trading company, Normeston Trading, has shipped over 20 million tonnes of Russian crude worth more than $10 billion to Central European countries. Registered in Belize in 2006, the company operates through a network linking former Kremlin oil officials and close associates of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán. Despite EU sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sector, Normeston’s shipments surged after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and again after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Until 2021, 49.9% of Normeston Trading shares were owned by the UK company Marte Trading and Investment, controlled by Valery Subbotin – former vice president of Russia’s private oil giant Lukoil and former chairman of its trading subsidiary Litasco, which managed all of Lukoil’s EU trading operations. Subbotin left Russia in 2016, is now a Cypriot citizen, and resides mostly in Monaco. Another Russian shareholder was Lev Tolkachov – a former Lukoil employee and professional race car driver.
On the Hungarian side, Normeston’s shareholders include Imre Fazakas, an oil consultant at MOL, and the Madera investment fund linked to businessman György Nagy, who has close ties to Viktor Orbán’s political circles. Until 2022, Normeston Trading owned dozens of Lukoil gas stations in Hungary and Slovakia, but hurriedly sold them to MOL Group that year. Tellingly, Normeston’s Moscow office shares the same building with Hungarian companies tied to György Nagy, as well as with the Russian branch of OTP Bank – Hungary’s largest bank, headed by Sándor Csányi, the country’s richest man and a personal friend of Orbán.
Since 2020, Normeston Trading has been cooperating with the Swiss firm Proton Energy Group, owned by Nissan Moiseev, a Russian-born Israeli businessman. From 2020 to the present, Proton Energy has received payment guarantees totaling $18 million from Normeston Trading via Hungary’s OTP Bank.
According to sector analysts, Hungary’s liberation from Russian oil dependency is a matter of political will, time, and money – but is entirely feasible. MOL’s CEO Zsolt Hernádi estimates that a complete switch away from Urals would cost between $500 million and $600 million for refinery retrofits, logistics adjustments, and contract restructuring. Unfortunately, for now Hungary and Slovakia are resisting efforts by most EU member states to impose new sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.