September 2026 greeted Europeans with a deceptive calm. The lights are still on in Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam, and officials insist that the worst energy shocks are behind them. Behind closed doors, however, analysts and energy-crisis staff are growing uneasy. Autumn is here, temperatures across Europe are sliding, and the risk of a new fuel crisis is rising.
The picture now is very different from recent years. According to the European association of gas storage operators GIE AGSI+ and the analytics platform StorageCurve, by the third week of September 2026 underground storage in the European Union was only 68–70% full — the lowest level for this point in the year in a decade and a half. A year earlier, Europe entered the same period with stocks above 80%. In Germany, the continent’s largest economy, fill levels have fallen to a “risky” 54–57%; the Netherlands is little better. The TTF gas benchmark has settled around €80 per megawatt-hour — 150% higher than at the end of February. Leading outlets, including The New York Times on 18 September, have said plainly that the EU needs a mild winter if it is to avoid catastrophic consequences.
The causes are more complex than the first break with Russian supplies. The EU is caught between two layers of energy risk: gas and refined products. After pipeline volumes from Russia declined, Europe reoriented toward LNG from the United States and Qatar — a system that has proved highly sensitive to external shocks. Military escalation around the Strait of Hormuz, which began in late February 2026 after U.S. and Israeli strikes on targets in Iran, disrupted global logistics. Qatar extended force majeure on cargoes for European and Asian buyers. The picture worsened with the forced shutdown of Norway’s key Ormen Lange field, which is offline until February 2027. Analysts at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and Morgan Stanley warn that even an ordinary cold winter would empty European stocks and push gas prices comfortably above €100 per megawatt-hour.
The liquid-fuels market is deteriorating just as fast. OilPrice.com and a Reuters report of 21 September say the crisis in Europe has already hit diesel and jet fuel. Aviation-fuel stocks at the Amsterdam–Rotterdam–Antwerp hub have fallen to their lowest since 2019. Energy Aspects forecasts a daily jet-fuel shortfall of 510,000 barrels in the fourth quarter. European refineries are running with negative margins because the jump in crude prices has outpaced product prices. To cover the middle-distillate gap, they are raising diesel output at the expense of gasoline — a shift Goldman Sachs analysts say will inevitably produce a shortage of motor gasoline.
Pump prices are already at historic highs. European Commission figures show that over the past year the average price of diesel in the EU has risen 38% and gasoline 24%. In France, about 16–17% of filling stations report shortages, and one in ten is completely dry. TotalEnergies, which tried to hold down retail prices, has been hit especially hard. Ordinary drivers say a single fill-up now costs up to half a day’s wages.
In this energy chaos, Russia occupies a paradoxical position. EU law provides for a phased ban on Russian hydrocarbons, yet according to the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, Russia still accounts for about 12% of European gas imports. Short-term contracts began to be restricted in spring 2026; a full ban on Russian LNG takes effect on 1 January 2027, and pipeline supplies are due to be prohibited in autumn 2027. Even so, European companies, racing to take remaining volumes under existing deals, increased Russian gas imports in January–May 2026: pipeline flows rose 7% and LNG cargoes 11% year on year, mainly via terminals in Spain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and by pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia and Greece.
At the same time, Ukrainian forces have waged a sustained campaign against Russian refining infrastructure. Estimates from the International Energy Agency and Oxford experts show that by June 2026 Russian crude processing had collapsed to 3.8 million barrels a day — a 20-year low — cutting diesel output by about 30% and gasoline by almost 25%. Moscow faced an acute domestic shortage, blocked fuel exports and began importing gasoline. In August, Russian gasoline purchases, mainly from India and South Korea, reached a record 172,000 tonnes. Russian diesel exports that once went to Turkey, Brazil and Africa then fell more than 70%, knocking the global balance and feeding higher prices at European pumps.
The central paradox is that even as plants and refining volumes are lost, Russia still collects huge sums from geopolitical instability. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimates that the Hormuz crisis and the surge in crude prices gave Moscow about €31 billion in extra revenue over six months. Windfall profits from oil sales to Asia and expensive gas to Europe fully offset the Kremlin’s losses from lower export volumes. On 9 September, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said EU citizens were paying a high price for rejecting Russian resources and could have avoided the trouble by buying cheap gas — both an invitation to bargain and a reminder that leverage remains.
In the longer run, Moscow’s position still looks bleak. The premium European market is being lost for good. Despite sharp criticism from the European Court of Auditors — which noted that less than a fifth of the planned €300 billion under REPowerEU has been spent — the strategy has worked: Russia’s share of EU gas has fallen from 45% in 2021 to 12% now. Refineries damaged by Ukrainian drones keep pressure inside Russia, while sanctions and the Urals discount continue to weigh on the federal budget.
For Europe itself, the numbers on the pump boards are no longer dry statistics; they are a political risk. Public anger is already forcing governments to discuss windfall taxes on energy majors and new subsidies for households. Elections are due in eight EU states in 2027. Reuters analysts warn that empty storage and expensive fuel will boost far right and populist parties.
A full physical collapse this winter is unlikely: countries have strategic oil reserves and still take U.S. tankers. But a large price shock and a social-political crisis in the 2026/27 season are becoming a hard reality. The continent is again hostage to geopolitical wars, while Russia, even as it loses its long-term position, still extracts immediate financial gain from other people’s conflicts. The only question is how long that paradox can keep working in Moscow’s favor.
