Against the backdrop of rhetoric about “protecting sovereignty,” Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party is systematically shifting the political struggle from the realm of ideology to the realm of law. A new wave of bills and institutional changes is creating legal barriers that not only complicate the work of opposition parties and independent media, but are directly aimed at neutralizing them through funding blocks, administrative sanctions, and the expansion of the powers of special agencies.
In May 2025, Fidesz submitted a bill to parliament that gives state agencies the right to compile lists of organizations “suspected” of receiving foreign funding and to impose severe restrictions on them. The text of the initiative includes a wide range of measures: from mandatory reporting and public disclosure to the possibility of blocking bank transfers and initiating administrative proceedings against legal entities. Critics warn that the wording about “protecting national sovereignty” is so vague that it allows any organization whose views differ from those of the ruling party to be included in the registry.
At the end of November 2025, the Hungarian Parliament, where Fidesz and its ally KDNP hold a constitutional majority, adopted amendments to the Law on the Protection of National Sovereignty, significantly expanding the powers of the newly created Office for the Protection of Sovereignty. Now, any NGO or media outlet receiving more than 20% of its funding from abroad (previously the threshold was higher) is required to undergo an annual audit and publicly disclose all donors. Violations are punishable by fines of up to 3 million forints (about €7,500) and possible bans on activities. Opposition parties say that the Hungarian law effectively replicates Russia’s law on “foreign agents” and will be used against independent media and NGOs that support the opposition.
The pressure mechanism is simple and effective. First, financial strangulation through restrictions and transparency requirements, which creates the risk of fines, blockages, and reputational losses for donors, as well as sharply reducing the flow of funds to independent NGOs and media. Second, administrative degradation. The emergence of “blacklists” and expanded powers for new or repurposed structures means that every inspection becomes an excuse to slow down work, cause rental and banking problems, and lead to legal battles. As a result, organizations are forced to spend resources on defense and settlement instead of conducting public activities.
The latest changes also affected Hungarian party law. The amendments raise the minimum number of members required to register a new party from 1,000 to 5,000 and require the party to have branches in at least 50 municipalities (previously nine districts). Experts note that this will seriously hinder the emergence of new political players ahead of the 2029 European Parliament elections and the 2030 national elections.
The leader of the opposition coalition “Hungary for All,” Péter Márki-Zay, assessed such initiatives as another step toward authoritarianism.
These measures are not accidental; they are part of a continuum of long-standing policies by the Fidesz party and its leader, Mr. Orbán, to undermine media pluralism and civil society. Human rights organizations have noted a steady trend of interference in the work of media regulators, pressure on independent editorial offices, the use of state media to discredit opponents, and reforms that weaken judicial independence. The consequences for democratic infrastructure are clear: limited access to independent information for citizens, increased self-censorship, and the loss of platforms for political mobilization.
The role of the so-called Sovereignty Protection Office is particularly telling. Officially created to counter “external interference,” this body has been given the tools to monitor and compile lists of those who, in its assessment, “influence public opinion” to the detriment of state interests. In practice, this becomes a convenient tool for political disqualification, since any media project or NGO that has received a foreign grant or simply covered the authorities critically is at risk of being “labeled” and subsequently sanctioned.
The results are already visible today. Journalists and activists are taking to the streets in protest, editorial offices are losing advertisers and access to banking services, and charitable foundations are being forced to urgently change their legal structure or shut down their programs. International human rights organizations and individual governments have issued sharp criticism and open letters, pointing out that the proposed measures will even affect EU grants and civil society institutions in the region. Amnesty International and other organizations have expressed concern that the law could affect a wide range of organizations, including those that receive funding from the EU.
Practical cases demonstrate how the legal machine works “in real life.” Independent investigative publications have already come under scrutiny from the new structures. Investigations have been launched against some of them, complicating their work and undermining the trust of international donors. The result of pressure on the media is not only the seizure of money or the blocking of transfers, but also the “assignment” of the label “enemy” in official reports, a decline in public support, and an increase in administrative barriers to registration or holding events.
In its annual report on the rule of law, the European Commission notes the alarming trend that reforms in Hungary’s judicial system, media regulation, and mechanisms for controlling non-governmental organizations are increasing institutional risks and creating conditions for the political use of the law. This means that Hungary’s problem is not only local “political struggle,” but also a systemic shift that affects the state’s obligations to comply with democratic standards within the EU.
Attempts to circumvent the rules (reorganization of organizations, transfer of activities abroad, horizontal support networks) are restrained by the attention and resource capabilities of the authorities. The problem arises when the law begins to serve not the citizens, but the preservation of the monopoly on power, blurring the line between legality and repression. For civil society, this means a long period of adaptation in conditions of semi-legal marginalization.
In summary, the legal changes promoted by Fidesz appear to be part of a systematic strategy to shift the conflict into the legal sphere, where the government’s resources and administrative capabilities give it an advantage. As a result, opposition parties and independent media are losing their usual tools for political work, and civil society organizations are under constant threat. If these trends continue, Hungary risks losing the level of democratic pluralism and freedom of opinion that existed in the region a decade ago for a long time to come.