On 17 July 2026, the 26th Franco-German Council of Ministers took place at Augustusburg Castle in Brühl. Against the backdrop of the protracted military conflict in Ukraine and yet another crisis in the Middle East, Paris and Berlin issued a joint statement containing a direct ultimatum to Brussels’ foreign policy structure, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The main message of the document was the urgent need to fundamentally reform the “internal organisation of the EU’s foreign policy activity” to ensure a “stronger, faster and more coordinated” response to global challenges. At the upcoming European Council in October 2026, the leaders of the member states will be tasked with officially launching this process, and the final blueprint for a comprehensive overhaul is to be prepared by the end of 2026. Europe is no longer prepared to tolerate the diplomatic sluggishness that, amid the crises of 2026, has pushed Brussels “to the sidelines” of world politics.
The EEAS was conceived as Europe’s single voice on the international stage. However, the foundation of this structure contained a systemic flaw from the outset. Born of the Lisbon Treaty in 2010 as a “dirty compromise struck at three o’clock in the morning,” the EEAS was doomed to permanent structural friction. The key problem lies in the dual subordination of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a post currently held by Kaja Kallas. On the one hand, the HR/VP is a Vice-President of the European Commission; on the other, he or she is accountable to the 27 national governments through the Council of the EU.
This dual loyalty has led to a continuous struggle for influence, in which the EEAS’s powers constantly overlap with those of the Commission’s directorates-general — DG INTPA (International Partnerships) and DG TRADE — as well as with the apparatus of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the national foreign ministries of the member states. Meanwhile, the EEAS’s annual budget stands at a modest €1 billion. By comparison, this is incommensurate with the resources of the world’s leading diplomatic services, resulting in a shortage of analytical capacity and a steady loss of qualified personnel. In the end, the EEAS has become not an instrument of “power politics” but a bureaucratic conveyor belt for agreeing non-binding communiqués and lengthy sanctions lists.
The period from 2022 to 2026 clearly demonstrated how the structural weaknesses of the EEAS hinder the operational defence of Europe’s security interests. Although the EU managed to adopt 20 packages of sanctions against Russia, the approval process each time turned into a months-long bureaucratic drama. Individual member states with veto power regularly delayed the adoption of critical decisions. Negotiations on defence initiatives and arms deliveries stretched on for months; legal hesitation and the search for compromises slowed the use of Russian Central Bank assets; and the agreement of energy restrictions and measures against Russia’s “shadow fleet” suffered from numerous exemptions and caveats that reduced the effectiveness of the measures taken.
Russian diplomacy systematically exploited the requirement of full consensus as the key vulnerability of EU foreign policy.
The final trigger that pushed Paris and Berlin into decisive action was the events surrounding Iran in the summer of 2026. The military escalation (Operation Epic Fury) culminated in the signing of a US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, in which the United States, Pakistan and Qatar acted as the key mediators. Europe, including the traditional E3 negotiating group, was completely excluded from the diplomatic process. As analysts from The Soufan Center noted in their report of 30 June 2026, “Missing in Action: Europe’s Absence in the Diplomatic Process to End the Iran War,” the EU demonstrated a complete inability to act at high tempo. Having concentrated all its diplomatic resources on the Ukrainian track, Kaja Kallas and the EEAS proved unable to compensate for internal disagreements between the capitals. As a result, when Washington and regional powers accelerated events, Brussels found itself in the role of a bystander.
The public joint statement by Paris and Berlin of 17 July 2026 was only the tip of the iceberg; it was preceded by a series of closed consultations and leaks in leading European media. According to the Financial Times (article of 11 June 2026, “EU countries weigh ‘tearing apart’ the bloc’s diplomatic service”), France had already prepared a secret analytical paper in June outlining options for a radical overhaul of the EEAS. A series of investigations by Politico Europe in late June and early July 2026 — “Why the EEAS is fighting for its future” and “How Paris, Berlin and the Berlaymont are plotting to switch off the EU’s diplomatic service” — revealed unofficial reform scenarios. These included limiting the autonomy of the High Representative; transferring strategic foreign-policy functions back to national capitals, the Council or the Commission; reducing and consolidating the network of EU delegations abroad; and, in the most radical scenario, dismantling the EEAS in its current form and folding the service back into the structure of the European Commission or creating an alternative European Security Council — an idea actively promoted by experts such as Stefan Lehne of Carnegie Europe.
Within the Paris-Berlin axis, differences in approach remain. France traditionally defends the concept of national sovereignty and the return of powers to the capitals, while Germany leans towards structural solutions within the EU institutions. Both powers, however, agree on the main point: the existing model of the EEAS is dysfunctional and requires deep changes.
Recognising the depth of the threat, Kaja Kallas and the EEAS leadership have gone on the defensive. Internal appointments, including the recruitment of former Dutch Defence Minister Kajsa Ollongren as the service’s new Secretary-General, represent an attempt to strengthen the politico-military dimension and demonstrate readiness for change. In messages to EEAS staff, Kallas emphasises that the service has already delivered enormous “added value” through activities ranging from the coordination of sanctions to the scaling-up of work with the Global South. The EEAS argument is simple: weakening an already fragile diplomatic apparatus at a moment of acute geopolitical crises would finally deprive Europe of agency.
The coming months until the end of 2026 will be decisive for Europe’s future. At stake are key questions: will the EU retain a single foreign-policy vector, or will a partial “nationalisation” of foreign policy in favour of national capitals take place; how will the reform affect the integration of Ukraine and the countries of the Western Balkans, which requires operational and firm diplomatic decisions; and will the EU be able to build an effective foreign policy amid unpredictable global processes, the growing influence of China and the unrelenting Russian threat?The October EU summit and the final report due by the end of 2026 will draw a line under the multi-year experiment of creating a single European diplomatic service. For some, such an outcome will represent a victory for pragmatism; for others, a defeat of the idea of Europe’s single voice.