A decade ago, Poland was perceived in the West as an important, but still “junior partner” of other NATO states. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fundamentally changed everything and forced most countries to rethink their defense doctrines and approaches, and Poland was no exception. It not only realistically assessed the scale of the Russian threat, but also began to prepare for potential defense and rearm its own army.
In 2025, Poland spent about 4.7% of its GDP on defense, the most among other NATO countries. Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced his intention to increase this figure to 5% in 2026. According to Reuters, during 2026, the Polish Ministry of Defense plans to conduct military training of at least 400,000 people in order to increase the mobilization reserve and increase the size of the regular army to 300,000 by the end of 2026. For comparison, the German Bundeswehr currently has about 180,000 personnel and faces recruitment problems. Poland already has one of the largest armies in Europe, and in the medium term there are plans to increase its size to 500,000 soldiers. Recent sociological surveys have shown that more than 52% of Poles support the return of compulsory military service due to the threat of Russian aggression.
The pace of rearmament is also impressive. Poland is purchasing American Abrams tanks, Patriot air defense systems, HIMARS MLRS, F-35 aircraft, as well as South Korean K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled guns and K239 Chunmoo multiple launch rocket systems. Moreover, at least 486 units of American HIMARS systems alone are planned to be purchased by 2030. Warsaw is trying not to limit itself to imports, and last year the government of D. Tusk signed an agreement with the British BAE Systems to assist in the deployment of production of 155-mm artillery shells in Poland.
Aware of the military and hybrid threats from Belarus and Russia, the Polish government has initiated the Eastern Shield defense initiative, which is aimed at strengthening the protection of the eastern borders. The program is one of the largest investments in national security and border defense in the entire post-war history of Poland. It is a network of fortifications, anti-tank obstacles, detection systems, storage and transport infrastructure, which should give the army time to deploy and deter the aggressor. The EU recognized Eastern Shield as a flagship project and gave it strategic importance.
After a series of incidents involving Russian drones and missiles crossing its airspace, Warsaw began demanding a more active response from NATO. In September 2025, British Typhoon fighter jets carried out an air patrol mission over Poland, which London called a confirmation of the Alliance’s determination to protect Polish airspace. For Warsaw, such missions are important in terms of military and political support, demonstrating that Poland is not a periphery, but an outpost of security on NATO’s eastern flank.
Not the least role in this was played by Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Unlike the previous government, his government is trying to combine a tough and proactive defense policy, while trying to restore trust in Poland in the EU. This gave Warsaw the opportunity to speak with Brussels on an equal footing and offer effective solutions. Under Tusk’s government, Poland has become the main driver of the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, which involves investments in defense, and the Prime Minister himself is increasingly speaking openly about the need to build an independent European nuclear deterrent system.
Polish defense policy is fully consistent with the long-term plans of the United Kingdom. After leaving the EU, London is focused on ensuring the protection of NATO’s eastern borders, countering Russian hybrid interference, defense cooperation and supporting Ukraine. Back in January 2025, the United Kingdom and Poland agreed to begin work on a new defense and security agreement. The British government believes that the agreement should strengthen Europe’s defense against Russian aggression, and also provides for joint counteraction to disinformation and hybrid threats. In practice, this creates an informal alliance of London, Warsaw and Kyiv, in which Poland plays the role of a rear and land hub, Britain provides military-political support, and Ukraine directly repels the Russian army on the battlefield.
The positions of Polish and British military experts coincide in understanding the Russian threat and they have no illusions about the Kremlin’s peaceful intentions. They understand perfectly well that Russia’s policy of “appeasement” is counterproductive and impossible, and countermeasures should include investments in the defense sector, sanctions, increased military production and active support for Ukraine. For Warsaw, the British partnership is important because it serves as a kind of compensation for Europe’s weakness and inertia in matters of military planning. Against the background of discussions in the EU about who and how should be responsible for the security of NATO’s eastern flank, the tandem of Poland, Britain and the Baltic states looks the most realistic.
There are also problematic aspects to all this. Poland is rapidly building up its army, but the scale of military purchases and contracts is already raising questions about the quality of personnel training, the problem of ensuring repair logistics, and the financial sustainability of the rearmament program. It is much faster to increase the number of troops on paper than to turn recruits and reservists into a real combat-ready force. The second weak link is dependence on external suppliers. Although Warsaw is trying to localize some of the production, other critically important segments of the military-industrial complex, from aviation to missile programs, remain tied to the United States and, to a lesser extent, to South Korea. The third problem is air and missile defense, since this component remains the most expensive and most difficult to implement in practice.
Poland today is perhaps the most serious about the scenario of a major war in Europe. However, the transformation of the defense budget into a real combat capability always lags behind political declarations. That is why Warsaw, despite some political disagreements with Kiev, is inclined to support Ukraine. For it, the Ukrainian front is not just a matter of solidarity, but a time buffer that gives Poland the opportunity to complete its own rearmament, complete the infrastructure of the “Eastern Shield” and increase its reserves.
Poland is no longer a country that asks the Alliance for security guarantees. It is positioning itself as a country capable of shaping the defense agenda for Europe itself. And in the event that Russia and Belarus try to test NATO’s eastern flank, Warsaw has a chance to show other European countries an example of mobilizing political will and a worthy armed response.