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Political turbulence in Romania and the Kremlin’s shadow hand

Romania has entered another phase of political crisis after the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the largest force in the ruling coalition, withdrew its support for liberal Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and began demanding his resignation. The loss of a parliamentary majority immediately created conditions for protracted inter-party negotiations and the possibility of a vote of no confidence against the current government. The destabilization serves the interests of the far-right and Eurosceptic opposition, while Russia is also contributing to the unrest through massive cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

The catalyst for the political crisis was a dispute over budget cuts and tax reforms required to meet Brussels’ demands — non-compliance directly threatens the country’s access to €11 billion in European funds. Furthermore, the pro-European forces’ loss of a parliamentary majority has complicated the implementation of defense contracts worth €16.6 billion and created a power vacuum that the Kremlin has moved swiftly to exploit by intensifying hybrid pressure on Romania.

In March 2026, Romania suffered an unprecedented wave of cyberattacks, with state institutions and critical infrastructure management systems subjected to no fewer than 10,000 intrusion attempts per day. The primary targets were the Ministries of Interior and Justice, the National Water Resources Agency, and the email accounts of senior military officials. Responsibility for the attacks was claimed by pro-Russian cyber groups NoName057(16), Qilin, and Gentlemen. The scale of the interference was officially confirmed by Defense Minister Radu Miruță and the leadership of the National Directorate of Cyber Security (DNSC), who established that these technical acts of sabotage were accompanied by a large-scale disinformation campaign.

The information warfare was aimed at radicalizing Romanian society through the mass dissemination on social media of narratives about the loss of national sovereignty under Brussels’ diktat, the futility of military aid to Ukraine, and the artificially inflated threat posed by Ukrainian refugees allegedly draining the country’s budget. These messages were targeted at conservative segments of the population, residents of rural regions, and voters dissatisfied with the austerity policies of Ilie Bolojan’s government. A direct consequence of the sustained information offensive has been a surge in support for the radicalized Eurosceptic opposition, whose ratings have rapidly climbed to 20–25%, despite their lack of any constructive development agenda for Romania.

To achieve this, Russia employs four main disinformation channels. The first is the mass distribution of political content on social media, primarily TikTok. The second involves network activity through “neutral” or dormant accounts that suddenly began operating as message amplifiers — some of these pages had previously covered topics like nail art, football, or cars, before switching to political content that garnered thousands of views ahead of elections. The third channel is Telegram, which serves as the primary relay for pro-Russian narratives. According to researchers at OpenMinds, 24% of Romanian-language Telegram channels spread Kremlin disinformation, and every fourth message promotes material from Russian state media and other pro-Kremlin sources. The fourth channel combines digital campaigns with offline activity and political crisis exploitation. Romanian MPs, having reviewed classified intelligence materials, concluded that cyberattacks, disinformation, and propaganda were deployed against the electoral process in support of Eurosceptic candidates and parties, who in turn incorporated these narratives into their political rhetoric.

The greatest beneficiaries of this Russian intelligence activity are Romania’s far-right and ultranationalist forces, whose core consists of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) led by George Simion, Diana Șoșoacă’s radical S.O.S. Romania party, and the Party of Young People (POT) — all of whose activities are actively promoted by Russian propaganda outlets Sputnik and RT.

Romania’s chances of emerging from the current political crisis depend on the coalition’s ability to reach a compromise. The country retains strong democratic institutions, maintains political consensus on EU and NATO membership, perceives the Russian threat as entirely real, and has accumulated experience in countering Russian interference. For now, Romania has entered a state of political turbulence from which it is unlikely to emerge quickly or without political consequences — a situation that Russia will inevitably exploit, as its political strategists and intelligence services continue to leverage the polarization of Romanian society to further destabilize the country.