On January 1, 2007, when Romania joined the European Union, Brussels viewed the reform of its judicial system as one of the key tests of the country’s ability to become a full-fledged European democracy. Corruption in state institutions at the time was chronic, and according to Transparency International data, in the mid-2000s Romania remained one of the most corrupt countries in the EU. For this reason, alongside its accession to the EU, a special monitoring mechanism was created — the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) — designed to oversee judicial reform and the fight against corruption.
Over the following decade, Romania indeed became an example of a tough anti-corruption campaign. The National Anticorruption Directorate (Direcția Națională Anticorupție — DNA) turned into one of the most powerful institutions in the country. Between 2013 and 2018, the DNA sent hundreds of cases to court each year against ministers and high-ranking officials. In 2015 alone, the agency reported more than 1,250 defendants. For Brussels, this appeared to be a rare success story of Eastern European reform, while for the Romanian political elite, it was perceived as a threat.
It was at this moment that a system began to take shape — one that is now increasingly described by Romanian lawyers, journalists, and international observers as a mechanism of corporate protection for the judicial-political class.
The symbol of Romania’s anti-corruption campaign was Laura Codruța Kövesi, the head of the DNA. Under her leadership, the agency launched investigations against representatives of virtually all major political parties. In 2015, then-Prime Minister Victor Ponta came under investigation, and dozens of mayors, county governors, and deputies received real prison sentences.
However, by 2016–2017, a powerful bloc against the DNA had formed within the political system. The turning point was the rise to power of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), led by Liviu Dragnea — a politician who had himself been convicted of electoral fraud. It was under the PSD government that a large-scale judicial reform began. Officially presented as “restoring the balance between branches of power,” in practice the reform significantly limited the possibilities for anti-corruption prosecutions.
In January 2017, the government attempted to decriminalize certain corruption offenses by emergency ordinance if the damage to the state was less than 200,000 lei. This decision triggered the largest protests in Romania since the fall of the Ceaușescu regime. According to various estimates, between 250,000 and 300,000 people took to the streets in Bucharest alone. Under public pressure, the ordinance was withdrawn. Nevertheless, the authorities continued the reform through other means.
In 2018, a special structure was created — the Section for Investigating Offences in the Judiciary (SIIJ) — which was granted exclusive authority to investigate crimes committed by judges and prosecutors. Formally aimed at combating abuses within the judicial system, the SIIJ quickly became a tool for pressuring independent judges and prosecutors. The European Commission, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe repeatedly warned Bucharest that the creation of the SIIJ could be used for political control over the judiciary. However, Romanian authorities continued to insist that it was about “protecting the independence of justice.”
By the early 2020s, Romania’s judicial system was increasingly accused not of classical corruption involving direct bribes, but of institutional collusion. The system had developed mechanisms allowing it to protect itself regardless of the political situation. A key role in this structure is played by the Superior Council of the Magistracy (CSM), which controls appointments, disciplinary procedures, and career advancement for judges and prosecutors. According to Romanian lawyers and journalists, it is through personnel decisions that dependence of magistrates on the system’s leadership has been created. Judges who issued inconvenient decisions faced disciplinary checks, delays in promotion, or transfers.
A particularly resonant issue was the statute of limitations for cases. In 2022, the Constitutional Court of Romania issued a series of decisions that effectively jeopardized thousands of criminal cases. The Court ruled that the legislation on statutes of limitations had been incorrectly applied for several years, allowing defense lawyers to seek the closure of cases — even those involving high-profile corruption investigations. According to Romanian media and experts, the consequences affected several thousand proceedings. Among those who benefited from the Constitutional Court’s decisions were former ministers, officials, and businessmen accused of corruption. Critics argued that the Constitutional Court had become a tool for systemic protection of political elites. What caused particular outrage was that many cases were closed after years of investigations, expensive expert examinations, and court proceedings. The state had spent millions of euros on investigations that ultimately ended in nothing due to procedural decisions.
However, the real shock for Romanian society was the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the results of the first round of the presidential elections on December 6, 2024. This decision was unprecedented in modern Europe. The grounds cited by the court were statements from Romanian intelligence services about possible external interference, an alleged Russian information operation, and opaque funding of the far-right candidate Călin Georgescu. Particular attention was paid to the TikTok campaign, networks of anonymous accounts, and suspicions of hidden advertising.
The problem was that the Constitutional Court had previously declared the first round valid. Moreover, the annulment occurred just two days before the second round, when the Romanian diaspora had already begun voting. According to analysts, the court’s decision became a symbol of the judiciary turning into an independent political actor. Even some pro-European politicians who supported a tough stance against Russian influence stated that a dangerous mechanism of judicial interference in the electoral process had been created.
The consequences were significant. After the cancellation of the elections, support for far-right and anti-establishment parties surged sharply. According to sociological surveys published in Romanian and European media in 2025, about 70% of citizens did not trust the country’s judicial system — one of the lowest figures in the European Union. Disappointment was particularly noticeable among young people and the Romanian diaspora, who had traditionally supported anti-corruption reforms.
At the same time, anti-Brussels rhetoric intensified. The European Union was accused of double standards: for years, European institutions had praised the Romanian judicial model as an example of successful reform, yet once signs of politicization appeared, Brussels’ reaction was cautious and delayed.
Why have the reforms reached a dead end?
The main problem of Romania’s modern judicial system is that any attempt at reform is now automatically perceived as a political attack. If the authorities propose limiting the powers of the Constitutional Court or changing the disciplinary control system, it is immediately interpreted as pressure on judicial independence. If reforms are not carried out, society sees it as the preservation of corporate opacity and impunity.
As a result, Romania’s justice system has found itself in a deadlock. The paradox is that the tools — such as the independence of the magistracy, the strengthening of the prosecution, and the autonomy of the courts — created after Romania’s accession to the EU and originally designed to cleanse the state, have over time become mechanisms for the system’s self-preservation.
The crisis of the Romanian judicial system has long ceased to be solely an internal problem for Bucharest. It has forced the EU to confront the question of how viable the European model of exported justice really is — a model built on the assumption that the independence of institutions automatically guarantees democratic accountability. Romania has shown that independence without proper control can generate no fewer abuses than direct political interference.