The case of prominent Pan-African activist Kemi Seba could become one of the most illustrative examples of how influence networks established by Russia in Africa may now be used against Europe itself.
On 16 April 2026, the Associated Press reported that Kemi Seba was detained in Pretoria by South African police on the basis of an international arrest warrant issued by the Beninese authorities on charges of “incitement to rebellion”. His son and another African far-right figure, François van der Merwe, were also detained. According to the case materials, van der Merwe was allegedly expected to assist them in illegally crossing the border into Zimbabwe, from where they planned to continue their journey to Europe.
In addition to the alleged attempt to leave South Africa illegally via Zimbabwe, Kemi Seba is suspected of preparing acts of sabotage and terrorism in Europe. On 11 August 2026, Bloomberg, citing South African prosecution documents, reported that he had received $15,500 from Russian sources intended to facilitate an illegal relocation.
Kemi Seba has long been known as a Pan-African activist and opponent of French influence in Africa. He has built a substantial following in Francophone African countries, operated YouTube and Telegram channels, and consistently promoted anti-Western views. This ideological positioning made him a convenient partner for Russian influence structures. His contacts with Russia began well before the current case. In December 2017, Russian Eurasianist ideologue Alexander Dugin invited Seba to Moscow, where they discussed the creation, under Russian initiative, of a geopolitical alliance between the Pan-African and Eurasian movements to oppose “Western hegemony”, with Russia expected to play the role of the principal unifying force.
On 23 September 2024, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported that, since 2018, Kemi Seba had cooperated with the former Wagner PMC and information structures associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. According to RUSI, he received approximately $440,000 in fees and funding for the development of his political project. One RUSI source who had worked within Wagner’s information team claimed that Pan-African activists such as Seba primarily disseminated narratives aligned with Russian interests.
The cooperation subsequently intensified. In March 2022, Seba spoke at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), where he publicly supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and promoted ideas of anti-European revanchism in Africa. In spring 2023, he delivered a similar message at the Russian State Duma, while Russian structures used him as a representative of an allegedly “authentic African position” opposed to Western influence. In July 2024, the French authorities stripped him of his citizenship, while in August of the same year the military authorities in Niger issued him a diplomatic passport.
Over recent years, Russia has established a multi-layered system of influence across Africa. Its principal instruments have included political consulting, propaganda, cooperation with local journalists, bloggers, radical activists and civil-society movements. According to RUSI, Wagner-linked information structures outsourced part of their activities to African companies, which recruited local journalists and influencers. Through these networks, the expansion of Russian influence was presented as an alternative to French “neo-colonialism”.
One prominent element of this system was AFRIC – the Association for Free Research and International Cooperation, which was linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin’s political and information infrastructure. In parallel, Russia established the Africa Corps, a military-political structure created under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence and linked to Russian military intelligence. It replaced parts of the Wagner PMC’s operations and has been used to support regimes aligned with Moscow in several African countries.
The information component of this system relies on the African Initiative media agency, the RT and Sputnik networks, as well as internet trolls, bot networks and sympathetic civil-society organisations, including the Urgences Panafricanistes movement. Through this infrastructure, Moscow has sought to amplify anti-Western and anti-French sentiment across the Sahel – particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – while supporting protest mobilisation and shaping favourable narratives around political developments. Russian involvement is consequently portrayed not as external interference, but as support for “local resistance”.
This model is most effective when influential local or diaspora figures are used to disseminate the desired narratives. One of the most prominent examples is Franco-Cameroonian activist Nathalie Yamb, who became known as the “Lady from Sochi” following her appearance at the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019.
Through accounts on X, YouTube and Facebook with a combined audience of more than 500,000 followers, Yamb actively promoted narratives concerning “French neo-colonialism” and called for the withdrawal of European military missions from the Sahel. To reach European audiences, she appeared in French far-right media and participated in podcasts hosted by far-right commentators.
This format enabled pro-Russian narratives to be presented not as external propaganda, but as the views of an allegedly independent African activist. This, in turn, created opportunities to engage with protest sentiment among African diaspora communities in France, Belgium and Switzerland. The further dissemination of such content was supported by targeted hashtags and activity by Russia-linked information networks, leading the European Union to impose sanctions on Nathalie Yamb in June 2025.
In the broader geopolitical competition in Africa, Russia has exploited the weakening of traditional European positions to significantly expand its political and information influence. This has been particularly visible in the Sahel, where Moscow has established relations with local military regimes while simultaneously developing a network of media, political and civil-society partners.
For Europe, the key concern is that this infrastructure may no longer operate exclusively within Africa. Networks of activists, influencers, political organisations and individuals linked to security structures that were developed on the continent can potentially be used to engage European audiences, radical political environments and African diaspora communities.
The Kemi Seba case is therefore significant precisely because it may indicate a transition from information and political influence towards more coercive forms of hybrid activity.
If the allegations concerning his plans in Europe are substantiated, this would indicate that the influence system established by Russia in Africa is gradually extending beyond the continent itself. The issue would then no longer be limited to competition for political influence in Africa, but would involve the use of networks developed there as an instrument of pressure directly targeting European countries.