Russian hybrid attacks and has become a battleground for the unofficial standoff between Russia and NATO. The Kremlin is attempting to destabilize the situation there by resorting to provocations and actions that fall short of open military conflict. Regular flights by Russian military aircraft near NATO airspace, interference with satellite navigation systems
(jamming), and acts of sabotage provide grounds for viewing these provocations as part of a broader set of measures to prepare for a hybrid operation against one or more Alliance countries. All of these actions by Russia are also intended to test the defense alliance’s response options and the coordination of allies’ actions in crisis situations.
The most common provocation involves Russian fighter jets violating the airspace of European countries near the Baltic states, flying very close to the border and occasionally entering the airspace for a brief period. Since the beginning of 2026, European fighter jets participating in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission have scrambled more than 100 times to respond to violations of flight regulations by Russian military aircraft in the Baltic region.
During a single sortie like this, the allies often intercepted several Russian aircraft at once. At the same time, the Russian military aviation is in gross violation of international flight regulations, as its aircraft fly without their transponders activated, fail to report their flight plans, and often ignore radio communications with NATO air traffic control services. Such flights serve several purposes at once: they demonstrate a military presence, force NATO to expend resources in response, and at the same time allow Moscow to observe the operational procedures of the Alliance’s air defense and aviation systems. The systematic nature of these incidents and their high frequency provide grounds for viewing them as part of a broader strategy to exert pressure on the West.
Another element of the hybrid confrontation between Russia and the West is GPS jamming. The bulk of the electronic warfare (EW) and navigation spoofing capabilities in the Baltic Sea region are deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast.
According to intelligence reports and the Lithuanian State Security Department, the deployment of new specialized antenna complexes (including the “Tobol” and “Pole-21” systems) has been observed within this Russian enclave, and a significant expansion of the GPS signal jamming radius has also been noted.
This jamming affects the airspace and territorial waters of Poland and the Baltic states, and extends as far as the Danish Straits and the Swedish island of Gotland.
The effects of such jamming have recently been observed even near the Danish island of Bornholm, affecting merchant ships and civilian aircraft in the vicinity, which were unable to accurately track their geographical location.
According to reports from the ISW and the GPSJam monitoring service, the manipulation and transmission of false GPS coordinates (spoofing) pose risks to aviation safety, and as early as 2026, Finnair and Lufthansa had to cancel or adjust flight routes on multiple occasions due to signal loss while flying in the airspace of the Baltic States and Scandinavia near the Baltic Sea.
On May 26, 2026, Reuters, citing Darius Kulešius, deputy head of the Lithuanian telecommunications regulator, reported that, according to intelligence data, Russia began using 36 electronic warfare stations in 2026, compared to three at the beginning of 2025. On August 10, 2026, the Danish broadcaster DR reported detecting a record level of navigation interference in the area around the island of Bornholm.
A Danish Armed Forces monitoring station located there recorded at least 30 instances of GPS signal jamming and the transmission of false coordinates in 2026, compared to 16 such instances throughout 2025 and 11 in 2024. According to military experts, this activity is intended to test mechanisms for disrupting the navigation and orientation of NATO naval forces, as well as to hinder allied logistics in the event that Russia carries out a hybrid special operation.
The rise in hybrid threats from the Russian Federation has forced the Baltic states and Finland to shift from a passive monitoring stance to active measures and begin developing scenarios for responding in the event of an escalation by Russia. As reported by Ilta-Sanomat on August 9, 2026, Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hykkänen stated that Helsinki recognizes its role in collective self-defense and will begin preparing its military infrastructure to safeguard its own security.
The nature of the statements made by officials from the Baltic and Scandinavian countries indicates that they view Russian provocations as systematic and premeditated actions.
On August 6, 2026, Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas stated that Lithuanian intelligence believes Russia may use captured Ukrainian drones against the Baltic states for provocations or “false-flag” operations.
The current trend in Russian activity in the Baltic region indicates that the Kremlin is seriously preparing for a possible escalation and the launch of a hybrid special operation against one or more NATO countries. And although a final decision on whether to carry it out does not appear to have been made yet, the Kremlin’s strategy—by creating local tensions—is to generate uncertainty, which is, in fact, one of the tactics of hybrid confrontation, allowing Moscow to test the limits of what is acceptable, observe the Alliance’s reaction, and gradually increase the level of escalation.