The A7 payment system was established and launched in 2024 by Promsvyazbank (PSB), a Russian state-owned bank serving the country’s Defence Supply Base (DSB). In the Russian Federation, the entity is legally registered as LLC A7 (Obshchestvo s ogranichennoi otvetstvennostiu A7).
Promsvyazbank provided the newly established company with its own IT infrastructure, personnel, and initial capital. The A7 platform itself operates as an autonomous network comprising payment agents, cryptocurrency exchanges, and a network of foreign intermediary banks. This structure enables the involvement of Russian entities in international transactions to be concealed and allows A7 to remain formally outside the direct scope of compliance controls applied by foreign banks.
The platform processes payments without using bank accounts held with Western financial institutions, including US dollar-denominated accounts. At the beginning of a transaction, the Russian importer uploads a commercial invoice directly to the A7 platform. The service then verifies the transaction amount, payment destination, recipient, and required currency, after which the system engages designated payment agents or intermediary banks in Asian countries that have not undertaken equivalent sanctions commitments.
To conceal the nature of the transactions, A7 uses so-called irrevocable bills of exchange, which may be issued for an amount equivalent to the transaction value in Chinese yuan, UAE dirhams, or even euros. According to specialists, A7 has also developed a programme known as Invoicer, which modifies suppliers’ invoices in order to prevent the actual purpose of a payment from triggering scrutiny by bank compliance departments or international financial-monitoring mechanisms. While the transaction amount remains unchanged, information identifying the Russian purchaser and the actual description of the goods is removed from the invoice and replaced with descriptions of ordinary consumer goods that are less likely to attract the attention of financial-monitoring systems. As a result, the transaction appears externally to be a conventional commercial operation between companies with no formal connection to Russia.
In addition to bills of exchange, the system uses its own stablecoin, A7A5, which is pegged to the Russian ruble at a 1:1 ratio. In a January 2026 report, the analytical company Elliptic recorded total A7A5 stablecoin turnover of more than $100 billion. On 12 March 2026, Chainalysis reported that $2.2 billion had passed through cryptocurrency exchanges linked to A7. In a study dated 15 May 2026, experts at TRM Labs stated that “A7 crypto assets function as the primary channel for financial settlements among entities excluded from the international banking system.” Notably, approximately 65% of all transactions processed by the platform are currently denominated in Chinese yuan.
A7’s foreign network of counterparties includes financial and trading institutions in countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates. An investigation by IPN reported that Keremet Bank and Capital Bank of Central Asia served as key operational links in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the A7 holding established subsidiaries in the country under the names A71 and A7-Agent, as well as a company called Old Vector for cryptocurrency issuance.
In Uzbekistan, the Russian company established structures operating under the names Uzimpextrade and Urimpextrade. In the UAE, A7’s network is represented by the Dubai-based company Favnir SRL-FZ, while cryptocurrency transactions associated with the platform are serviced by the Kyrgyz exchange Grinex.
By early 2026, the UK-US research organisation Open Source Centre (OSC) had identified at least 75 Russian sanctioned entities using A7’s services, including companies operating in the nuclear sector, manufacturers of military equipment, and military logistics operators. The list included MG-Flot, whose vessels are reportedly used to transport millions of artillery shells and other military cargoes from North Korea and Iran, as well as Rustakt, one of the largest suppliers of FPV drones to the Russian armed forces. Researchers paid particular attention to the resilience of the A7 system, noting that Rustakt, despite being subject to European and US sanctions, continues to conduct transactions worth tens of millions of US dollars through the platform.
The A7 financial and cryptocurrency platform therefore represents a significantly broader and more complex challenge to Western sanctions policy than an individual cryptocurrency exchange or sanctioned bank. In effect, Russia has established an alternative financial infrastructure for international settlements in which every participant—from the purchaser to the final supplier—constitutes a separate link in a single payment chain.
At the same time, the scheme retains a significant vulnerability: A7 remains dependent on foreign banks and their correspondent accounts, particularly in Asian countries, some of which continue to use SWIFT and maintain links with the Western financial system. In this context, one of the most effective measures available would be to expand secondary sanctions against companies and banks that facilitate A7 transactions on behalf of Russian entities.