One of the central issues on today’s civilizational agenda is energy. Humanity’s growing needs require ever more energy, and the world’s leading minds are seeking all possible reliable sources of supply to counterbalance traditional hydrocarbons and nuclear power. Yet oil and gas are in no hurry to surrender their positions, remaining strategic commodities.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Europe’s energy dependence on supplies from the Russian Federation has shifted from being an economic issue to one of the key factors of security and stability. Gas and oil have become not only commodities but also instruments of pressure, while Europe’s energy crisis reflects the Kremlin’s longstanding policy of creating infrastructural and pricing dependency.
Historically, Russia—never a “source” of advanced technology—became a major raw-material appendage for Europe, enabling it for decades to build a consistent network of influence through oil and gas exports. The Kremlin placed its bets on projects such as Nord Stream and TurkStream, which significantly reduced the importance of transit states like Ukraine, Poland, or Slovakia—depriving them not only of revenue but also of political weight in the region. Russia repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to use energy as a lever of pressure. One need only recall the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, when disputes with Ukraine’s Naftogaz led to supply disruptions in Europe.
The result was a unique situation in which the EU’s largest economy—Germany—became deeply integrated into the Russian supply system, while several Central and Eastern European states were rendered virtually hostages to Moscow’s energy policy.
Predictably, after 2022, Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas turned into an acute crisis. Reduced energy supplies, sanctions, and soaring gas prices triggered a sharp increase in electricity and heating tariffs. This immediately hit households and industry alike, leading on the one hand to rising social protests and on the other to a loss of competitiveness for European businesses, particularly those dependent on energy-intensive production.
The high cost of energy also became a driver of political instability. In countries where tariffs rose especially steeply, populist and pro-Russian parties gained ground, blaming Brussels for the failure of energy policy and calling for a “revision” of sanctions. In Slovakia and Hungary, for example, the energy agenda has been directly used to justify a softer stance toward Russia.
Russian influence over the European energy sector was expressed above all in infrastructural dominance. Pipelines built to bypass Ukraine and other transit states allowed Moscow to vary supply volumes and apply selective pressure to different EU members, deepening the dependence of some while pressuring others. Gazprom contracts also played a key role. Long-term agreements often contained provisions that complicated European countries’ ability to escape dependency, creating legal uncertainty and raising the risk of penalty sanctions.
Even after imports were reduced, Russian energy resources remained a significant source of revenue for its budget, directly fueling military operations and enabling the Kremlin to use exports as an instrument of economic coercion. Political lobbying should not be underestimated either. Within the EU, actors appealing to the need for “energy stability” and advocating the preservation of certain ties with Russia slow decision-making at the Union level and deepen divisions between states, complicating the formation of a common energy and foreign policy line.
At the same time, the energy crisis exposed a host of vulnerabilities within Europe. The first was aging infrastructure. It became evident that the development of cross-border power lines and gas storage facilities was progressing too slowly, severely limiting flexibility in reallocating energy flows between countries. Price discrepancies further complicate matters, as differences in tariff systems, taxes, and grid fees produce imbalances: some states must spend more on household subsidies, while others direct resources to supporting industry.
No less significant was social pressure. The sharp price hikes fueled mass discontent, amplified protest movements, and made energy one of the central issues of domestic politics. Climate-related factors remain an additional source of risk. The so-called “dunkelflaute” periods—when both solar and wind generation are low—intensify reliance on gas and, under conditions of limited reserves, increase the vulnerability of Europe’s energy system. It must be acknowledged that as of today, so-called “green” energy is still not fully competitive with thermal and nuclear power.
Under these circumstances, Brussels has been actively working to reduce Russia’s influence. The REPowerEU plan envisages the accelerated development of renewables, diversification of imports, and measures to improve energy efficiency. In 2025, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to phasing out Russian hydrocarbons entirely by 2028 and is also discussing a ban on signing new contracts with Russian companies.
In parallel, the European Commission has presented the European Grids Package, aimed at eliminating bottlenecks in electricity networks and building “energy highways.” This should reduce the risk of disruptions and ensure system balancing. Particular attention is being paid to social policy: subsidies and tariff compensations are being introduced to protect households and businesses, while targeted support programs are designed for energy-dependent sectors.
Yet serious divisions persist within the EU. States with powerful industries demand protection of their competitiveness, while countries with fewer resources insist on a fairer sharing of transition costs. Russia skillfully exploits these contradictions, sowing doubts and nudging parts of the political elite toward advocating “continued dialogue.” Against this backdrop, dependence on Russian fuel is increasingly viewed not as an economic issue but as a threat to sovereignty. Moscow’s ability to influence tariffs, create disruptions, or use energy as political leverage turns hydrocarbons into a geopolitical weapon.
The energy crisis has demonstrated that Europe ignored the political dimension of energy for far too long. It is now clear that Russian influence is not merely the result of advantageous contracts but a strategic project aimed at undermining EU unity. Overcoming dependency requires not only technological investments but also political solidarity—harmonizing tariffs, creating unified market rules, accelerating infrastructure development, and supporting those countries and social groups that bear the highest costs.
Only under such consolidation will Europe be able to turn energy from a vulnerability into an instrument of autonomy, and finally deprive Moscow of the ability to dictate the rules on the European continent.