Unsettled times in every era have always provided fertile ground for making profit, even of questionable ethical nature. War, however, most clearly illustrates the principle that all means are fair when it comes to profit. As the saying goes – money has no smell. Although this was never meant in the context of war, the principle is eagerly embraced by profiteers who seek to make fortunes “on blood.”
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union and its partners introduced unprecedented sanctions packages aimed at cutting Moscow off from finances, technology, and military capabilities. Yet alongside the official statements of European unity, a less visible but extremely dangerous reality persists. A network of grey schemes has emerged, allowing Russian businesses to obtain goods and technology, while certain European suppliers pocket profits by circumventing restrictions.
Sanctions evasion has relied on several well-tested mechanisms. The simplest is transit through third countries. Goods from the EU are officially exported to states loyal to Moscow, such as Turkey, the UAE, or Kazakhstan, where documents are altered before being re-routed to Russia. The surge of imports into these countries after 2022 was so abnormal that it triggered Reuters investigations and diplomatic pressure from Brussels and Washington. Another method involves shell companies and professional intermediaries. Front firms, along with lawyers and logistics operators, structure deals to conceal the ultimate recipient. International investigations have uncovered entire networks of such “sanctions consultants.” In the energy trade, manipulation of shipments plays a special role: flag-switching of vessels, “ship-to-ship” operations, and transponder shutoffs are used to disguise the origin of Russian oil. The EU was forced to acknowledge these practices as one of the key vulnerabilities of its sanctions regime.
At first glance, individual companies seem to profit: contracts remain intact, money flows, and business survives. But looking at the broader consequences, Europe as a whole suffers serious losses. Above all, there are legal, financial, and reputational risks. Companies entangled in sanctions evasion may face multimillion-dollar fines, secondary sanctions from the US and UK, criminal prosecution, and asset freezes. Reputational fallout can be just as devastating: every journalistic investigation becomes a blow to the brand, and investors and partners are quick to shun “toxic” firms.
Moreover, if sanctions can be bypassed, they lose their effectiveness and Europe’s international standing weakens as a result. An internal division also emerges: firms that follow the rules are disadvantaged compared to those that break them. Fair competition erodes, while grey schemes become entrenched in the economy.
The security implications are no less alarming. Through these loopholes, Russia continues to receive dual-use goods such as electronics, industrial and defense equipment, and advanced technologies.
This picture is further compounded by the growth of financial crime. Complex logistics and banking chains fuel the grey zones of the global economy, undermine European anti–money laundering mechanisms, and make the EU an attractive target for organized crime.
Examples of such practices are already documented. In 2022–2023, EU exports to Kazakhstan skyrocketed, coinciding with a rise in Russian imports of the same categories of goods. Journalists and experts noted that much of this trade consisted of repackaged European products. Similar cases were identified in Turkey and the UAE. In 2023, the US Treasury sanctioned several companies in Dubai and Istanbul, accusing them of collaborating with Russia. This served as a warning to European partners: involvement in such schemes risks not only EU penalties but also Washington’s retaliation.
Despite EU governments’ declarations of fighting sanctions evasion, the lack of strict coordination in export controls and the blurred accountability of intermediaries allow grey networks to persist. Financial and political outlets point out that the EU has only recently begun to build a centralized system for monitoring exports of sensitive technologies. For now, European countries act in a fragmented manner, making it much easier for sanctions-busting operators to achieve their goals.
The silent consent of parts of the business community to such deals means that Europe is effectively undermining its own sanctions. Money disappears into the shadows, trust in law-abiding companies declines, and Russia retains access to the resources and technologies it needs to continue the war. The conclusion is sobering: every contract signed in defiance of restrictions translates into greater political vulnerability for the EU, economic instability, and risks to the safety of its citizens.
Europe’s choice here is limited. It can turn a blind eye and allow businesses to profit in the short term. But soon enough, it will have to admit that the true cost of such cooperation is too high, as in the long run it leads to weakened European institutions, a fragile economy, and a stronger adversary on its eastern borders.