Despite numerous international sanctions against the Russian Federation, the Kremlin continues to freely generate significant profits from oil sales. Billions of euros flow into the Russian budget annually, supporting the aggressor state under economic pressure. These substantial revenues are made possible through the use of a so-called “shadow fleet” – a vast and covert network of tankers that bypass maritime law and typically operate under offshore flags. This fleet enables Russia to evade sanctions, pumping massive volumes of hydrocarbons onto global markets and maintaining Russia’s financial stability. This is not just a violation of established norms – it is a systemic challenge to global economic security and an attempt to undermine international law.
When Western sanctions hit Russian oil exports, the Kremlin didn’t stop — it simply vanished. In their place emerged a murky network of old tankers, fake companies, and international loopholes now known as Russia’s “shadow fleet”.
Estimated at over 387 tankers, this unofficial armada doesn’t fly the Russian flag — but it exists almost solely to keep Russian oil flowing, far from the eyes of regulators and sanctions enforcers.
Flags of Convenience, Flags of Convenience
One of the fleet’s most basic tricks: fly the flag of a small, regulation-light nation that’s unlikely — or unable — to ask too many questions. Think Comoros, Tanzania, Djibouti, São Tomé and Príncipe, Palau, or Guyana.
Since early 2023, Tanzania has added at least 18 suspect tankers to its registry; Palau more than 20. These countries offer low scrutiny and even lower costs — making them ideal for cloaking suspicious activity in legitimacy.
Shell Games at Sea
Ownership? That’s where things get even murkier.
Russia uses a dense fog of offshore shell companies to hide who really controls these vessels. Most are over 20 years old, purchased at discount prices and registered to firms that barely existed before 2022. Studies suggest roughly 80% of shadow fleet tankers are owned by hidden or newly formed entities — impossible to trace back to Russia directly.
Ghost Ships
In open waters, many of these tankers simply turn off their AIS transponders, disappearing from international tracking systems in direct violation of maritime safety rules.
In 2023, the number of these “dark voyages” jumped by over 30%.
Sure, they can’t transit tight choke points like the Bosporus or Suez Canal without detection — but in the vastness of the Mediterranean, North Sea, or Atlantic, they’re nearly invisible.
Tanker-to-Tanker Trickery
Once they’re off the radar, the real magic begins: Ship-to-ship (STS) transfers — a method designed to obscure the origin of Russian crude. Oil is quietly moved between tankers in open waters, where jurisdiction is unclear and enforcement is rare.
These covert exchanges now occur regularly in:
- The Laconian Gulf off Greece – where STS activity has soared 500% since 2022
- The Atlantic Ocean, near the Azores
- The North Sea, off Denmark (notably Køge Bay)
After the transfer, the oil is often rebranded, paperwork forged, and it enters global markets under a different name — no longer “Russia
Billions in the Shadows
Russia’s shadow fleet is more than a workaround — it’s a well-oiled, global system that helps the Kremlin evade sanctions, maintain export revenues, and fund its war machine.
And it’s not just a geopolitical problem. With outdated vessels, hidden ownership, and disabled safety systems, these tankers pose a massive environmental and maritime risk — drifting oil disasters waiting to happen.
Key Buyers of Russian Oil via the Shadow Fleet
- China: The largest buyer of Russian oil, with delivery volumes significantly increasing through shadow channels.
- India: Since early 2022, Indian imports of Russian oil have surged by a factor of 15, making it one of Russia’s top energy clients. A substantial portion of this trade relies on shadow fleet mechanisms, allowing India to buy oil at steep discounts.
- Turkey: Remains a key hub for the transit and refining of Russian oil, much of it delivered through clandestine routes.
These countries continue to import Russian energy without full transparency and ignore the G7 price cap, thereby bolstering the Kremlin’s financial capacity to sustain its aggressive foreign policy.
Sanctions vs. Shadow Trade
The international community—including the EU, US, Canada, and UK—has imposed numerous sanctions packages. The EU’s 17th sanctions package, adopted recently, targets nearly 200 vessels linked to shadow fleet operations.
Yet the effect remains limited. Why?
⚠️ Why Sanctions Fall Short:
- Lack of Monitoring in Open Waters: The high seas offer shadow tankers space to operate undisturbed. Inspections are expensive and legally complicated.
- Weak International Coordination: The absence of a unified global enforcement system allows sanctioned actors to evade detection. While ships can be traced via IMO numbers, this requires coordinated intelligence and political will — often lacking due to competing geopolitical or economic interests.
- Fear of Global Oil Shock: A key concern is the risk of a spike in global oil prices. Many countries, especially in Europe, remain dependent on imported energy and fear economic instability if Russian oil flows are completely cut off. Russia exploits this dependence as leverage.
- Russia’s Adaptability: The Kremlin demonstrates tactical agility — constantly rotating ship ownership, reflagging vessels, creating new shell companies, and developing sophisticated evasion strategies.
Case Study: Tanker KYLO
The KYLO is deeply involved in shadow oil operations. Its captain, Mohseni Ali, an Iranian national, has been under Ukrainian sanctions since February 2025.
Previously, he commanded the DAKSHA, a vessel sanctioned by the US, UK, Canada, Switzerland, and the EU for transporting sanctioned Russian and Iranian oil.
According to maritime tracking tools, the KYLO has made repeated voyages from Russian ports (Novorossiysk, Primorsk) to India and China, often with its AIS transponder disabled.
The vessel is linked to Maritime DMCC OceanLink, a Dubai-based company repeatedly cited in investigations into sanctions evasion.
Maritime OceanLink DMCC: A Front for Sanction Dodging
Registered in the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), OceanLink presents itself as a legitimate shipping and logistics company. Its website boasts of “a passion for maritime transport” and aims to become “a logistics leader.”
In reality, the company has been repeatedly accused by regulators and investigators of facilitating sanctions evasion, particularly in transporting Iranian and Russian oil in violation of embargoes and price caps.
Sanctions and International Response:
- April 2024: The U.S. Treasury (OFAC) sanctioned OceanLink and a significant part of its fleet for transporting Iranian oil on behalf of Iran’s military general staff and Ministry of Defense, directly supporting military operations in Iran and Russia.
- Ukraine also imposed sanctions against the company, recognizing its role in supporting Russian aggression.
- Sanctions have also been applied by the UK, Canada, Switzerland, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
OceanLink operates a large shadow fleet, including oil tankers, petroleum product tankers, and LNG carriers. Notable vessels include:
HECATE, ANTHEA, BOREAS, CAPE GAS, GLAUCUS (renamed AGNI), OCEANUS GAS, HEBE (also known as DAKSHA), ALYPSO GAS, MERAKI, ELSA, BAXTER, DEMETER, and OUREA.
Many of these vessels operate under flags of convenience, such as Comoros, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Panama, and the Cook Islands.
OceanLink’s Methods of Evasion:
- STS Transfers: The company frequently uses ship-to-ship operations to disguise the true origin of oil.
- Example: HECATE received an Iranian cargo worth over $100 million from the sanctioned tanker DOVER via STS transfer.
- Disabling AIS: Many OceanLink ships routinely disable their AIS systems in suspicious regions.
- Flags of Convenience: Used to avoid strict oversight from national regulators.
- Renaming and Re-registering Ships: A common tactic to obstruct tracking and evade legal consequences.
OceanLink exemplifies how firms from “neutral” jurisdictions become key players in enabling sanctions circumvention, thereby sustaining the financial pipelines of aggressor states.
Other Shadow Fleet Examples
Tanker JUN MA
- Captain: So Hlaing Win (Myanmar)
- Employed by Maxwell Self Services Private Limited, an Indian shipping and logistics company.
- Since January 2024, JUN MA has made at least seven voyages from Russian ports (including Ust-Luga) to India, with opaque cargo origins.
- The tanker has engaged in short AIS blackouts and unusual maneuvers, indicating covert activity.Tanker MAIN
- Captain: Boz Serdar (Turkey)
- Holds a Master’s in Maritime Business Administration and has worked with Sand Ship Management, first as MAIN’s captain, now as an inspector.
- Social media posts confirm his active involvement. Over the past six months, MAIN has visited Russian ports at least 12 times, typically en route to the Mediterranean, where STS operations are common.
These examples highlight how seemingly legitimate companies are drawn into elaborate networks designed to undermine international sanctions.
The Bigger Threat
The continued existence and unhindered operation of Russia’s shadow fleet poses a serious threat to global security and to the credibility of sanctions regimes.
It allows an aggressor state to generate revenue in defiance of sanctions and undermines faith in the international legal system.
What Must Be Done:
The EU and its partners must improve:
- Coordination across agencies and jurisdictions
- Real-time intelligence sharing
- Maritime tracking technologies
- And most importantly — demonstrate the political will to enforce meaningful action.
The cost of inaction?
An endless stream of “shadow” money fueling an aggressor state and increasing security risks for all of Europe.