Three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Europe faces an entirely new security reality. The war itself, Russia’s increasingly regular strikes on border regions of Eastern European countries, and the repeated incursions of drones into EU airspace have made defense and security the number-one priority. What used to be the domain of a narrow circle of military experts has now become the subject of everyday debate — from Brussels to towns in Poland and Romania, where “stray” Russian drones have started appearing in the skies.
Incidents involving Russian drones over Poland, Romania, and other states have become genuine “alarm signals” for both NATO and the EU. Moscow uses UAVs not only as weapons against Ukraine but also as instruments of pressure on its neighbors. Each incursion forces the activation of air defense systems, the mobilization of air forces, and urgent media alerts. For the military, this means additional shifts, higher costs, and increased operational strain. For civilians, it means living under an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. Flight delays and airspace closures directly affect civil aviation and the economy.
Russia’s escalation has driven Europe into an unprecedented surge of military spending. According to international research institutes, the EU’s defense budget in 2024 reached around €343 billion — nearly 20% higher than the previous year and the steepest rise since the end of the Cold War. EU states are rapidly strengthening air defenses, investing in electronic warfare systems, and scrambling to secure remaining stockpiles of weaponry on the global market — which is already scarce.
But this military appetite comes at a cost. Funds allocated to arms procurement are being diverted from healthcare, education, and social welfare, which face cuts or frozen development. Governments are forced to search for new revenue streams, and higher taxes or rising public debt fuel political risk and social discontent. Without a clear long-term plan for modernization, public patience may quickly wear thin.
The surge in defense orders is also reshaping Europe’s economic structure. Demand for military technologies is crowding out investment in long-term development priorities such as renewable energy and digital infrastructure.
At the political level, every new increase in defense funding requires legitimacy. While governments appeal to security needs and the necessity of supporting Ukraine, the social price is becoming more visible. Tax hikes and shrinking social services are feeding protest moods and creating fertile ground for populism — including for Kremlin-backed leftist forces, which pose a serious threat to EU stability.
Adding to Europe’s anxiety is the growing question of China’s role in supporting Russia’s military capabilities. Beijing officially maintains a “neutral” stance, calling for diplomacy and negotiations, but multiple intelligence assessments and independent investigations suggest a more complex picture. Notably, the uptick in Russian drone activity near EU borders coincided with Putin’s September visit to China.
Evidence from Western and Ukrainian sources confirms that Chinese-made components and electronics are widely used in Russian drones and other equipment. According to Ukrainian intelligence and investigative reports, a substantial share of critical electronic parts — flight controllers, radio modules, navigation cameras, semiconductors — are produced in China and delivered to Russia via intermediaries. Moscow, lacking its own advanced electronics industry, heavily relies on this flow.
Despite export restrictions introduced by Beijing in 2023–2024 on drones and components, enforcement appears selective. Supply chains have adapted with third-country intermediaries, barter schemes, and civilian transport routes to circumvent controls. Analysts note that while restrictions reduced direct sales, they did not sever flows entirely.
Further reports link China to the supply of rare earths and semiconductors critical for modern weaponry. Western analysts cite cases where Chinese companies, via third parties, provided Russia with materials under sanctions, allowing its defense industry to continue production. This has fueled pressure on Brussels and Washington to tighten sanctions and blacklist intermediary firms.
Overall, the deepening Moscow–Beijing economic and military ties are creating a strategic cushion, blunting the effect of Western sanctions and giving Russia greater room to maneuver. Experts warn that even “passive” Chinese economic engagement with Russia — trade growth, energy purchases, investments — strengthens Moscow’s war capacity and hybrid operations in Europe and beyond.
It must be stressed that no open-source evidence proves Beijing is deliberately fueling escalation in Europe. Most findings combine intelligence assessments, trade statistics, and supply-chain investigations, all of which admit difficulties in tracing final end-users. Analysts caution against hasty claims of a “grand conspiracy,” but agree on one undeniable point: Chinese-origin technologies are finding their way into Russian military programs, indirectly bolstering Russia’s war machine.
If these supply chains indeed sustain Russia’s military production, Europe’s challenge becomes even more complex. Protecting EU skies requires not just air defense procurement and intelligence upgrades, but also coordinated sanctions enforcement, export controls, and pressure on transit states that facilitate sanctions evasion. This adds a new dimension to the threat landscape: alongside direct military dangers, there is now a trade-and-technology front to the war.
The war has shown how asymmetric methods — drone strikes, attacks on energy infrastructure, cyber operations — can have regional effects, forcing neighbors to respond. Europe is reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank and deploying new air defense systems, but without institutional reform and long-term guarantees, these measures risk remaining piecemeal.
Today, Europe faces accelerated militarization out of necessity, not choice. Yet militarization without addressing social costs — and without dismantling the technological and commercial lifelines feeding Russia’s war — risks internal fractures and strategic vulnerability. In the new reality, Europe’s key defenses are not only missiles and joint arms procurement, but also economic diplomacy, export control, and international coordination to choke off sanctions evasion. Only by combining military strength, technological independence, and social resilience can the EU withstand the pressures of the war in Ukraine and the continuing Russian threat, reinforced by shadowy trade-and-technology channels.