The return of Robert Fico to the post of Prime Minister in 2023 has launched the process of “orbanization” of Slovakia. Bratislava is increasingly copying the Hungarian model of governance in all key areas of the state. This course involves not only the dismantling of anti-corruption structures, the usurpation of power and the suppression of freedom of speech, but also a review of relations with Brussels, where Bratislava, following Budapest, is starting to use the right of veto as a tool of blackmail and pressure on the EU.
Robert Fico and Viktor Orban are united not only by ideological proximity, but also by a policy aimed at preserving power through usurpation, oppression of the opposition, the creation of government-controlled media holdings and, most importantly, the elimination of independent anti-corruption bodies. If it took V. Orban almost two decades to usurp power, then Slovakia, led by R. Fico, is going through this path in an accelerated mode, using schemes developed by the neighboring country. This cooperation and at the same time symbiosis have created problems for the European Union itself due to the fact that both countries undermine the EU’s sanctions policy. Not to mention the fact that Hungary and Slovakia have become in fact Russia’s rear and the conductor of its hybrid operations in Europe.
The main tool of V. Orbán’s usurpation of power was increased control over the information space. In Hungary, this became possible thanks to the KESMA conglomerate, which includes more than 476 publications and media. Slovakia took this step in three key stages in 2024–2026, which ultimately led to increased censorship. In the first, under R. Fico, the public television RTVS was liquidated and a completely state-owned channel STVR was created on its basis. According to the new legislation, the STVR board, which is appointed by the parliamentary majority, received the right to veto the appointment of management and influence its editorial policy. This led to the fact that the previous editorial staff of the news was dismissed, and since then there have been no critical news about the government on the air. The dismissal of the Slovak journalist Marta Janučuková for her persistence in uncomfortable issues regarding the reform of the criminal code and abuses was indicative.
The second stage was the pressure on independent media and mass media. R. Fico’s government officially stopped all communication with leading publications (Denník N, SME, Aktuality.sk), calling them “hostile media”. State advertising budgets, which were previously transparently distributed among all media outlets, were redirected to the benefit of loyal tabloids and online resources owned by the Slovak oligarchic groups Penta and J&T.
In the third stage, Slovakia adopted a law on “organizations with foreign support and financing”, according to which any media outlet that receives more than 5,000 euros in grants from Western funds is obliged to mark each material as “a product of foreign influence” (a similar practice already exists in Russia and Hungary). This label is used to distinguish independent journalism from state-supported media and for the physical survival of free media outlets from the media market.
In 2025, under pressure from the government of Robert Fico, the popular political talk show “Na telo” on the Markíza channel finally disappeared from the Slovak airwaves. Its host, Michal Kovačić, was fired after he declared live on air about the “organization” of the Slovak media and the government’s attempts to impose desired guests on the airwaves.
Many experts and observers have drawn attention to the fact that the information policy of Budapest and Bratislava now functions as a single mechanism, often synchronized on key issues. Hungarian and Slovak state TV channels raise the same topics, give them a similar interpretation, and even use identical visual images. The main topic today is “war fatigue” and discrediting aid to Ukraine. The narrative that “the West continues the war, while Hungary and Slovakia stand for peace” has become dominant in the information space and serves for its own legitimization and opposition to Brussels.
An example of such synchronization is the joint campaign to accuse Ukraine of “energy terrorism” due to restrictions on the transit of Russian oil. Using identical theses, both governments blackmail Brussels by blocking financial assistance to Kyiv, presenting themselves as “defenders of the interests of ordinary citizens”. This “narrative factory” operates on the basis of joint bot farms, coordinated by structures close to the Hungarian KESMA fund, but adapted to the Slovak context and public opinion.
The media and big business have always been closely linked. The basis of the Hungarian model is a loyal oligarchy that has made its fortune thanks to state contracts and proximity to V. Orbán. Slovakia has followed a somewhat similar path, albeit with some differences. As a result of the 2024 judicial reform, the Special Prosecutor’s Office was liquidated there, which for years had successfully investigated cases against top corrupt officials. The result of its work was the closure of more than 110 criminal proceedings, in which Robert Fico’s associates and representatives of big business appeared.
Changes to the Slovak Criminal Code have significantly shortened the statute of limitations for corruption crimes and softened the punishment for embezzlement of public funds. This has effectively opened the way to the legalization of “kickbacks” at the level of 20-30% of the value of contracts. Corruption at the power level has become vertical: oligarchic groups, such as the structures of the shadow tycoon and friend of the Slovak Prime Minister Miroslav Vyboch, have received priority in state defense procurement. Hungarian capital, associated with Lerinc Mesáros, has begun to actively enter the Slovak energy and construction sectors, creating consortia where public money from both countries is mixed and transferred to offshore zones. Such a “synergy” allows both regimes to buy the loyalty of local elites, providing them with immunity from prosecution and allowing them to earn money.
In 2025, the investigative journalism and disinformation campaign center VSquare, based on testimony from former Slovak intelligence officers, reported on the exchange of data between the Hungarian Office for the Protection of Sovereignty and the Slovak Information Service (SIS) on activists organizing anti-corruption protests in both capitals. They also found that lists of “undesirable persons” compiled in Budapest coincided strangely with databases used by the Slovak police to detain or refuse to hold mass events under the pretext of “threats to national security” in Slovakia.
The challenge facing Brussels and London is not only to economically contain authoritarianism in these two countries, but also to prevent them from creating a mini-authoritarian bloc that would constantly sabotage NATO’s strategic decisions. It is possible that more effective measures will be needed to neutralize this, such as additional political pressure and sanctions against Hungarian and Slovak top corrupt officials, since corruption within the European Union is a threat to the national security of Western democracies.