In the last three years, the arena of geopolitical struggle has become the seabed with underwater gas pipelines, power cables and internet communications. The Nord Stream gas pipeline explosions in September 2022, a series of cable damage in 2023 – 2025 and inter-state investigations have raised the question of whether these incidents are isolated episodes or part of a targeted campaign of sabotage as part of hybrid warfare? Critical underwater infrastructure, as it is called, generates about $9 trillion in daily traffic. A coordinated attack on this infrastructure could undoubtedly have devastating consequences. Geopolitical. The answer to this question requires a combination of technical analysis, intelligence and political context.
The first and biggest shock was the explosion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. The explosions disabled several highways, which was immediately classified as sabotage and launched international investigations. In 2025, arrests and criminal trials began in a number of countries, but court disputes and extradition decisions show that after three years, the path to final legal attribution remains long and complicated. In parallel, since the end of 2023-2024, there have been several underwater cable damages in the Baltic Sea and near some EU/Scandinavia coastal zones, ranging from partial ruptures to complete breakdown of communications, which has raised serious concerns about possible sabotage activities. At the same time, investigations gave mixed assessments, since some incidents appear to be intentional, while in others, accidental causes (anchors, techsbawa) seem likely. Some of the incidents were accompanied by criminal investigations with accusations of intentional injury, in other cases the investigation was inclined to the version of technical errors or navigational accidents.
Attacks on deep-sea infrastructure are fundamentally different from normal sabotage on land, because damage to a power line or communications artery requires accurate seabed survey, which takes time and considerable effort. To get an accurate picture it is necessary to carry out exploration. This is a painstaking work, the results of which depend on the state of the sea. This work cannot be done without specialized tools: deep-sea vehicles, remotely controlled underwater robots, operating ships and well-coordinated actions. This technical complexity makes such operations difficult for lone saboteurs, which increases the likelihood of organizing and participating in them state or semi-official structures, or professional proxy groups.
Analysts also note that a targeted attack usually leaves specific traces, such as the location of the detonation points, the nature of the damage, the traces of work with deep equipment, which allow to distinguish the diversion from accidental damage to the anchor or natural event.
Why do many experts and special services suspect Russia in underwater diversities? On the agenda is geopolitics. Russia, while waging a large-scale war against Ukraine and simultaneously conducting hybrid operations in Europe, has both the motivation to destabilize Europe’s economic and communications unity and the potential to do so. Representatives of the Western intelligence services assume that Russia’s efforts to monitor and enhance technical capabilities for access to this vast underwater infrastructure are expanding, and currently cover a number of different units of the country’s armed forces and security services, including the Navy and the Directorate-General for Deep Sea Research (DGCA). It is also noted that Russia has experience in conducting covert underwater operations.
A number of analytical reports directly point to increased activity by Russian military vessels and special equipment in areas where damage was detected, and Western intelligence services have consequently expressed concern about the risk of deliberate attacks on underwater infrastructure. However, in the majority of public investigations direct and indisputable evidence of a particular state’s involvement is not presented, and the trials of some suspects proceed with a great number of legal and procedural complications.
And although Russian officials are generally silent about the Kremlin’s alleged interest in underwater communications, former Russian president and close ally of Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, said in 2023 that there were no restrictions left, «that could prevent us from destroying the cable communications of our enemies laid on the ocean floor».
The identification of submarine attacks faces several barriers. First, operations are carried out in a remote marine area, often at night and in international waters, where traces are easily hidden. Second, technical evidence – for example, fragments of explosives, fingerprints of equipment – is rarely sufficient for legal prosecution. And third, the political motivation of states requires hiding their direct involvement through proxies or «quiet» methods, leaving traces that can be interpreted in two ways. As a result, expert assessments often remain «high-risk» scenarios rather than proven facts.
The hybrid war combines military operations, cyber attacks, media campaigns and economic pressure. Underwater infrastructure disruption fits perfectly into this set. It inflicts immediate economic damage (disruption of energy supplies, loss of communication channels), causes political destabilization and forces countries to spend resources on protection and reconstruction. Unlike direct military attack, such actions allow the aggressor to retain a degree of «negative responsibility». The lack of public recognition and the complexity of the evidence base reduces the risk of a corresponding political reaction in response. That is why experts warn of the increasing number of incidents and call for strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure.
The political effect of individual, unsettled in court incidents requires increased attention to national defense, energy autonomy, improvement of international maritime rules.
Underwater diversions have become a real and serious threat to the modern world, combining high technical complexity and significant political effect. When states use hybrid methods to achieve strategic objectives, attacking underwater infrastructure becomes a logical, if dangerous, tactic. The complexity of the investigation procedure only underlines that until the international community develops effective fact-finding and joint protection mechanisms, the vulnerability of undersea arteries will remain a convenient tool for geopolitical pressure.