On 4 September 2026, Giorgia Meloni’s government will set a historic record by becoming the longest-serving government in post-war Italian history, surpassing the record of Silvio Berlusconi’s 2001–2005 cabinet. Formed after the right-wing coalition’s victory in the 25 September 2022 general election, the government will have remained in office for almost four years — an exceptional achievement in a country accustomed to frequent changes of government.
However, the record may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. After returning from the summer recess on 9 September, the governing coalition will have to address several challenges simultaneously: push through a controversial electoral reform, restore discipline within the parliamentary majority, and respond to the rise of a new party to the right of the Brothers of Italy (FdI), General Roberto Vannacci’s National Future (FN). Against this backdrop, early elections in spring 2027 and a broader realignment of Italy’s political landscape are increasingly being discussed.
Meloni’s government came to power with an absolute parliamentary majority. The Brothers of Italy, Matteo Salvini’s League and Antonio Tajani’s Forza Italia secured control of both chambers. The first years were relatively stable, but in 2026 the cohesion of the majority has increasingly come into question. Following the government’s setback in the March referendum on judicial reform, the coalition suffered another defeat on 15 July, when key amendments to the new electoral system were rejected in a secret vote in the Chamber of Deputies. According to political estimates, between 20 and 30 government MPs either voted against the coalition line or abstained. Meloni declared that “the swamp has won again”, effectively acknowledging the problem of internal discipline, while Elly Schlein of the Democratic Party (PD) and Giuseppe Conte of the Five Star Movement (M5S) called for the government’s resignation and early elections.
The situation has been further complicated by a crisis within the League. In August, regional party officials in Lombardy, one of the League’s key northern strongholds, openly challenged Matteo Salvini, accusing the leadership of abandoning the party’s traditional identity. The resulting loss of support has reportedly reduced the League’s polling level to around 5.5–6%.
Mid-August polling shows that the Brothers of Italy remain comfortably ahead at 26–27%, while Elly Schlein’s Democratic Party stands at approximately 21% and Giuseppe Conte’s Five Star Movement at 12–13%. The main changes are taking place on the right. Forza Italia remains at 7–8%, while Vannacci’s National Future has already reached 6.5–7.5%, drawing substantial support from the weakening League.
Roberto Vannacci, a former paratrooper general and former Italian military attaché in Moscow, formally broke with the League in February 2026 and established his own party. FN has built its platform around hard-line Euroscepticism, anti-immigration rhetoric and criticism of Meloni for moving away from traditional right-wing positions and becoming excessively aligned with Brussels and Washington. Within only a few months, FN has overtaken the League in some polls and approached the level of Forza Italia.
For Meloni, this creates a difficult political dilemma. Without FN’s electorate, the FdI–League–Forza Italia coalition would face greater difficulty securing a victory over a united centre-left bloc. With Vannacci, however, the broader right-wing camp could potentially command around 47–48% of the vote. A formal alliance with the general could nevertheless weaken Meloni among moderate voters, damage her image as a conservative leader acceptable to Brussels, and complicate relations with the European Union.
The central political issue this autumn will be electoral reform, provisionally known as “Stabilicum”. The proposal envisages a shift towards a proportional electoral system combined with a majority bonus. A coalition or electoral bloc securing more than 42% of the vote could receive up to 70 additional seats in the Chamber of Deputies and up to 35 in the Senate, theoretically ensuring a stable parliamentary majority for a five-year term. The opposition regards the reform as an attempt by the incumbent government to alter the electoral rules in its own favour.
By 1 September, the relevant Senate committee is expected to complete the submission of amendments. Plenary sessions will resume on 9 September, with the decisive vote expected around 15 September. To prevent a repeat of the internal rebellion seen in July, the government may tie the bill to a vote of confidence. If successful, the reform would then proceed to final consideration by the Chamber of Deputies in October.
Although the current parliament’s term does not expire until December 2027, early elections in April 2027 are increasingly being discussed. For the centre-right, such a scenario offers several advantages. Elections could be held before major municipal campaigns in Rome and Milan, where the centre-left remains strong. By the end of March 2027, MPs from the current legislature would also have passed the 4.5-year threshold required to secure their pension rights, reducing their personal incentive to preserve the current parliament. Moreover, Meloni would benefit from holding elections before economic and social problems exert greater pressure on her approval ratings.
The main constraint on this scenario is President Sergio Mattarella. Under Italian constitutional practice, the head of state dissolves parliament primarily when the existing majority is no longer capable of sustaining an effective government. Political support among the right alone would therefore not be sufficient to trigger early elections.
Domestic political difficulties are unfolding against a more complicated foreign-policy backdrop. At the G7 summit in summer 2026, a public dispute emerged between Meloni and Donald Trump. Following criticism from representatives of the MAGA movement and accusations that she was seeking joint photo opportunities, the Italian prime minister stated that “Italy is asking for nothing.” The episode highlighted the growing uncertainty surrounding her previous role as a potential intermediary between the American right and the European political mainstream.
Vannacci’s growing influence is also significant for the EU. The possible inclusion of the strongly Eurosceptic FN in a future governing coalition could complicate European decision-making on Ukraine, transatlantic security and common foreign policy. At the same time, Italy’s high public debt and the need to comply with European fiscal rules make political stability in Rome a matter of wider importance for the euro area. A prolonged political crisis could increase pressure on Italy’s public finances and its relations with EU institutions.
September and October will therefore be decisive for Meloni’s government. If “Stabilicum” is adopted and the coalition restores internal discipline, the prime minister could enter 2027 from a relatively strong position. If internal divisions continue to deepen, early elections will become considerably more likely, while the resulting shift in Italy’s political balance could have consequences extending well beyond the country’s borders.