In the common perception, war means weapons, soldiers, and the struggle for territories, resources, and dominance. But there is another kind of war — one without explosions or gunfire — the information war. It is invisible, and its weapon targets not the body but the human mind.
In the 21st century, Europe’s information sphere has become a battleground for confrontation between states, social movements, and corporations. Russia has been particularly active in this war, using the full range of available tools, including political propaganda, cultural projects, and work with public opinion.
The Kremlin focuses its information policy on undermining the unity of the EU and NATO, as well as promoting the idea of a multipolar world. A key role in this is played by international media outlets like RT and Sputnik, which regularly broadcast stories criticizing European governments, migration policy, and sanctions against Russia. Certain political forces in Europe, such as right-wing parties in France or Eurosceptic movements in Italy and Germany, also benefit from Russian informational support. The targets of Russian information operations include both politicians and parties that are disloyal (through informational pressure) and those loyal (through informational promotion) to Moscow’s policies.
There is no shortage of examples of Russian information operations in the European sphere.
A 2020 report by the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee noted Russia’s involvement in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 Brexit referendum. The report described how Moscow used its media, including English-language outlets, to undermine Scots’ trust in the referendum results by spreading information about alleged voting and counting irregularities. This was described as “the first documented case of post-Soviet influence on democratic processes in the West.”
Romania also felt the impact of Russian informational influence during the 2024 parliamentary elections. According to DFRLab, a network of “volunteers” on the Telegram messenger played a key role in the campaign of pro-Russian candidate Georgescu. Their activities were coordinated through accounts such as Propagator – Get Involved, Renaissance Romania, Food Water Energy, and Calin Georgescu. These “volunteers” received instructions and ready-to-use materials for distribution on platforms like TikTok and Facebook. Investigations later uncovered a “Russian trail” behind the organizers.
In 2024, France held elections to both the European and local parliaments. A report by the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) described Russia’s involvement in election interference, particularly through social media manipulation. Efforts included “astroturfing” — artificially creating support or opposition to certain ideas to push them into public debate. The most active profiles had Kremlin ties. Content aimed to create anxiety and uncertainty about the future, with topics such as sending French troops to Ukraine or rising electricity prices.
In Germany, Russia’s tactics relied on supporting far-right forces, particularly Alternative for Germany (AfD), and spreading disinformation online. Research by CORRECTIV found that to influence the course and results of parliamentary elections, Russian intelligence created around a hundred websites to spread fake news. These sites targeted Economy Minister Robert Habeck and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, while also spreading rumors that the Bundeswehr was mobilizing a 500,000-strong army to attack Eastern Europe and that an agreement with Kenya would bring 1.9 million Kenyans to Germany. According to CORRECTIV, these actions were part of Russia’s “Storm-1516” operation, known from U.S. elections. Fake news in Germany was amplified by right-wing, pro-Russian activists.
An equally striking example of Russian information influence was the October 2024 presidential election and EU accession referendum in Moldova. Social networks were flooded with false claims that Brussels planned to relocate Middle Eastern migrants to Moldova or mobilize Moldovans to fight Russia. President Maia Sandu became a particular target, with fabricated stories portraying her insulting ethnic minorities or resigning from office. According to Sandu, Russia is currently conducting an “unprecedented campaign” to influence the parliamentary elections scheduled for September this year, aiming to bring pro-Russian parties into parliament.
Russia’s information front also covers issues of military-political influence and conflicts in which it participates or has strategic interests. During the war in Syria, Russian media promoted the narrative of “fighting terrorism” and preserving state sovereignty. After the 2014 events in Crimea and the start of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russian outlets actively spread Moscow-friendly versions of events. From 2022 to 2025, Russian information campaigns have focused on discrediting Western military support for Ukraine and promoting the narrative of “Europe’s war fatigue.”
The prime example of Russian methods remains the “Doppelgänger” operation, in which cloned websites of European media outlets spread propaganda undermining Ukraine and support for the EU and NATO. Another large-scale initiative is the Pravda Network, an automated system publishing up to 10,000 articles a day in dozens of languages to “feed” AI systems and autonomously influence niche audiences. In parallel, the LLM grooming method is developing — networks like Pravda Network generate massive volumes of fake texts to train chatbots, leading to the inclusion of false stories (e.g., about biolabs in Ukraine) in AI responses.
An important aspect of Russia’s informational influence is its attempts to affect European economic policy, especially in energy and trade. During the 2022 energy crisis — when Europe faced the urgent question of ending Russian energy imports due to Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine — Kremlin-controlled media actively pushed the message that sanctions were harming Europeans themselves.
The seriousness of Russia’s informational influence on Europe is confirmed by investigative journalism. Associated Press and The Guardian have documented nearly 60 sabotage and disinformation incidents in Europe in recent years. Wired has analyzed operations Overload / Matryoshka, which mass-produce AI-generated content, including fake videos and voice clones, for distribution on international platforms. Europe’s response has included sanctions and removing RT, Sputnik, and RIA Novosti from its media space, labeling them as propagandists for aggression against Ukraine. Western analysts stress that to counter Russia, it is essential to maintain a trans-European informational presence through broadcasting and digital platforms, despite funding challenges.
Europeans have already recognized the danger of Russian information influence and are developing strategies to counter the threat. An EEAS (European External Action Service) review examines EU methods for fighting Russian disinformation and proposes primary sanctions for interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Meanwhile, analysts at the Carnegie Endowment and CSIS, based on the study of Russia’s hybrid operations in Georgia, Moldova, Germany, and other states, have detailed hidden information campaigns by Moscow against Western countries.
In summary, informational warfare is becoming one of the key factors in global politics, shaping the future of relations between Russia and Europe.