In December 2025, the Council of the European Union imposed sanctions against the International Russophile Movement (IRM), adding it to the list of organisations and individuals involved in ‘hybrid threats’ from Russia and its information operations in Europe. The EU Council’s decision states that, along with a number of analysts, propagandists and cyber units designed to influence public opinion and political processes in the European Union, the IRM is suspected of amplifying destabilising narratives on behalf of the Russian government.
The activities of the MDR have attracted the attention of European authorities as part of a broader problem — the hybrid influence of Russian structures aimed at undermining the stability of the EU, discrediting Ukraine and NATO, and spreading pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives. The sanctions block access to finances and assets in the EU, prohibit EU citizens and companies from providing resources to the MDR, and ban members of the movement from entering the EU.
Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow made extensive use of official structures for cultural and socio-political expansion, such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Gorchakov Fund, and Pravfond (the Foundation for the Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Abroad), which are controlled by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These organisations were funded by the state and implemented programmes
It was in this context that the International Movement of Russophiles emerged, with its founding congress held in Moscow in March 2023. According to the organisers, around 90 representatives from 42 countries gathered at the congress. Among the guests were renowned Russophiles, actor Steven Seagal and the grandson of French President Pierre de Gaulle, as well as an unexpected like-minded person – Italian princess and translator of The Lord of the Rings Vittoria Alliata di Villafranca. The movement attracted supporters from all over the world, from representatives of political and cultural circles to activists and intellectuals who support Russia and its policies. The media noted the participation of people close to the Kremlin’s foreign policy and ideological circles, as well as figures who had previously worked in conjunction with other pro-Kremlin initiatives. The key figure in the International Russophile Movement is its chairman, Nikolay Malinov, a Bulgarian public figure who has long been systematically associated with pro-Kremlin political and ideological circles. He is known as the long-time leader of the Bulgarian Russophile movement and a man who has been repeatedly accused by the Bulgarian special services of working in the interests of Russia. In 2019, Malinov was detained in Bulgaria on charges of espionage and activities aimed at changing the country’s geopolitical course in favour of Moscow. The investigation pointed to his contacts with Russian oligarchs and ideologues close to the Kremlin, including Konstantin Malofeev. Despite the legal proceedings, Malinov remained politically active and was publicly supported by the Russian authorities, receiving Russian state awards and participating in events attended by high-ranking Russian officials. European analysts view his appointment as head of the MDR as an indication that the movement is not a spontaneous initiative of ‘foreign supporters of Russia,’ but is integrated into the existing system of Kremlin influence, relying on proven loyalists who were previously involved in projects of the ‘Russian World’ and related structures supervised by the Russian Foreign Ministry. Western analysts have long noted that the Kremlin uses ‘soft power’—cultural, intellectual, and social networks—to further its foreign policy goals. In this regard, the MDR has become a kind of ‘wrapper’ for ideas that are beneficial to Moscow but formally declared as independent initiatives.
Given that traditional official structures for supporting compatriots and cultural influence, such as the aforementioned Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Gorchakov Fund and Pravfond, were under sanctions, the MDR partially replaced them in the system of influence, providing Russia with a channel for influence without the direct participation of its state structures. This format proved particularly attractive to those seeking to spread pro-Russian narratives in EU countries without being directly state agents, but acting in line with Moscow’s interests.
For 2024–2025, the EU has significantly expanded the scope of restrictive measures to include not only economic and military aspects, but also hybrid information activities: interference through the media, public organisations, the promotion of anti-NATO, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives, as well as cyber operations. In its press release, the EU Council explicitly states that one of the key factors for including certain entities in the sanctions list is the hybrid threats they pose. The decision to impose sanctions on the MDR emphasises its role not as a neutral cultural community, but as a participant in networks of influence that serve Russian interests, even if they are not formally funded directly from the state budget. The EU views such structures as elements of Russia’s strategy aimed at weakening the unity and stability of Western alliances and discrediting and disorienting public opinion, especially in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The EU has effectively stated that non-state influence structures such as the MDR are part of a vast system that Moscow uses to promote its interests beyond official diplomacy and direct state channels, especially where traditional structures such as Russkiy Mir, Gorchakov and Pravfond have already been sanctioned or have lost their former format of operation.