In recent decades, Russia has been actively seeking ways to use its influence in the EU countries. Of course, the Russian persistence and system have paid off. Today we see the results of Russian «efforts» in Hungary, Slovakia, even in France with Germany. Italy was also a target for Russian foreign policy. Political polarization, dependence on Russian gas, economic ties with energy giants, weak mechanisms to protect the information space have made Italy a convenient platform for promoting the interests of the Kremlin. The effects of this «presence» did not last long. The crisis of confidence in Italian politics and the threat to national security is also becoming apparent.
The Italian state had many figures willing to cooperate with Moscow, and Italy’s good relations with Putin’s Russia were not the prerogative of either side. Especially noteworthy are the close ties of the Russians with the center-left and center-right governments in Italy. However, it will be important to remember the sudden turn of Melanie’s activities towards NATO at the end of 2022. It caught a significant portion of her electorate by surprise, while Ukraine’s support in the country was low. The coalition allies of Salvini and Berlusconi were prepared to use this break to weaken Meloni’s leadership, which is rather typical of Italy’s fragile parliamentary democracy. To avoid further disillusionment with her electorate, Meloni focused on issues of migration, family values and tax policy.
It should be noted that the increasing political fragmentation in the Italian parliament has hampered the elaboration of a unified line of Rome regarding the war against Ukraine. As a result, Italy has periodically demonstrated an ambiguous policy, that is formally supporting EU sanctions but leaving strong pressure groups inside the country calling for «dialogue» with Moscow. Energy has become a traditional factor of the Russian presence in Europe. Italy was no exception, and up to 2022 more than 40% depended on Russian gas. The Kremlin used this factor as a lever of influence: from price pressure to political signals through energy corporations. Even after the sharp reduction in purchases, Moscow continues to be involved in legal and commercial disputes, for example, in arbitration disputes with Eni.
According to documents released in 2025, the Italian company Eni supplied Russian gas to Turkey last year. According to the documents, the company is still trading in Russian gas despite the suspension of deliveries to Europe. In particular, Russian gas accounted for 12% of the total volume of supplies of gas Eni, providing 6.2 billion cubic meters delivered to the Turkish market through the pipeline «Blue Stream».
The negative consequences of «dependence» on Russian gas for Italy are obvious. First, energy vulnerability has blackmailed the country and dramatically increased the cost of switching to alternative sources. Second, social upheavals have occurred. The rise in tariffs hit households first of all and increased discontent, which was actively used by populist forces, often repeating Kremlin narratives.
But one of the most destructive tools of Russian influence has been disinformation via Italian media. ECFR analysts note that in the Italian information field, there are regularly messages about «NATO’s fault» and the need to «take into account the interests of Russia», and through social networks, fabricated materials about the war are actively distributed. This undermines the credibility of state institutions and creates a feeling in some people that Italy is «drawn» into another’s war. In the run-up to the elections, the intensity of such campaigns is increasing, threatening the very process of democratic expression.
Russia is actively investing not only in politics and energy, but also in «soft power», where the church remains an important channel. The Russian Orthodox Church, which has a wide network of parishes in Europe, is used as a tool for spreading ideas of «traditional values» that coincide with the conservative agenda of part of Italian society. This creates opportunities for Moscow to penetrate social discussions about family, migration, culture and strengthen polarization. In Italy, there were also cases of attempts to influence educational content, including through textbooks, where the rhetoric was traced close to the Kremlin’s interpretation of history. In September 2025, the Senate debates revealed how Kremlin propaganda is infiltrating Italian schools. During the discussion of a new report by the Gino Germani Institute, it became clear that repeated Russian stories in high school textbooks can affect the worldview of future generations of Italians, forming perceptions of Ukraine and Moscow in ways that resonate with Kremlin propaganda. It should be noted that Italian state structures have repeatedly become the target of cyber attacks attributed to the Russian groups Killnet and NoName057. Thus, in February 2025, after the speech of Italian President Sergio Mattarella, in which he compared the invasion of Russia in Ukraine with «conquering wars» Nazis, there was another cyber-attack, paralyzing the work of the ministries of defense, interior and transport, as well as law enforcement.
Media investigations also include attempts to circumvent the sanctions regime through Italian companies. In 2023, Italian law enforcement agencies uncovered a pattern of supplying Russia with machines and high-precision electronics used in the defense industry through laying firms in Turkey and the UAE. Media attention was drawn to the case of a company from Lombardy that sent equipment for the production of drones and optical systems, formally masking it for civilian use. Another high-profile episode was an investigation into the supply of petrochemical products and shipbuilding components through small enterprises in northern Italy, which used fictitious export contracts to circumvent the embargo. These articles, published in the Financial Times and La Repubblica, have been the subject of debate in parliament, where the opposition has directly accused the government of insufficient export control. As a result, not only did Italy suffer reputational losses, but it also found itself in a vulnerable position in the EU’s collective security system – a state through which Moscow experienced mechanisms of pressure on the entire union. And if the Italian society does not build an effective system to counter threats, the country risks becoming a «weak link» of European security, a convenient entry point for external pressure.
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