With the outbreak of a full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, the world, and Europe in particular, faced a new form of “hybrid” warfare: covert operations in international waters.
Central to this strategy has been the so-called Russian “shadow fleet,” which comprises over 1,000 vessels registered under shell companies and offshore flags. These vessels regularly appear in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, often changing names and flags to conceal the origin of their cargo and ownership. But transporting petroleum products is only the visible part of their activities.
A deeper purpose of the “shadow fleet” lies deeper: intelligence gathering and covert operations directed against European countries. Despite Moscow’s official claims that these vessels are purely commercial, Western media and intelligence agencies are documenting indications that some tankers are carrying Russians with direct ties to the armed forces, intelligence, and security services.
According to CNN, these vessels are staffed by “technicians” or “specialists” who, while formally lacking maritime experience, are the only Russian citizens on board and are involved in activities beyond the scope of standard cargo transportation.
According to Western sources, these individuals not only supervise the remaining crew members, who are comprised of third-country nationals, but also collect data on European military infrastructure, ship and aircraft movements, and are involved in the launch of drones near NATO military bases.
For example, this fall, French forces arrested the captain of a Russian tanker in Atlantic waters on suspicion that the vessel may have been involved in drone incidents near Denmark.
In separate incidents, Western naval authorities have confirmed the presence of armed individuals in camouflage uniforms reminiscent of those of the Russian Navy aboard such tankers in the Baltic Sea. This suggests that these are not just reconnaissance operations, but also clear elements of military activity disguised as civilian fleets.
The most telling example was a recent incident in the neutral waters of the Mediterranean Sea, which generated international attention. On December 18-19, 2025, one of the tankers in the Russian shadow fleet, the QENDIL, was attacked by naval drones allegedly used by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. Following the strike, the vessel sustained critical damage and was disabled.
A key element in this story was the emergence of reports that Andrei Averyanov, a major general of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), a high-ranking officer associated with the coordination of special operations abroad, was on board. According to several sources, he may have been killed in the attack on the tanker. The very presence of a high-ranking GRU officer on board the vessel raises a host of questions about the goals and objectives for which he was there.
There is no official confirmation of Averyanov’s death from either Russia or Ukraine. However, reports of his participation in the voyage indicate the deep integration of Russian intelligence agencies into the activities of the shadow fleet, making this incident a unique precedent in modern geopolitics, demonstrating how military intelligence missions are intertwined with “commercial” activities.
This use of tankers cannot but raise serious concerns, as the presence of Russian military and intelligence personnel on commercial vessels near the territorial waters of EU states poses a direct security threat.
These individuals can collect data on the location of military bases, NATO troop movements, and critical infrastructure, paving the way for future operations in the “gray zone” of the conflict. Such actions blur the boundaries between civilian and military targets, which in turn complicates the application of international law. Finally, the very use of military force against such vessels, including drone strikes at significant distances from battle lines, reflects the escalation of hybrid conflicts in the 21st century. When intelligence, trade, and military action are so intertwined, separating one from the other is becoming increasingly difficult.
The precedents examined indicate that Russia’s “shadow fleet” has ceased to be simply a channel for circumventing sanctions. It has become a strategic arena where intelligence, military, and commercial interests intersect in a complex network of “gray” operations.
The presence of Russian specialists with ties to the military and intelligence services on board tankers has been repeatedly confirmed. The events surrounding the tanker QENDIL and the possible death of GRU Major General Andrei Averyanov only underscore that Europe is facing a new kind of threat not through open military clashes, but through covert campaigns of espionage and hybrid pressure at sea.
And while Western countries seek to respond to these challenges, Russia’s shadow fleet continues to operate in the gray zone of international politics—between oil, exploration, and war.