In the shadow of the war in Ukraine, far from global news headlines, a quiet but equally dangerous battle for Moldova’s future is unfolding. The former Soviet republic, increasingly committed to European integration, has once again become the target of a hybrid offensive from the Kremlin. The “front lines” of this covert war are not measured in kilometers, but their coordinates are clearly marked in spheres of influence, electoral manipulation, and networks that Moscow has been weaving into Moldova’s political landscape for years.
A Puppet Theater of Politics
Although Moldova officially dissolved the country’s largest and most aggressive pro-Russian party—the Shor Party—in 2023, its influence has not disappeared. Instead, it continues its destabilizing activities under the guise of quasi-movements and local initiatives, particularly in the southern regions of Gagauzia and Taraclia. What hasn’t changed is that the operations remain coordinated from Russia.
These efforts are overseen by Ilan Shor, a controversial oligarch convicted for his role in a $1 billion financial fraud. Shor now resides in Russia, where he directs these campaigns from exile.
Other political figures, like former President Igor Dodon, have also not faded from the scene. On the contrary, as Moldova prepares for new presidential and parliamentary elections, Dodon has become more active—clearly encouraged by the Kremlin. Despite facing criminal investigations and a decline in popularity, Dodon’s Socialist platform remains a structured force with access to pro-Russian media, funding, and connections. Publicly, he continues to promote familiar Kremlin-aligned narratives: “traditional values,” “neutrality,” and “defense of national identity”—themes echoed across the post-Soviet space.
Gagauzia: An Autonomous Region Speaking Moscow’s Language
Geographic peripheries often provide fertile ground for political manipulation, and Gagauzia—an autonomous region in southern Moldova—is no exception. It now serves as a litmus test for Russia’s soft-power infiltration strategy.
Eugenia Gutsul, the current bashkan (governor) of Gagauzia, makes no secret of her loyalty to Moscow. Her rhetoric openly supports federalization of Moldova, a “return to fraternal cooperation with Russia,” and harsh criticism of the central government in Chișinău. Gutsul regularly participates in forums organized by Rossotrudnichestvo (a Russian state agency for “humanitarian” outreach) and maintains ties with influence agents operating under the guise of cultural or humanitarian initiatives.
Gagauzia is where Moscow tests its influence tools—from humanitarian “aid” to religious propaganda. The region hosts an active “Russian House,” promotes school exchanges with Russian institutions, and its local churches—fully controlled by the Moscow Patriarchate—serve as channels for spreading anti-vaccine, anti-Western, and anti-European messages.
Transnistria: The Kremlin’s Rear Base in the Heart of Moldova
In eastern Moldova lies Transnistria—an unrecognized pseudo-republic functioning as an occupied enclave under Russian protection. Its de facto “president,” Vadim Krasnoselsky, plays the role of the Kremlin’s local governor. However, real power lies with the Sheriff business group, which is closely tied to Russian financial and criminal networks.
Everything in Transnistria is under Moscow’s control: the media, customs, military forces, and even pension payments. As a result, the region has become not just a tool for blocking Moldova’s full European integration, but also a logistical hub for smuggling, espionage, and intelligence operations. Coordination with Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) and the FSB has been confirmed by multiple Western intelligence reports.
Information War in Real Time
TV channels banned in Moldova for spreading disinformation—Primul în Moldova, Accent TV, and NTV Moldova—have not ceased operations. Their content continues to circulate via YouTube, Facebook, and a vast network of Telegram channels. These platforms are actively used as hybrid influence tools to promote narratives about “foreign control of Moldova,” “the danger of being dragged into war,” and “the need to preserve neutrality.”
This disinformation campaign, fueled by direct instructions from Russian influence centers, plays a critical role in shaping public opinion in preparation for a political comeback of pro-Russian forces. The goal is not only to erode trust in the pro-European government but to impose false narratives that Moldova’s “real choice” is between stability—at the cost of abandoning its European ambitions—or chaos under Western leadership.
Elections as a Battlefield
The upcoming parliamentary elections are a critical moment as Moldova accelerates its EU integration process—and the Kremlin knows it well. Moscow has already outlined its interference strategies: from provocations and mass protests to uniting pro-Russian and populist forces into tactical alliances. The most likely scenario is the formation of a coalition after the elections, in which pro-Russian parties may not win outright but gain enough seats to become a “golden share” in Parliament.
While a direct intervention via Transnistria currently seems unlikely, Moscow retains this enclave as a strategic reserve. If the situation in Ukraine or southern Odesa changes suddenly, the scenario of destabilizing Moldova could be enacted within weeks.
Control or Chaos
Moldova is a litmus test for the region. The Kremlin views it not just as a former “backyard,” but as a key to destabilizing the entire Black Sea area. A successful, European Moldova challenges Russia’s neo-imperial project. If the “Moldovan experiment” fails, it will signal to other countries on the EU’s periphery that integration is futile and dangerous.
For the West, therefore, supporting Moldova is not altruism—it is a matter of strategic self-defense. Moldova’s fate is being decided not only in government offices but also on Telegram channels, in Orthodox churches in the south, and in closed-door forums in Moscow. To understand Moldova’s future, one must look not only at electoral graphs but at the shadow stretching from the northeast—where Russia is preparing its next geopolitical offensive.
Amid growing pro-Russian activity in Moldova, the European Union can no longer afford to simply observe. The Kremlin is deliberately undermining democratic processes in a candidate country for EU accession and turning it into a staging ground for destabilizing the entire Black Sea region.
Rhetoric of solidarity and formal declarations of support are no longer sufficient. A clear action strategy is needed:
- investments in the resilience of Moldovan institutions,
- transparent funding of independent media,
- technological aid to counter disinformation,
- and pressure on countries that shelter key players in this hybrid war, such as Ilan Shor or the infamous local oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc.
The EU must also recognize that supporting Moldova is not merely a political gesture—it is a vital component of European security. Fast-tracking accession talks, pursuing parallel economic integration, launching EU-monitored anti-corruption programs, and strengthening an independent judiciary must be cornerstones of a new European “anti-hybrid doctrine.”
Otherwise, if the Kremlin succeeds in derailing Moldova’s democratic trajectory, the next targets may be countries that until recently seemed to be the “deep rear” of the European project—meaning the fight with Moscow could soon take place on Europe’s own soil.