In June 2026, Ukraine and Poland — states that had become the closest allies in Eastern Europe after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war — found themselves on opposite sides of a historic dispute that touched on the most painful pages of the past. The symbol of this crisis was the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state award, which on April 5, 2023, President Andrzej Duda presented to Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a sign of special Polish-Ukrainian partnership and unprecedented rapprochement between the two countries. Three years later, Poland’s new president, Karol Nawrocki, stripped Zelenskyy of the award. In response, the Ukrainian leader demonstratively sent the order back to Warsaw by mail.
Why did this happen? After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Poland became one of Kyiv’s main partners, the largest logistics hub for Western military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and a refuge for around a million Ukrainian citizens. At that time, awarding V. Zelenskyy was perceived as a symbol of a new strategic alliance being formed between the two states. However, by the spring of 2026, the situation began to change. On May 26, 2026, the President of Ukraine signed a decree awarding one of the units of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine the honorary name “in honor of the Heroes of the UPA.” On May 29, 2026, K. Nawrocki publicly announced his intention to initiate the revocation of V. Zelenskyy’s Polish award, and on June 19, 2026, he officially declared his decision to strip the President of Ukraine of the Order of the White Eagle. Kyiv’s response was immediate: on June 20, 2026, V. Zelenskyy announced that he had sent the order back to Poland, emphasizing that he had viewed the award not as a personal merit but as recognition of the Ukrainian people’s struggle against Russian aggression.
Examining the political context of the incident, critics of K. Nawrocki see in his actions a calculated move and the choice of the most painful possible moment. The announcement of the decision did not occur during a calm period of bilateral dialogue, but against the backdrop of preparations for international events on Ukraine’s reconstruction, which were supposed to serve as a platform for Warsaw to demonstrate its key role in the future post-war arrangement of the region. In this context, K. Nawrocki’s step appeared especially harsh, as it shifted the focus of attention away from economic cooperation, infrastructure projects, and European support for Kyiv toward a conflict over historical memory. In both Warsaw and Kyiv, suspicions arose that this was not merely a reaction to the Ukrainian decree, but a deliberate political demonstration. According to critics, the Polish president chose this moment deliberately: instead of strengthening Poland’s position as Ukraine’s main partner in the reconstruction process, he turned an important international context into a tool for domestic political mobilization and pressure on Kyiv. This demonstration was intended to put V. Zelenskyy in an awkward position and show that the new Polish president could independently set the tone in Ukrainian policy.
In addition, the conflict was fueled by the political confrontation between the Polish president and the government. For Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the Ukrainian-Polish alliance remains an important element of Poland’s European policy and its claim to leadership in Eastern Europe. For Nawrocki, the conflict over the order became an opportunity to seize the initiative from the government and demonstrate that it is the president, not the cabinet of ministers, who determines the boundaries of what is permissible in relations with Kyiv. Therefore, the dispute over the award quickly went beyond the Ukrainian-Polish agenda and turned into an internal Polish conflict over who controls the country’s foreign policy.
The most important factor of “big” politics in this precedent is Ukraine’s future membership in the European Union. In statements from the Polish side, the idea is increasingly heard that Ukraine’s European integration is impossible without an honest conversation about the difficult pages of the past. In this context, the revocation of the order became not only “punishment” for Zelenskyy’s specific decree, but also a warning to Kyiv that historical issues would accompany Ukraine on its path to the EU and could become a tool of political pressure. Warsaw made it clear that support for Ukrainian security does not automatically mean a willingness to “turn a blind eye” to topics that Polish society considers fundamental.
It should be noted that almost everyone agrees on one thing: the main beneficiary of what happened turned out to be Russia. While there is no basis to claim that the conflict itself was created by Moscow — its historical roots are objective and exist independently of Russian propaganda — Russia gained clear benefits from it. Any public clash between Kyiv and Warsaw allows the Kremlin to promote the thesis of the “instability” of Ukrainian alliances, deepen mistrust between the societies, and undermine the image of Poland as Ukraine’s main regional partner. This is why critics of K. Nawrocki call his decision “a gift to Moscow,” since even if the Polish president’s motives were domestic, the consequences proved extremely convenient for Russian information influence.
It is for this reason that this episode became more dangerous than an ordinary diplomatic scandal. It demonstrated that Ukrainian-Polish partnership has entered a new phase in which the common threat from Russia alone is no longer sufficient to maintain trust. If Kyiv and Warsaw do not find a way to separate the strategic alliance from the “war of memories,” similar crises will recur, and every new confrontation will be exploited by those forces interested not in reconciliation, but in the gradual destruction of the Eastern European anti-Russian bloc.