Although Poland’s next parliamentary elections are scheduled for October–November 2027, the election campaign is effectively already in full swing. A year ahead of the decisive political contest, Poland is experiencing one of the most serious political confrontations of the past decade. The outcome will determine not only the composition of the future government in Warsaw, but also the balance of power within the European Union — from the framework of support for Ukraine and defence financing to further European integration, migration policy and the principles of the rule of law.
In autumn 2023, the victory of the Civic Coalition (KO), led by Donald Tusk, and its partners appeared to mark a decisive triumph for the pro-European course over the eight-year rule of the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS). However, expectations of a rapid restoration of pro-European policies and domestic political stability soon collided with political reality. The turning point came with the 2025 presidential election, which was won by Karol Nawrocki, the candidate backed by the right-wing camp. Armed with veto powers, Nawrocki blocked key legislative initiatives of Tusk’s government, while the political deadlock between the Presidential Palace and the Prime Minister’s Office turned the current parliamentary term into a continuous crisis campaign. Bills concerning judicial reform, tax changes and social benefits have repeatedly faced presidential vetoes. As a result, the “regular” 2027 elections have become one of the few remaining mechanisms through which the governing coalition could overcome the institutional deadlock, while for the right they represent an opportunity for political revanche.
The main political surprise of the summer of 2026 has emerged within PiS itself, where a long-standing, largely concealed rivalry between the party’s moderate technocratic wing and its ultraconservative faction has developed into an open split. Under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński, the party had maintained a largely cohesive structure for many years. In July 2026, former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki officially left PiS and, together with a group of 40 Sejm deputies, established a new political movement, Development Plus (R+). Morawiecki is targeting a centre-right, economically pragmatic electorate that has grown tired of Kaczyński’s ideological confrontations but remains unwilling to support Tusk’s liberals. The move followed developments in March 2026, when PiS made a sharp shift to the right by officially nominating Przemysław Czarnek as its candidate for prime minister. Czarnek’s nomination represented a victory for Kaczyński’s ideological wing and ultimately encouraged the party’s technocrats to establish an independent movement.
Jarosław Kaczyński’s response was forceful. PiS sought to restrict the resources available to the breakaway group and consolidate its remaining forces under the patronage of President Karol Nawrocki. However, the radicalisation and fragmentation of PiS have benefited not so much Kaczyński himself as more extreme forces on the political spectrum. This has contributed to the rapid growth of the far-right Confederation, led by Sławomir Mentzen, and the even more radical Confederation of the Polish Crown (KKP), led by Grzegorz Braun. Mentzen’s libertarian-nationalist platform and Braun’s hardline Euroscepticism collectively attract between 20% and 25% of voters, making these parties the principal beneficiaries of the breakdown of Poland’s traditional two-bloc political system.
According to aggregated polling data available in early August 2026, including the Politico Poll of Polls and surveys conducted by the IBRiS institute, the ruling Civic Coalition (KO), led by Donald Tusk, remains the leading political force, with support ranging from 29% to 32%. PiS, under Jarosław Kaczyński and Przemysław Czarnek, ranks second at approximately 20%. The right-wing camp continues to expand its influence, with Sławomir Mentzen’s Confederation polling at around 15% and Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown (KKP) at approximately 10%. The remaining major forces include the Left (Lewica), with around 8%, and Mateusz Morawiecki’s new Development Plus (R+) movement, whose support is estimated at between 6% and 8%.
Although Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition remains in first place, the position of the current government remains difficult. KO’s junior partners in the 2023 governing bloc, the agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL) and the centrist Poland 2050, are facing a deep crisis of public confidence and are hovering around the 5% electoral threshold.
Public sentiment is also reflected in a mid-August 2026 survey conducted by UCE Research for Onet. Asked whether Donald Tusk’s coalition deserves a second term in office, 39.6% of respondents said that the government should be re-elected, while 45.0%–47.0% opposed extending the coalition’s mandate. The remaining respondents were undecided.
Overall, the electoral contest is developing around four key areas of tension. The first is the so-called “Ukraine issue” and growing public fatigue. While Poland demonstrated broad public unity in support of Kyiv in 2022–2023, a more pragmatic approach has become increasingly prominent by 2026. Competition in the labour market, questions surrounding social benefits for refugees and unresolved historical disputes, particularly the issue of the Volhynia tragedy, are being actively exploited by Braun’s and Mentzen’s political forces. Even mainstream parties are being compelled to adopt tougher rhetoric, shifting the focus from “unlimited assistance” towards the protection of Poland’s national and economic interests.
Another source of political tension is the EU’s requirements concerning climate standards and agricultural-sector reform, which have generated strong resistance among farmers and parts of the industrial sector. The opposition has effectively exploited concerns over “Brussels diktat”, accusing Tusk of surrendering national sovereignty in exchange for the unblocking of EU funds.
Migration is another major source of public discontent. The situation on the border with Belarus and the distribution of migrants within the EU remain among the central issues of political debate, while any attempts to liberalise migration policy are perceived by part of the electorate as a threat to national security.
Finally, against the backdrop of elevated inflation in previous years and the rising cost of living, internal disputes within the governing coalition and controversies surrounding appointments to state-owned corporations have significantly weakened the coalition’s reputational standing.
If the current trends are projected onto the composition of the Sejm after the 2027 election, three basic scenarios can be identified. The first is the “Continuation of the Pro-European Course”. Under this scenario, KO succeeds in consolidating the left-wing and centrist electorate and securing a narrow majority. Poland would remain a reliable pillar of the Brussels-led European agenda, continue its systematic integration into the EU security architecture and maintain strategic support for Ukraine.
The second scenario is a “Right-Wing Radical Revanche”. It would involve a coalition agreement between a restructured PiS under Czarnek, the Confederation under Mentzen and KKP under Braun, resulting in a sharp shift towards right-wing populism.
The third scenario is “Fragmentation and Morawiecki’s Kingmaker Role”. In this scenario, none of the traditional political blocs secures the necessary majority, while Mateusz Morawiecki’s Development Plus, together with moderate elements from other parties, becomes the political “kingmaker”, forcing the competing camps to form complex and potentially unstable technocratic coalition governments.
Poland has become one of the most prominent examples of a broader European process involving the restructuring of traditional party systems, the growing influence of radical political forces and increasing political fragmentation. The 2027 election is no longer merely a domestic political contest. Its outcome will determine whether the key country on NATO’s eastern flank remains a stable participant in European politics or becomes a new source of systemic uncertainty for Europe as a whole.