The death of Radomir Kurtic, a representative of the Serbian state defense company Jugoimport-SDPR, who died in Moscow on November 17, 2025, remained virtually unnoticed by the international community until mid-December, when it was reported by the Serbian media.
The Military Security Service and the Information and Security Agency (BIA) of Serbia prepared a report for President Aleksandar Vučić, classifying his death as suspicious and requesting forensic examination data and case materials from their Russian colleagues. However, according to Serbian sources, these documents were never received. In addition, after the tragedy, a commission inspection of the Moscow office of Jugoimport-SDPR recorded the disappearance of a significant amount of official documents and hard drives from work computers. The disappearance of such materials in the context of the sudden and unexplained death of a representative of the defense structure most likely indicates the deliberate destruction by the Russians of evidence that could shed light on commercial chains, contracts, and arms supply routes.
Jugoimport-SDPR is a key element of Serbia’s military-industrial complex and one of the largest export-import structures in the region. Any commercial data relating to it potentially concerns not only business but also Belgrade’s foreign policy, since issues of the legality of export certificates, transit chains through third countries, and possible “redirection” of cargo have always been the subject of heightened attention, especially after public accusations made by Russian intelligence in the spring and summer of 2025. At that time, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service accused a number of Serbian companies of supplying ammunition through intermediaries and fake end-use certificates, which ultimately ended up in Ukraine. Belgrade disputed this claim, but Russian-Serbian relations became more complicated.
Given the company’s profile and the context of allegations of arms supplies through intermediaries, the most logical scenario is that of targeted information theft by Russians and pressure on Jugoimport-SDPR employees and management by Russia to settle disputed contracts, “smooth over” problems, or intimidate them. This version gives rise to theories about the involvement of Russian special services and possible forms of blackmail or coercion, ranging from economic pressure to the use of compromising information. In any case, the combination of facts such as sudden death, delays in providing expert conclusions, and the disappearance of confidential company materials raises serious concerns, as Russian special services have repeatedly used “dirty” methods, including murder and sabotage.
Russia does not “compete” in the arms market; it tries to achieve its goals by force. Among the examples, we can recall the explosions at ammunition depots in Vrbětice, Czech Republic, which the Czech authorities directly linked to the GRU. In Bulgaria, prosecutors and authorities have repeatedly spoken of suspicions regarding Russian citizens in a series of explosions at defense facilities and warehouses in 2011–2020. The poisoning of Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev in 2015 was also investigated in connection with suspected Russian intelligence agents.
The delay in the investigation on the Russian side and the lack of official reports are causing irritation in Belgrade and increasing public pressure on the Serbian authorities, as Moscow’s silence only fuels speculation about the existence of “inconvenient” information in the case. This precedent could lead to a whole range of consequences: from increased demands for transparency in foreign economic activity and a review of the practices of Serbian state-owned companies abroad to increased diplomatic tension between Belgrade and Moscow.
It is worth highlighting the factor of possible blackmail of the Serbian leadership by Russia based on data from “disappeared” individuals, most likely with the help of Russian special services, which could become a powerful argument for Serbia’s return to the orbit of pro-Russian politics and force the Serbs to work in the defense sector according to Russian schemes and under its control.
The case of Radomir Kurtic is an example of the interconnection between state interests, commercial contracts, and geopolitical risks. Until Russia provides Serbia with official investigation materials and the results of the forensic examination, and until a clear explanation is given for the disappearance of documents and data storage devices from the Moscow office of Jugoimport-SDPR, this story will remain a test for Belgrade’s ability to protect its own state structures and their employees abroad, as well as its willingness to publicly defend the right to a transparent investigation in its relations with Moscow.