Russia is one of the world’s largest arms exporters. Officially, contracts for deliveries of military equipment are signed with dozens of countries and annual turnover runs into billions of dollars. But behind the façade of legal exports there are frequent reports of clandestine shipments to criminal, paramilitary, or terrorist organizations. Russian weapons turn up in the depots of Middle Eastern proxy groups, in the basements of armed militias in Africa, and in the arsenals of Mafia clans in Italy.
Italian police have repeatedly reported finding stockpiles of Russian-made assault rifles and ammunition during raids on Mafia networks. In several cases the weapons appeared to be “fresh” consignments: the samples bore manufacture dates after 2010 and showed no visible signs of prior use. Journalists noted that some items lacked serial numbers or that numbers had been removed so professionally that it looked like a factory operation.
An investigation by the Italian outlet Linkiesta also established schemes used to deliver weapons to Italy. Shipments were routed through Sicilian ports in containers or in barrels filled with petroleum products. These routes coincided with the smuggling channels the Mafia has long used to move drugs and other illegal goods.
Experts point out that Russia’s export-control system for arms remains opaque, so weapon serial numbers are not always tracked in international databases. That creates opportunities for abuse, whether through corruption at the point of manufacture or through deliberate operations by intelligence services. The result is a European “black market” flooded with modern Russian small arms and ammunition.
While in Europe these flows mostly fuel organized crime, in Africa the weapons become part of a geopolitical game. In Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan, U.N. investigators and independent think tanks have documented the presence of Russian personnel and mercenaries linked to the Wagner private military company and its successors. Along with people, equipment — from armored vehicles to small arms — has been delivered to those regions.
Official shipments to these countries are constrained by sanctions, but cargoes have been moved by a Russian “shadow fleet” and by air transports operating under “false flags.” U.N. investigators and several western analytic centers estimate that the volume of illegal supplies to Libya in 2019–2020 may have reached tens of millions of dollars, including consignments of small arms, armored vehicles and unmanned aerial systems. In the Central African Republic, regular deliveries of weapons and ammunition worth up to $10 million a year were recorded, accompanied by Wagner instructors, thereby arming local militias fighting on the government’s side. In Mali, illicit consignments were routed via logistics companies in the UAE and Syria using aircraft with altered registration numbers to bring equipment to groups associated with the military junta. Individual voyages by the “shadow fleet,” chartered under Tanzanian and Belizean flags, crossed the Mediterranean toward the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi, where weapons ended up in the hands of Marshal Haftar’s formations. For local armed groups this meant not only access to modern weaponry but also dependence on an external sponsor, turning them into instruments of geopolitical influence. For Moscow, it provided an additional lever of influence in resource-rich regions.
The mechanism of Russia’s illicit arms trade has long been honed into a finely tuned logistical system in which every element has its place. Experts single out several key techniques by which Russian weapons end up with actors who could never receive them through legitimate channels.
The first link is the “shadow flotilla.” Cargo ships flying convenient flags of registry intentionally switch off transponders to disappear from radars. In international waters containers are transshipped onto other vessels, documents are changed and sometimes the vessel’s name is altered. As a result, the origin of the cargo becomes almost impossible to determine.
Next comes concealment. Small arms are disassembled and packed into equipment, building materials, or even barrels of petroleum products. To an external inspector the load looks ordinary and therefore passes formal checks with ease.
Criminal networks play an equally important role. Routes used for drug and contraband trafficking are also ideal for firearms deliveries. The supporting infrastructure is already in place — bribed officials, shell companies and trusted couriers.
The final touch is serial numbers: they are removed or damaged so the weapon cannot be entered into international tracking databases. Consequently, rifles and munitions become “invisible” to control systems.
The combination of these methods renders the chain nearly invulnerable. Cargoes slip out of oversight, dissolve into flows of legal transport and ultimately reach recipients whose names will never appear on official contracts.
Illicit arms trading yields a twofold benefit for Russia. Beyond direct profit, it complicates law-enforcement efforts in Europe, scaling up threats to societies and public safety. In Africa and the Middle East, Russian weaponry becomes a tool for exerting forceful influence over state institutions and is actively used to ignite conflicts, topple unfavorable politicians and impose advantageous terms.
There is, however, a flip side: the illegal arms trade is a powerful blow to international reputation. Although official Russian spokespeople deny any involvement in illicit shipments, the lack of transparency and robust control mechanisms makes skepticism toward Russian statements entirely justified. In this context Europol and the United Nations insist on strengthening oversight over weapons movements and on creating an appropriate international database.
For Russia the question boils down to a strategic choice — either to continue clandestine supplies, arming criminal and militarized groups abroad, or to build a system of transparent exports. It is worth considering that the “shadow” arms trade could well be part of Russia’s state strategy. As noted earlier, weapons are an excellent instrument of control and influence — in today’s conditions a tool Moscow finds extremely useful. Arms have become a component of the global shadow economy and an instrument of influence. Every new consignment that falls into the hands of criminals or militants turns into a threat not only to regional but to global security.