Following the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, the Council of the European Union imposed sanctions and banned one of the main official channels for disseminating Kremlin propaganda in Europe — the Russian state broadcasters RT and Sputnik. In France, this led to the suspension and subsequent closure of RT France – a television channel that for years had positioned itself to French audiences as ‘alternative media’, but was in fact part of the Russian state information system. The ban was met with resistance from RT France, which attempted to challenge it in the Court of Justice of the European Union, arguing that it violated freedom of expression and the right to information; however, in July 2022, the court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the restrictions were a legitimate tool for protecting the European information space from disinformation.
However, this decision by the Council of the EU turned out to be largely institutional and left certain agents of Russian propaganda influence outside the scope of direct restrictions, notably the former head of RT France, Ksenia Fedorova, who was able not only to remain in France but also, according to media reports, renew her residence permit for a further 10 years and continue her public activities in a new role – within a media environment linked to French businessman Vincent Bolloré, known for his support of the right-wing conservative media sector.
As for Ksenia Fedorova herself, it is known that she has been working in the Russian state media for over 20 years, having started her career at Russia Today back in 2005, when the organisation was first established. For a long time, she held senior positions in the Kremlin’s international media structures. From 2017 to 2022, she headed RT France and served as its chief news editor. Following this ban, Ksenia Fedorova launched an active media and publicist campaign, attempting to portray herself as a ‘victim of Western censorship’. She subsequently gained the opportunity to appear in media outlets linked to the Bolloré Group, which owns CNews, Europe 1, Le Journal du Dimanche and other platforms. There, she acts as a political commentator and columnist, regularly promoting views aligned with the stance of Russian state media: criticising the EU’s sanctions policy, shifting part of the blame for the war in Ukraine onto NATO, questioning Western support for Kyiv, and attempting to portray Russia not as an aggressor but as a party allegedly reacting to external pressure.
K. Fedorova’s influence within Bolloré’s media empire has come under particular scrutiny following reports of her possible role in establishing a pool of ‘compliant’ spokespersons. A telling precedent, which was covered by the European media, was the story of the removal from the list of regular guests of retired French general Bruno Clermont, who had long collaborated with CNews as a military analyst. The general lost his contract and was removed from the airwaves after he allowed himself to criticise Russia and its aggression against Ukraine in his assessments of the geopolitical situation. As Clermont himself later stated, the reason for his departure was the intervention of Fedorova, who, in his words, ‘did not like’ his anti-Russian statements ‘at all’. It was this very episode that became one of the key arguments for critics who speak not merely of the former head of RT France’s presence on air, but of the influence of her pro-Russian sympathies on editorial decisions.
The media outlets belonging to Vincent Bolloré’s media empire have a distinct right-wing conservative slant, with anti-immigration rhetoric, criticism of Euro-Atlantic globalism, Euroscepticism and distrust of existing democratic institutions featuring regularly among their key themes. It is in this environment that pro-Russian narratives can gain additional legitimacy, as they are presented not as direct Kremlin propaganda, but as an ‘alternative perspective’ on the war, sanctions, NATO and the role of the EU. Despite criticism of Fedorova from journalists, MEPs and sections of the French public, the management of the media outlets linked to Bolloré shows no willingness to distance itself from her, explaining her presence by the need for ‘pluralism’ and the presentation of a different point of view.
Fedorova’s obvious political bias has already caused a significant stir. Representatives of the French political establishment and the foreign ministry have criticised her statements, emphasising that they echo the Kremlin’s key narratives and distort reality by shifting the blame for the aggression from Russia onto Ukraine, NATO and the West. A complaint was lodged with the national media regulator ARCOM by Valérie Hayer, an MEP from the centrist bloc, demanding a legal assessment of the systematic dissemination of pro-Russian narratives on French airwaves under the guise of editorial pluralism.
The scandal surrounding the former head of RT France has exposed the weaknesses in the European model for countering Russian hybrid threats. The EU sanctions introduced in 2022 blocked RT France as a legal entity and an institutional channel of Russian influence, but did not resolve the issue of this influence being transferred personally to other media formats. French regulatory bodies are forced to operate within a legal framework where previous employment at RT France does not in itself constitute automatic grounds for deportation, arrest or a ban on professional activity. This creates a complex situation: formally, the sanctions mechanism has worked, but in practice, some of the narratives previously disseminated via RT France have been able to appear on other French platforms.
In defending Fedorova’s presence, representatives of this media environment invoke company law, freedom of speech and the need to ‘present a viewpoint that differs from the mainstream’. However, it is precisely this logic that sets a dangerous precedent: Russian disinformation is no longer presented as the product of a state propaganda channel, but is disguised as one of the permissible forms of political debate. As a result, the banned institution disappears, but its arguments, spokespersons and methods of influence are partially preserved.
Fedorova’s appearances on prime-time broadcasts of popular conservative channels also have a broader political dimension. She is creating a favourable media environment for forces which, in the run-up to the 2027 presidential election, may advocate a review of France’s policy towards Russia, Ukraine and sanctions. On CNews, Fedorova has claimed that it is Russia that is supposedly capable of helping the French economy, and that for Emmanuel Macron’s successor, maintaining friendly relations with Moscow will be ‘essential’. Through the systematic repetition of the argument that it is the West and NATO that are interested in prolonging the war, whilst Russia is almost the victim, French voters are being led to believe that withdrawing support for Ukraine and lifting sanctions against Russia will supposedly automatically resolve France’s domestic economic problems.
French media reported that Fedorova attended a private lunch hosted by the Institut de l’Espérance think tank, linked to Bolloré, where strategies for 2027 were discussed in the presence of certain government officials, public figures and an adviser to far-right leader Jordan Bardella. The very fact that the former head of RT France was present at such an event became politically sensitive, as it showed that she not only remains in the French media sphere but also has access to circles where the agenda of the right-wing conservative camp is shaped.
This lunch sparked yet another scandal in French political circles. French Agriculture Minister Annie Genevieve was forced to explain her presence at the event, stating that no one had warned her about the former director of RT France being there. According to her, had she known about it in advance, she would not have attended such a meeting.
Thanks to political and media leniency on the part of the Bolloré circle, Russian propaganda narratives have found new ground in French public discourse. This is not just about one former head of RT France, but about a broader mechanism whereby EU-blocked news channels lose their legal cover, yet their spokespersons and talking points continue to operate through legitimate European platforms. In such an environment, criticism of the Kremlin can be sidelined under the pretext of editorial balance, whilst pro-Russian arguments are presented as one of several legitimate viewpoints.
This case serves as an important warning for France and the EU. The ban on RT France was a necessary step, but it did not resolve the issue of Russian information influence. If former representatives of Kremlin media can freely integrate into high-profile European media platforms, influence the selection of speakers, promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-sanctions narratives, and participate in political debates in the run-up to elections, then sanctions policy needs to be reviewed. Otherwise, Russia will continue to exploit the weaknesses in the European legal and media landscape to undermine EU unity, erode support for Ukraine and create favourable conditions for politicians seeking a geopolitical shift in France in 2027.