Roberto Vannacci is a relatively new but ambitious figure in Italian politics. A former soldier, now a member of the European Parliament and leader of the Futuro Nazionale party, he aims to head the far-right flank, promises to restore Italy’s supposedly lost sovereignty, criticizes the EU and NATO, and calls for closer ties with Russia. In this context, growing questions are being raised about the people with whom Vannacci is building his political project, among them open supporters of the Kremlin, individuals with Russian ties, and people with a record of corruption. In September 2026, Il Giornale published an investigation into his circle that names numerous figures with pronounced sympathies for the Kremlin regime and documented Russian connections.
The Russian factor played an important role in Vannacci’s rise and in shaping his worldview even before he entered high politics, because he served as Italy’s military attaché in Moscow. The politician himself admits that he still maintains contacts with Russians he met during his posting, but he denies links with senior representatives of the Russian authorities. He does not publicly name his Russian “friends.” Private acquaintances are not in themselves a violation, but for a politician who aspires to a significant role in Italy, such contacts give grounds to demand greater publicity and transparency.
Former British military attaché John Foreman told Fanpage.it that in 2021, on instructions from headquarters, NATO countries’ military attachés in Moscow reduced contacts with the Russian defense ministry to a minimum. Vannacci, he said, instead proposed restoring joint Italian-Russian military exercises and explained Russia’s confrontation with the West by NATO enlargement. On the eve of 24 February 2022, he also insisted that Russia would not attack Ukraine. That forecast proved wrong at a moment when one of a military attaché’s core tasks was to assess the intentions of the Russian leadership.
Former Italian ambassador to Russia Giorgio Starace judged Vannacci’s official memoranda to be accurate and technically sound and said he had not noticed any obvious sympathy for the Russian regime in his work. At the same time, the diplomat said, the attaché overestimated the capabilities of the Russian army and expected it to advance quickly through Ukraine. Vannacci thus first failed to foresee the invasion and, after it began, overestimated Russia’s military capacity. He now claims the role of an expert on Russian politics, while people with pro-Russian views are taking part in building his party.
Among those described by Il Giornale is Eliseo Bertolasi, the representative in Italy of the International Russophile Movement, who has been involved in its activities since its creation and received an award and the status of “knight of the Russian Order of Friendship.” In December 2025 the EU imposed sanctions on the movement for spreading destabilizing and anti-European narratives, although Bertolasi himself was not sanctioned.
The newspaper also mentions Ugo Rossi, who called Putin one of the world’s best leaders, and the Italian-Russian Pietro Stramezzi. The latter lives in Moscow, has been photographed in the State Duma and, according to journalists, maintains contacts with Anton Kobyakov, an adviser to the Russian president. Vannacci’s wife, Camelia Mihailescu, heads the Generazione Xa foundation, which collects contributions from party supporters and, according to La Repubblica, finances her husband’s political project. Il Giornale also reported that she had backed the Romanian politician Călin Georgescu, known for his criticism of NATO and of aid to Ukraine.
Among those building Futuro Nazionale, Stefano Valdegamberi stands out. A member of the Veneto regional council, he organized the party’s first branch in northeastern Italy and became coordinator of its work with local authorities in the region. The council’s official website records his speeches against sanctions on Russia and a statement calling for the war not to be treated as a confrontation between aggressor and victim. Valdegamberi has also claimed that some residents of eastern Ukraine supposedly regard Russia as a “liberator,” repeating one of the Kremlin’s key narratives about the war.
Vannacci responded to the investigation into his pro-Russian circle by attacking the journalists. He called the published material “a set of insinuations and conjectures,” accused the newsroom of being obsessed with him, and invited his critics to wait for the elections to see the “real result.”
Vannacci wants to make Futuro Nazionale the engine of a far-right turn in Italy. Alongside calls for “remigration” and the repeal of the Mancino law on countering racist and neo-fascist propaganda, the party’s program demands an end to arms supplies to Ukraine. Eight percent support in an SWG poll of 21 September 2026 does not give Futuro Nazionale grounds to expect a majority. At the same time, that rating allows Vannacci to claim a visible place among the Italian right and to draw voters away from the governing coalition. One of the main constraints on his political plans remains the position of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who has rejected an alliance with forces opposed to support for Ukraine.
Vannacci’s pro-Russian circle is already taking part in building Futuro Nazionale: these people work in structures linked to the party and are setting up its local branches. If the party’s political position strengthens, they could gain greater influence over its foreign-policy line and over the promotion of decisions that suit Moscow’s interests. Should Futuro Nazionale enter parliament, it could become an additional political channel for advancing positions favorable to Russia, including on Ukraine, sanctions, and Italy’s relations with the EU and NATO, and could make it harder for the center-right government to pursue a foreign policy aligned with its allies.
