All of Europe will be closely watching the Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 12. The parliamentary campaign, which Fidesz strategists and leadership had intended to be another routine procedure for legitimizing Viktor Orbán’s power, has now turned into a fierce battle for the survival of his regime. The dynamics of the confrontation have shown that the system of “illiberal democracy” is facing, for the first time, a genuine threat of internal collapse — forcing Budapest and its allies in the Kremlin to take decisive action.
Recent polls conducted by independent institutions show that the opposition party Tisza, led by Péter Magyar, holds a lead over Fidesz. The growing support for his political force and the capturing of a share of the provincial electorate have broken Orbán’s monopoly on representing the interests of “deep Hungary,” which he has long relied upon. The leading opposition figure has also managed to win over a portion of the traditionally Fidesz electorate.
Recognizing the real possibility of losing everything, the Hungarian authorities have resorted to extremes, labeling every opposition figure as an “agent of war” or a “puppet of Brussels or Kyiv.” The streets of Budapest and other Hungarian cities are plastered with billboards and posters bearing slogans that appeal to emotions and fears — including the threat of losing energy stability and the alleged risk of dragging the country into an armed conflict with Russia.
Hungary’s dependence on Russia developed through a combination of inherited Soviet-era infrastructure and deliberate policy decisions by Viktor Orbán’s government, which bet on long-term contracts with Gazprom and the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant using Russian loans and Rosatom technology. This strategy was driven by the desire to keep energy prices low for the population in exchange for electoral loyalty, turning the country’s energy security into a tool for the ruling party’s political survival. The Kremlin, equally unwilling to lose such a reliable ally, has thrown all available resources into saving Fidesz.
On March 6, the investigative journalism project VSquare published information — citing European intelligence services — that the Kremlin had dispatched a group of political strategists and Russian military intelligence officers to Budapest, tasked with operating bot networks, executing information operations, and discrediting the Hungarian opposition. The Kremlin assigned oversight of this “rescue operation” for Fidesz to Sergei Kirienko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration. His mission: to ensure the Hungarian electoral process remains “manageable.”
The political technologists answerable to Kirienko are employing a scenario already tested in Moldova — using pro-Russian forces and Kremlin-controlled bot networks to destabilize the situation. VSquare journalists, citing European intelligence data, reported that at least three operatives are operating under the cover of “technical staff” or “attachés” at the Russian Embassy in Budapest, enjoying full diplomatic protection and privileges.
VSquare’s investigative journalists also established that the management and coordination of the fake-spreading bot networks is being handled by the already-notorious Social Design Agency (SDA), led by Ilya Gambashidze, who is under EU and US sanctions. SDA specialists have deployed a sophisticated automated disinformation system across the Hungarian internet, operating on a rapid-injection principle: hundreds of bot accounts simultaneously spread “sensational exposés” alleging that the Hungarian opposition is being funded through structures affiliated with NATO and Ukrainian intelligence. Given Fidesz’s traditionally strong support in rural areas, the agency actively employs micro-targeted advertising aimed at rural regions and other target audiences, with the core message being the inevitability of economic catastrophe should Hungary abandon “cheap Russian gas” — which, they claim, only the current prime minister can guarantee.
The British newspaper the Financial Times gained access to internal documents of the Russian Social Design Agency containing plans for “information attacks” against opposition leader Péter Magyar. These included the creation of deepfakes and memes portraying him as a “Brussels puppet” ready to send Hungarian soldiers to war in Ukraine.
The exploitation of the “Ukrainian factor” has become perhaps the central pillar of Viktor Orbán’s election campaign. Against the backdrop of the suspension of the Druzhba oil pipeline — which Kyiv attributes to damage from Russian strikes while Budapest frames as political pressure — Orbán has made energy one of the campaign’s key themes. The narrative that “Ukrainians will leave us without heat” became a staple of pro-government media and served as justification for blocking EU financial assistance to Ukraine. It should be noted that the “Ukrainian question” is being used by the Hungarian authorities as a tool for radical electoral mobilization, aimed at reducing the political choice to a crude binary: “peace and stability” associated with Orbán versus “war” linked to the opposition.
Moscow’s interest in preserving Orbán’s regime extends far beyond simple loyalty — for Putin, Hungary is valuable as a mechanism of influence within the EU and NATO. Keeping the current government in power guarantees the Kremlin a set of leverage tools: through Budapest’s persistent blocking of financial aid to Ukraine and its vetoing of anti-Russian sanctions. Hungary serves as a reliable hub for Russian intelligence services in Central Europe and as a platform for energy dealings — notably with Lukoil and Rosneft — that allow Russia to circumvent financial restrictions. For the Kremlin, the fall of Orbán would mean not merely the loss of an ally, but the final collapse of its strategy to divide European unity from within, making a Fidesz victory the only way Moscow can retain a lever of influence over Europe.
The end of the Viktor Orbán era in Hungary is not simply a matter of a change in political course — it is a necessary condition for the country to escape deep institutional degradation and international isolation. The methods of “state racketeering” — from energy blackmail of neighbors to the brazen seizure of foreign state bank assets — are transforming Hungary from a full member of the European family into a bad neighbor, one that will inevitably face the complete loss of access to EU funds and economic stagnation. For Hungarians, the “end of the Orbán era” represents a chance to restore the country’s status as a predictable state governed by the rule of law — one where the well-being of citizens is no longer sacrificed to corrupt schemes and dangerous geopolitical games with the toxic Kremlin.