After Robert Fico became prime minister for the fourth time in 2023, Slovakia reversed its foreign policy and shifted markedly toward closer ties with Russia. His government is now one of the main opponents of the EU’s hard line on the Kremlin. That shows up in attempts to block or delay the adoption and renewal of new packages of anti-Russian sanctions, in a refusal to look for alternatives to Russian energy, and, most importantly, in the retransmission of Kremlin narratives. The answer to why Bratislava is damaging Euro-Atlantic unity lies in the corrupt past of Fico and his inner circle in Smer-SD, in the contacts people from that circle have with Russian politicians and state structures, and in an energy dependence that the current Slovak prime minister uses to extract political dividends and to mobilize and hold his electorate.
On 19 September 2026, Fico said that some Western politicians supposedly want to provoke a war between NATO and Russia, and that after the “failure” of the strategy of supporting Ukraine they want to drag the Alliance into a direct confrontation with the Russian Federation. He also promised that he would not allow Slovakia to take part in a war under what he called a “fabricated pretext.” While European leaders warn of Russian hybrid escalation and the need for consolidation, the Slovak prime minister shifts responsibility for the risk of escalation onto those who support Ukraine and strengthen deterrence of Russia.
To understand what leverage Moscow has over Bratislava, it is worth looking at the Russian ties of people in the prime minister’s immediate circle. The clearest example is the March 2025 trip to Moscow by Fico’s legal adviser, Dávid Lindtner, together with another Smer MEP, Ľuboš Blaha. Journalists from VSquare and the Jan Kuciak Investigative Centre published a copy of a letter dated 21 February 2025 in which State Duma deputy and LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky asked the Russian embassy in Bratislava to issue Lindtner a visa as quickly as possible and to give him every possible assistance. The letter stated that the purpose of the trip was talks on humanitarian and charitable projects run by the Russian Peace Foundation, which Slutsky heads. The foundation also promised the guest material and medical support and offered to pay for accommodation and all other expenses.
What drew investigators’ attention was that the purpose given in the visa letter did not match the one Blaha later described. According to him, Lindtner accompanied him as a lawyer and as Robert Fico’s legal adviser, and the talks with the Russians concerned criminal proceedings against Fico and his circle that had been pursued by the governments of Igor Matovič and Eduard Heger in 2020–2023. Blaha did not mention the foundation’s humanitarian projects. The gap between the stated purpose of the visit and the participants’ account of what was discussed raises questions about the real nature of the talks and the range of issues on the table.
According to The Insider, the Russian Peace Foundation works closely with, or is sponsored by, a unit of Russian military intelligence that operates on the European track. The fact that a trip by someone from the circle of a prime minister of an EU and NATO state was arranged through this structure raises questions about counterintelligence risks and the threat to Slovakia’s national security. It later emerged that Lindtner met Slutsky, while Blaha met Sergei Naryshkin, director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. Tellingly, they did not comment on the substance of the talks, so firm conclusions about what was discussed are impossible. Even so, the level of these contacts points to a direct channel of communication between Smer representatives and senior Russian officials.
Lindtner is known for having represented Fico in the Súmrak (“Twilight”) case, in which Fico was accused of forming a criminal group and abusing power. He later became Fico’s legal adviser. He then advised Justice Minister Boris Susko and took part in drafting the controversial 2024 reform of the Criminal Code, which softened penalties and shortened statutes of limitation for some economic and corruption offences. The opposition at the time accused Lindtner himself of corruption and of interfering in the administration of justice. The trip to Russia also raised questions about who paid for it, about Lindtner’s possible access to confidential information, and about whether the Slovak security services were properly informed of his contacts in Russia after he returned.
It is also notable that, shortly before this visit, Slutsky received another Slovak parliamentary delegation that included Smer MP Tibor Gašpar, and that two months later Blaha and Lindtner travelled to Russia. All of these visits took place under sanctions against the Russian Federation and without EU approval, which may indicate the formation of a separate, unofficial channel of communication between Smer representatives and Moscow.
Another layer of Slovakia’s dependence on Russia is energy. After transit through Ukraine stopped in January 2025, Slovakia continued to receive Russian gas via TurkStream, and the contract between the Slovak company SPP and Gazprom runs until 2034. In July of the same year, Bratislava delayed adoption of the 18th sanctions package, demanding guarantees linked to a separate EU plan to phase out Russian gas. The sanctions were eventually adopted, but the episode showed how Fico uses energy and sanctions as tools of political bargaining with Brussels.
Fico’s policy toward Russia is shaped by several factors: long-standing contacts between his political circle and Russian representatives, Slovakia’s energy dependence, and the government’s domestic political interests. As a result, Bratislava increasingly takes positions that diverge from the common EU and NATO line on Russia and Ukraine. That makes it harder to shape a common European policy and gives Moscow a way to exploit divisions among allies in pursuit of its own interests.
