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Why France Is Withdrawing Military Forces from Senegal

France’s decision to withdraw its military forces from Senegal in 2024–2025 marks a major shift in its Africa strategy. This move is driven by a combination of regional, political, and strategic factors, reflecting the erosion of French influence in West Africa.

1. Regional Anti-French Sentiment

  • Growing public hostility toward French military presence in former colonies like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal has made continued deployment politically untenable.
  • In Senegal, recent protests and nationalist rhetoric (especially among the youth and opposition) labeled the French bases as symbols of neocolonialism.

2. End of France’s Sahel Military Strategy

  • After failures and unpopular interventions in the Sahel (e.g., Operation Barkhane), France has been winding down direct military involvement.
  • With coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger expelling French troops, Senegal was the last major foothold in West Africabut maintaining it became increasingly isolated and risky.

3. Senegalese Political Shift

  • Under President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, elected in 2024 on a platform of sovereignty and anti-French sentiment, Senegal is redefining its foreign relations, pushing for greater autonomy from Paris.
  • His government supports revisiting defense agreements, a signal to France that its era of military privilege in the region is ending.

4. Strategic Recalibration by Paris

  • France is pursuing a “non-intrusive” Africa policy, favoring training, logistics, and partnerships over permanent deployments.
  • It aims to prevent being a scapegoat for internal African crises while reducing costly and politically damaging military entanglements.

 Risks and Consequences

For France:

  • Loss of strategic depth in West Africa.
  • Weakening of intelligence and counterterrorism presence across the Sahel.
  • Shrinking diplomatic clout amid rising influence from Russia, China, and Turkey.

For Senegal:

  • Short-term security gap, especially in regional anti-terrorism coordination.
  • Risk of external actors (e.g., Wagner-linked forces) filling the vacuum, similar to Mali and Burkina Faso