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Why Poland and Romania refused to increase the transit of Ukrainian grain

On October 4, 2026, Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy Taras Vysotsky left Brussels empty-handed after asking European partners to increase the transit of agricultural products through EU territory and allocate €1.1 billion to cover rising transportation costs. The reason was a firm refusal from two key countries — Poland and Romania — through whose port, rail, and river infrastructure most of the alternative routes for Ukrainian grain pass after the Black Sea was effectively blocked and Ukraine’s Black Sea port infrastructure came under continuous attacks.

According to Vysotsky, a critical situation has now developed, and European land and river routes are currently capable of handling less than half of the export volume Ukraine needs. If the blockade continues until the end of the year, up to 35 million tons of grain and oilseeds could remain stuck inside the country. This would not only cause substantial losses but also risk a 35–40% reduction in sown areas next season, as farmers would be left without money for seeds, fuel, and autumn planting.

The origins of the current crisis go back to 2022, when, after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine and the European Union established a network of rail, road, and river routes through Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Moldova, known as the “Solidarity Corridors.” Over four years, about 230 million tons of cargo passed through them, but the sea route remained preferable because shipping one ton was $45–70 cheaper. However, as Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and vessels in the Black Sea have now entered their third month, Kyiv has once again turned to the land corridors.

It should be noted, however, that the “Solidarity Corridors” mechanism, intended to prevent a global food crisis, unexpectedly faced resistance from the agricultural sector of Eastern Europe itself back in 2023–2024, when Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, despite objections from the European Commission, introduced unilateral embargoes on the import of Ukrainian wheat, corn, and a number of other crops. The reason was that cheap Ukrainian grain intended for transit partially settled on domestic markets and crashed prices, prompting Polish farmers to stage mass protests and block borders. Political pressure proved stronger than European solidarity.

Since then, transit has formally continued, but under strict control. Ukraine insists that even now the discussion is exclusively about transit to third countries, not sales on the EU market, yet Warsaw and Bucharest have little faith in this — especially against the backdrop of discussions about possibly expanding Ukraine’s access to the single market even before full membership.

By autumn 2026, the contradictions had flared up with renewed force. The cause was not only the constant flow of grain but also the coincidence of several critical factors: the peak harvest season for domestic crops in the EU, the critical overload of the port of Constanța, and record-low water levels on the Danube that made barge transport practically unprofitable.

At the core of the problem lies a significant divergence in the priorities of Kyiv and its Eastern European partners. Romanian Agriculture Minister Barna Tanczos stated that Bucharest’s key task remains protecting the interests of Romanian farmers and supporting its own infrastructure. In particular, the port of Constanța, which became the main maritime hub for Ukrainian grain after the Black Sea blockade, is operating at the limit of its capacity while simultaneously handling Romanian and Moldovan harvests. In addition, the anomalous shallowness of the Danube in autumn 2026 has sharply reduced the throughput capacity of the river fleet.

Rising costs of logistics, elevator services, and freight are causing open discontent among Romanian farmers, who accuse Ukrainian transit of creating an infrastructural collapse.

Warsaw is taking an even tougher stance. Anna Szumanska, a representative of Poland’s Ministry of Infrastructure, directly stated that the country has no plans to expand transit capacity for Ukrainian agricultural products. This decision is backed by strong pressure from the Polish agricultural lobby and trade unions. Polish farmers speak of dumping, arguing that the lower cost of Ukrainian grain — shaped by the scale of production and the absence of strict EU requirements — is undercutting domestic purchase prices. Amid complex domestic politics and pre-election calculations, the Polish government is unwilling to take risks and prefers to maintain a protectionist course, while also expressing skepticism about further trade liberalization with Kyiv.

The confrontation over the transit of Ukrainian grain goes beyond bilateral disputes, and the resulting deadlock carries serious geopolitical and economic consequences. The situation has shown that Ukraine’s potential future accession to the European Union will face colossal resistance in the agricultural sector, where Ukrainian agribusiness is seen not as a partner but as a dangerous competitor. Without tough intervention from Brussels, the development of compensation mechanisms, and large-scale infrastructure modernization, no compromise will be found between declared values and national economic protectionism.

Today, in search of a way out, Ukraine is forced to work on routes through the ports of Germany and the Netherlands. However, the lengthening of the transport leg dramatically increases logistics costs and requires direct financial support from Brussels.

According to expert estimates, a decline in exports from Ukraine could affect about 17% of the global grain market. Reduced export supplies would fuel food inflation, putting at risk African and Asian countries dependent on Black Sea grain, while simultaneously strengthening the positions of alternative suppliers, including Russia.

Within the EU, the refusal of Poland and Romania exposes significant disagreements and places Brussels in a difficult position, forcing the European Commission to balance between supporting Ukraine and preventing internal protests. So far, no clear mechanism exists to compel Eastern member states to expand transit. And time is working against everyone: every month of delay means lost tons, lost revenues, and a growing threat of global food instability.