In the spring of 2026, Germany once again found itself at the centre of events linked to the rise of right-wing extremism among young people, a phenomenon that has ceased to be a marginal issue and is increasingly perceived as a systemic threat. The trigger for this new wave of public unrest was both mass protests against the far right and reports of an increase in the number of far-right incidents in schools and among young people.
In the spring of 2026, Germany once again found itself at the centre of events linked to the rise of right-wing extremism among young people, a phenomenon that had ceased to be a marginal issue and was increasingly perceived as a systemic threat. The trigger for this new wave of public unrest was both mass protests against the far right and reports of an increase in the number of far-right incidents in schools and among young people.
Contemporary right-wing youth extremism in Germany has developed in several stages. In the 1980s and 1990s, its core consisted of neo-Nazi groups closely linked to the subcultures of skinheads, football ultras and street gangs. However, a qualitative shift occurred after 2010 with the emergence of the so-called ‘New Right’. This movement rejected overtly Nazi trappings and focused on intellectualisation, the media and a youth audience. The party ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD), founded in 2013, became a key centre of attraction. Initially Eurosceptic, it quickly shifted ‘to the right’ and became a channel for promoting radical ideas.
The 2015 migration crisis proved to be a pivotal event that radically altered Europe’s political landscape and provided fertile ground for a new generation of right-wing movements. Millions of refugees, arriving primarily in Germany, Sweden and other EU countries, not only sparked a wave of solidarity but also intensified deep-seated cultural, economic and demographic fears among European citizens. For some sections of society, these events came to be perceived as a threat to their way of life, whilst for young people, they symbolised the failure of political elites, who were unable to control the situation. It was during this period that the key narratives began to take shape, which today form the basis of the ideology of far-right youth movements. Central to these is the theory of ‘population replacement’, the idea that the indigenous European population is allegedly being gradually displaced by migrants. This theory is accompanied by harsh anti-immigration rhetoric, in which migration is presented not as a humanitarian challenge but as an existential threat. At the same time, mistrust of state and supranational structures is growing, particularly of the European Union, which is accused of ‘betraying the interests of citizens’.
By the mid-2020s, these ideas were no longer marginal. Whereas they had previously circulated mainly within closed neo-Nazi circles, they had now become widespread thanks to digital platforms. On TikTok, Telegram and X, they are being adapted to the format of short, emotionally charged content aimed at young people.
The new wave of radicalisation, which became clearly evident in 2024–2026, was the result of several interrelated factors. First and foremost were the economic upheavals caused by the energy crisis and inflation after 2022, which heightened a sense of instability and uncertainty, particularly among young people. According to pan-European surveys, up to 47% of young people in EU countries do not feel represented in the political system. This sense of alienation creates fertile ground for radical ideas that offer simple answers to complex social and economic problems.
The youth wing of right-wing movements plays a significant role in radicalisation. Following the dissolution in 2025 of ‘Young Alternative’ – the youth wing of the German far-right political party AfG – a new organisation, ‘Generation Germany’, was established, boasting around 2,000 members from the outset, which indicates that interest in such initiatives among young people has been maintained and even expanded. Unlike its predecessors, the new movement demonstrates a higher level of organisation and strategic planning. It actively uses social media for mobilisation and the dissemination of ideas, and also works purposefully on issues of youth identity. Ideologically, ‘Generation Germany’ promotes a combination of nationalism, anti-liberal criticism and cultural conservatism, adapting these ideas to the contemporary media context and the language of the digital generation.
The financial basis of far-right youth movements remains one of the least transparent aspects of their activities. A significant proportion of their resources is channelled through political structures, primarily via the AfD. State funding of political parties in Germany enables the development of a well-established infrastructure (offices, media platforms, educational events), which is then also used by youth organisations, often without any direct formal distinction. This creates the effect of ‘patronage’ whilst maintaining a formal distance. Additional funding comes from private donors. According to investigations by the German media, there is a network of entrepreneurs and foundations sympathetic to right-wing ideas and willing to support them financially. At the same time, funds often pass through cultural, educational or ‘civil society’ projects, which makes it considerably more difficult to track and monitor them. In a number of cases, this involves the creation of an alternative infrastructure in the form of publishing houses, think tanks and media platforms that form the ideological basis for youth movements.
Since the early 2020s, the role of crowdfunding and digital platforms has grown significantly. Online donations have become one of the key sources of income, generated through streaming services, paid subscriptions to Telegram channels, and fundraising under the guise of ‘civil initiatives’. This model makes funding more decentralised, flexible and less vulnerable to state control, allowing funds to be quickly raised for specific campaigns or actions. Finally, commercial activities play an important role. Far-right movements actively develop their own brands, selling clothing bearing their symbols, books, magazines and tickets to events. These practices serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, they provide a stable financial flow; on the other, they act as a tool for spreading ideology and strengthening group identity among young people.
Today, the international links between far-right youth movements form an extensive transnational network that has long extended beyond the borders of individual states. In Europe, stable channels of communication have been established between groups from Germany, France, Italy and Eastern European countries. These structures coordinate activities, exchange strategies for street and media mobilisation, distribute video content and propaganda materials, and maintain contacts at the activist level. For instance, the French movement ‘Génération Identitaire’ (dissolved by the authorities in 2021 but retaining its influence online) has become one of the ideological hubs whose approaches have been adopted in Germany and Austria. In turn, German initiatives linked to the AfD and its youth wing are having a noticeable influence on right-wing groups in Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states. So-called ‘ideological export’ plays a particular role. The concepts of the ‘New Right’ developed in France, including the emphasis on cultural identity and ‘metapolitics’, are being actively adapted by German youth organisations and subsequently spread further east across Europe. Examples of such interconnected structures include the Austrian movement ‘Identitäre Bewegung Österreich’ and the Italian organisation ‘CasaPound’, which maintain contacts with German and French activists and participate in joint actions and media projects.
Online globalisation has been the key factor enabling this transnational nature. Social media platforms have effectively erased borders, and young people in different countries consume the same content, engage in the same discussions and quickly adopt radical narratives. The result is a unified information space in which local movements become part of a flexible, decentralised and rapidly mobilisable pan-European network.
The rise of right-wing extremism in Germany is already clearly reflected in official statistics, and this is particularly evident in the education sector. According to regional authorities, the number of right-wing extremist incidents in German schools has risen significantly over the past two years. In Saxony, for instance, the number rose from 149 cases in 2023 to 245 in 2025; in Thuringia from 113 to 198; in Hesse from 39 to 159; and in Berlin from 74 to 126. This includes both the spread of extremist symbols and propaganda, as well as cases of threats, attacks and organised harassment motivated by ethnic or political hatred. Against this backdrop, public reaction is also intensifying. In April 2026, thousands of people took to the streets in mass protests against the far right in Germany’s largest cities, from Berlin to Hamburg and Munich. These demonstrations became one of the largest civil protests and demonstrated growing public concern. However, political confrontation is also intensifying at the same time. Extremist ideas are penetrating ever deeper into schools, universities and youth circles, shaping a new generation of political radicals. German society is increasingly splitting into opposing camps: liberal and nationalist, whilst the debate over a possible ban on ‘Alternative for Germany’ is shifting from a marginal idea to a real political issue, the consequences of which could set a precedent for the whole of Europe.