Until 2020, Armenia remained one of the most Russia-dependent states in the South Caucasus. However, its defeat in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent events dramatically changed the situation.
In 2023, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan publicly declared that Armenia’s exclusive reliance on Russia for security matters had been a “strategic mistake.” After this, Yerevan intensified cooperation with the EU, expanded ties with France, began distancing itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and approved the expansion of the European Union’s observer mission. The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) became particularly painful for Moscow. By 2025, its personnel had grown from around 100 to approximately 200 observers. In response, Russian media and Telegram channels began promoting the narrative that European observers were “NATO spies” and that Armenia was turning into an “anti-Russian bridgehead.”
By 2026, Armenia had become one of the main targets of Russian influence campaigns in the post-Soviet space. The direct reasons were the rapid deterioration of relations between Yerevan and Moscow, Armenia’s deepening cooperation with the EU and France, and the gradual withdrawal of Armenians from Russia’s political orbit. Another significant factor that intensified Russian information operations was the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia, scheduled for June 7, 2026.
A key feature of these Russian operations was their disguise as independent investigations. Instead of open propaganda, audiences were offered the format of “exposés” allegedly based on leaked documents, insider testimonies, and corruption schemes. The network “Storm-1516,” linked to Russian influence structures and the former “troll factory” of Yevgeny Prigozhin, played a central role in operations against Armenia. By 2026, this network had evolved into a full-fledged transnational infrastructure for information warfare, combining classical propaganda tools, cyber operations, and artificial intelligence technologies.
The foundation of these operations consisted of pseudo-journalistic investigations styled as publications from reputable Western media outlets. They appeared on clone websites mimicking the visual style of BBC, France24, Euronews, Politico, and others. In some cases, real journalists only learned about their “participation” in these investigations after the publications had already gone viral on Telegram and X/Twitter. At the same time, “Storm-1516” actively used AI tools to create synthetic content. According to the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center, in the first quarter of 2026 alone, the network disseminated over a thousand AI-generated videos and deepfake materials. Content was produced almost daily and included falsified document “leaks,” fake audio recordings, AI-generated photos, and videos featuring actors or digital avatars posing as “witnesses,” “insiders,” and “whistleblowers.”
Researchers have noted that “Storm-1516” employed the principle of “influence laundering”: a fake would first be published on an obscure platform or pseudo-human rights website, then spread through Telegram channels, and later amplified by networks of affiliated accounts on X/Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube. In the final stage, pro-Kremlin media and political commentators would pick up the materials, creating the illusion of widespread international discussion.
A special place in this system belongs to the “Foundation to Battle Injustice,” an organization established in 2021 that positions itself as a human rights structure. Formally, the foundation protects victims of “Western repression,” but investigations by CivilNet, FIP.am, NewsGuard, and Clemson University have shown that its main activity is the dissemination of disinformation and fabricated investigations. The foundation is headed by Mira Terada (Oksana Vovk), who was previously convicted in the United States for money laundering. Researchers link the organization to Prigozhin’s network and the infrastructure of the Internet Research Agency. Many fake investigations targeting Armenian politicians were published through this foundation.
By 2026, analysts recorded a sharp increase in the intensity of “Storm-1516” operations. According to Bloomberg and Meduza, in the first quarter of 2026, the volume of materials produced by the network nearly doubled compared to the same period in 2025. The campaigns also became increasingly technological, using AI-generated personas, automated bot farms, and sophisticated methods to conceal the origin of the content.
In 2025–2026, one of the main directions of Russian information attacks against the Armenian authorities was a campaign claiming that the government was preparing to “cede Armenian lands to Azerbaijan.” The first publications appeared on the Turkish site ODATV, after which the information spread massively through Russian Telegram channels, anonymous English-language websites, and networks of accounts on X/Twitter posing as “independent analysts” and “South Caucasus insiders.” The materials alleged that Nikol Pashinyan’s government was conducting secret negotiations with Baku and Ankara on new territorial concessions in exchange for Western support. Within days, messages about the “surrender of lands” were actively circulated in Armenian, Russian, and English. Investigations by Armenpress and the Gnida Project revealed signs of a coordinated information operation, including dozens of accounts synchronously posting identical messages, the use of bot networks, and profiles created just weeks before the campaign began. The main goal was to portray Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as a “traitor to national interests” acting in the interests of Turkey and the West.
In spring 2025, the “Foundation to Battle Injustice” published a piece presented as an “international anti-corruption investigation” into the family of Nikol Pashinyan. It claimed that the prime minister’s relatives were receiving illegal income, his inner circle was embezzling budget funds, state contracts were distributed through bribes, and his daughter was involved in financial fraud and illegal enrichment schemes. However, a subsequent investigation by the Armenian outlet CivilNet found that a significant portion of the “evidence” had been fabricated. Journalists discovered that links to Transparency International were fake, quotes from international organizations had never been published, statistics were distorted, and some documents showed signs of AI generation. Despite being exposed, the publication continued to spread actively through Telegram channels, pro-Russian platforms, and anonymous X/Twitter accounts — evidence, researchers say, of a coordinated information operation.
In the summer of 2025, one of the most resonant Russian information operations was a campaign alleging a secret agreement between the French company Orano and Armenian authorities to store radioactive waste in Armenia. The story claimed that Yerevan had agreed to accept French nuclear waste in exchange for a €1.6 million bribe, with storage planned in one of the country’s national parks with the help of Pashinyan’s entourage. The material first appeared on the site CourrierFrance24, a clone mimicking French media that used stolen names and photos of real French journalists. It was then widely disseminated through Telegram channels and sites linked to Russian influence networks. Neither French authorities nor the Armenian government confirmed the existence of such a contract. Subsequent investigations showed that the documents used were falsified, signatures forged, and some files exhibited signs of AI generation. Analysts note that the goal was to discredit the Armenian leadership with corruption allegations and undermine strategic cooperation between Armenia and France, which Moscow views as a threat to its influence in the South Caucasus.
Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Alen Simonyan also became a target of Russian information campaigns. In 2025–2026, publications circulated via Telegram channels, anonymous websites, and X/Twitter accounts alleging the existence of Simonyan’s “pedo-empire.” The materials included fake correspondence, allegedly leaked internal documents, accusations of sexual crimes, and highly emotional language designed to generate maximum public outrage. Some publications were presented as “investigations by international journalists,” although later analysis revealed signs of coordinated dissemination through affiliated accounts and proxy media.
Information security analysts point out that the use of sexual kompromat has been a classic tool of Russian active measures since Soviet times. Such campaigns rely on the principle of “emotional shock” — even without evidence, accusations of sexual crimes spread rapidly on social media, stir up the audience, and undermine trust in politicians. In Armenia’s case, attacks on Simonyan formed part of a broader strategy to discredit the country’s pro-Western leadership and create an atmosphere of constant political scandal.
Another persistent theme in Russian information operations in Armenia has been the so-called American biological laboratories. In 2025–2026, the “Foundation to Battle Injustice” and affiliated platforms spread materials claiming that the United States was conducting biological experiments on Armenian territory, testing “military psychostimulants,” and using the local population as test subjects. The publications alleged that experiments were being performed on children, pregnant women, and people with disabilities, and that Armenia was gradually turning into a “NATO testing ground” for secret military-biological programs. Armenian fact-checking organizations and independent journalists later established that the “evidence” was nonexistent, sources remained anonymous, and the materials were based on a system of cross-referencing within a network of proxy sites linked to Russian disinformation infrastructure. Despite numerous debunkings, the biolaboratory theme continued to be used to fuel anti-Western sentiment, discredit Armenia’s cooperation with the US and NATO, and reinforce the narrative that the country was losing its sovereignty under Western influence.
Today, Armenia has become a kind of testing ground for new Russian information warfare technologies, which may later be deployed in other countries in Europe and the post-Soviet space. This is why fabricated “anti-corruption investigations” have become one of Russia’s most effective tools in modern hybrid warfare. Their main danger lies in the fact that these operations do not work through direct propaganda, but through the destruction of trust in politics, journalism, the state, and facts themselves.